Transnational organizations and the Cold War

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Many actors crowd the stage of Cold War history: political leaders, mass movements, economic and military forces, ideologies, technologies, cultures, and identities. The role of transnational organizations may seem minor by comparison. Yet much evidence suggests that these groups helped keep the Cold War from turning into a hot war and contributed to the peaceful resolution of the East–West conflict and the nuclear arms race that represented its most dangerous component. Transnational contacts often contributed to an atmosphere conducive to the improvement of East–West relations, and sometimes transnational activists influenced specific decisions of governments by, for example, suggesting particular initiatives to resolve conflicts or move forward stalled negotiations.

Transnational relations have been defined as “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization.” The concept is intended to capture the phenomenon that many have observed of ordinary citizens involving themselves in issues that used to be the exclusive preserve of governments, or promoting new issues, such as the environment or human rights, onto the agenda of interstate relations. Such citizen-activists formed networks across borders, established sister-city relationships, and engaged in “track-two diplomacy” as an alternative to the official negotiations of government diplomats. The definition also encompasses regular interactions between state agents of one country and people of no official status in another, or between former and/or future government officials. During the Cold War, some government officials both in Moscow and in Washington maintained good contacts with their own transnational activists and sometimes those of the other side. Soviet and US officials alike tried to influence the activists – most notably participants in the European peace movements of the 1980s – but by and large organizations managed to maintain their independence.

The broadest coverage of transnational organizations during the Cold War would consider the role of such groups as Oxfam in disaster relief, Amnesty International in the promotion of human rights, and the International Committee of the Red Cross in monitoring compliance with the laws of war. This chapter is more narrowly focused on issues of “high politics” – the military and arms-control policies of the superpowers, particularly concerning nuclear weapons, and their involvement in regional conflicts. Many of the organizations discussed included members from or maintained branches in many countries, but the efforts of those organizations were targeted primarily at the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies. US and Soviet transnational activists cut a high profile in this account, but citizens of other countries figure as well.

In the context of the Soviet Union, the notion of a “nonstate agent” is somewhat problematic, given the dominant role of the Communist Party in the country’s political life and its supervision over all foreign contacts. Yet even organizations whose Soviet members required official approval of the Communist Party provided opportunities for informal exchange of ideas that deviated from and in some cases ultimately influenced official policy. On the US side as well, many participants in nongovernmental organizations who were acting ostensibly as individuals maintained close ties to, and sometimes sought approval from, their government. For both the US and Soviet governments, the high-level contacts typically enhanced the credibility of these otherwise “ordinary citizens.”

3 These activities were so widespread by the late 1980s that the Center for Innovative Diplomacy in California began publishing a quarterly Bulletin of Municipal Foreign Policy to report on them. On the Soviet case, see David D. Newsom (ed.), Private Diplomacy with the Soviet Union (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987); and Gale Warner and Michael Shuman, Citizen Diplomats (New York: Continuum, 1987).
Numerous organizations constituted the network of transnational relations during the Cold War. Some adopted names explicitly, even ponderously, describing their activities: the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat; the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control; International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. Others went by more mysterious names, often meaningful to few beyond the participants themselves: Chautauqua, Dartmouth, Pugwash.

Origins of East–West transnationalism

The heyday of transnational influence on Soviet foreign and security policy came during the period of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in the second half of the 1980s. Some important initiatives, however, date back to the mid-1950s, with the death of Iosif Stalin and the onset of the thaw associated with his successor Nikita Khrushchev. For the shestidesiatniki, the “children of the sixties” inspired by Khrushchev-era reformist politics, two events signaled the opening to the outside world and the possibility for forging transnational contacts. They represented themes that persisted throughout the rest of the Cold War era: the importance of recognizing a common humanity and the value of maintaining nongovernmental communication across international borders. The first event was a visit to Moscow State University in June 1955 by Jawaharl Nehru, the prime minister of India, and representative of the newly emerging Non-Aligned movement. Nehru’s linking of the “question of peace to the preservation and progress of all human civilization” made a big impression on a young law student in attendance named Mikhail Gorbachev. The second event was the World Festival of Youth, held in Moscow during the summer of 1957. In the words of Aleksei Adzhubei, Khrushchev’s son-in-law and then editor of Komsomol’skaja pravda, the newspaper of the Young Communist League, “if the first of these events – the visit of Nehru – ‘personified the new, ‘open’ diplomacy, the second was a step towards an open society, a manifestation of the faith of youth in a better future and the faith in youth’ on the part of the authorities.” Another Russian observer explained that the festival “was significant in that it allowed

5 See David Priestland’s chapter in volume 1.
6 Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizni i reformy [Life and Reforms], 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1998), vol. 1, 73.
7 Aleksei Adzhubei, Te den’ i let’ [Those Ten Years] (Moscow: Sovetskaja Rossiia, 1989), 179 (emphasis added for clarity).

Muscovites to see and even speak with foreigners for the first time in decades.” In fact, wrote the historian Roi Medvedev, it was the first time “in the history of the USSR that so many guests from other countries had come to Moscow,” and the event left a strong impression in the memories of the city’s residents.

Hopes for such broad-scale contacts between ordinary people were ultimately disappointed, but a certain sector of the Soviet elite did manage to pursue relations with their foreign counterparts. In 1958, for example, the journal Problemy mira i sotsializma (Problems of peace and socialism) was founded in Prague with an international editorial staff of European, US, and Third World Communists. The Soviet members of the staff who edited the journal in the early 1960s read as a Who’s Who of reformist officials and academics who became Gorbachev’s brain trust in the second half of the 1980s: Georgii Arbatov, Oleg Bogomolov, Anatolii Cherniaev, Gennadii Gerasimov, and Georgii Shakhnazarov, among many others. Contacts with foreigners, even if fellow Communists, opened the eyes and minds of the Soviet participants and made them early supporters of ending the Cold War and the arms race.

The post-Stalin era also witnessed the birth of one of the most prominent transnational organizations, the Conference on Science and World Affairs, known as the Pugwash Movement, after the estate in Nova Scotia where it held its first meeting in 1957. It was primarily an organization of scientists interested in issues of public policy, in the first instance the US–Soviet nuclear arms race. If the post-Stalin thaw provided the political preconditions for a transnational dialogue of scientists, developments in nuclear technology provided the stimulus. By 1954, both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed and tested thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs or H-bombs), with the potential for explosive power thousands of times greater than the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Responding to the alarm caused by radioactive fallout from nuclear tests, Prime Minister Nehru “called

scientists could play in reducing the risk of war. He also endorsed direct bilateral contacts between Soviet and US scientists. His thinking on this issue was influenced by his relationship with Leo Szilard – one of the leading atomic physicists and an immigrant to the United States from Hungary. Szilard had been in contact with Topchiev about organizing a US-Soviet discussion. In a private meeting in New York, Khrushchev promised Topchiev that Topchiev would make all the necessary arrangements. 

Because illness prevented Szilard from taking an active role at this point beyond securing Khrushchev’s blessing, he recommended that Topchiev deal with a group of scientists led by Paul Doty, a Harvard chemistry professor. Their efforts were supported by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which established a Committee on International Studies of Arms Control in March 1961. It became the main vehicle for promoting the bilateral discussions which became known, among the US organizers, as the Soviet–American Disarmament Study group or SADS. In late November 1961, Topchiev sent a cable to Doty conveying Soviet acceptance of SADS. In the meantime, the bilateral scheme nearly foundered for lack of support on the US side. The Ford Foundation, which initially expressed interest, made financial support for the venture contingent on written approval from the administration of John F. Kennedy. William Foster, the director of the newly created Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), was initially hostile to the idea of a bilateral study group. After two discussions with Doty, he offered to endorse the undertaking only if ACDA were given veto power over selection of the US participants. Doty and his colleagues were not willing to go that far. Foster eventually signed a statement, drafted essentially by Doty’s committee, which fell short of an endorsement; it expressed confidence that the group would “act as responsible private citizens and scientists,” but were “not official spokesmen in any sense whatever.” The Ford Foundation finally awarded the grant to fund SADS in April 1963. 

Bilateral contacts during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years

The original signatories of the manifesto, from Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Poland, and the United States, were soon joined by Soviet scientists – most prominently Academician Aleksandr Topchiev. Topchiev, a senior official in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, became head of the Soviet Pugwash Committee. The Soviet leadership initially favored creating an alternative international organization that would be dominated by Communists sympathetic to Soviet policies, as it sought to do at the mass level with the World Peace Council. Soon, however, Khrushchev came to appreciate the role that a transnational dialogue with independent foreign
 Whereas the Soviet–American Disarmament Study group emerged as a spinoff from the larger, multinational Pugwash Movement, the Dartmouth Conferences originated specifically as a bilateral US–Soviet project. The Dartmouth initiative arose from a conversation between Norman Cousins, editor of the popular Saturday Review of Literature, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower, whom Cousins had first met in 1951. In Cousins’s recollection, “Eisenhower’s basic idea was that private citizens who had the confidence of their government could serve as an advanced guard for diplomats,” elucidating disagreements and exploring possible solutions that the two governments were not yet willing to accept. Cousins promoted the idea of such a conference on a visit to Moscow in 1959, and with subsequent Soviet agreement, the first meeting was held on the campus of Dartmouth College, in Hanover, New Hampshire, in October 1960. The Ford Foundation provided initial funding, but later the Kettering Foundation became the main institutional sponsor of the Dartmouth Conferences. Over the years, the roster of regular participants fit Eisenhower’s expectations of prominent personalities, close to their government, and there was some subsequent Soviet agreement, the first meeting was held on the campus of Dartmouth College, in Hanover, New Hampshire, in October 1960. The Ford Foundation provided initial funding, but later the Kettering Foundation became the main institutional sponsor of the Dartmouth Conferences. Over the years, the roster of regular participants fit Eisenhower’s expectations of prominent personalities, close to their government, and there was some overlap with members of the Pugwash and SADS organizations. Given Dartmouth’s increasing focus on “task forces,” particularly to discuss regional conflicts, specialists on the Middle East, such as Evgenii Primakov and Vitalii Naumkin on the Soviet side, and Harold Saunders and Robert Neumann on the US side, were especially valuable participants. When Dartmouth meetings were held in the Soviet Union, one regular US attendee – David Rockefeller – occasionally found himself invited to visit top leaders such as Khrushchev or Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin to talk about matters such as East–West trade.

Despite Khrushchev’s forced retirement in October 1964, and the end of the thaw in Soviet culture and politics, his successors continued to support unofficial bilateral and multilateral discussions on security issues. Indeed, the first half-decade of the Leonid Brezhnev era (as we might call the period extending until Gorbachev came into office in March 1985) marked a high point in the activities of the transnational scientists’ movement. Pugwash convened some twenty-five conferences, workshops, and symposia in the five years between the end of Khrushchev’s rule and the first session of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in November 1969.19 The early Brezhnev period also witnessed the most intense bilateral interchange between Soviet and US scientists, as the Soviet–American Disarmament Study group pursued the work begun during the last year of Khrushchev’s tenure.20 This era also saw what is generally considered the most impressive achievement of the transnational disarmament community: official US and Soviet acceptance of the value of mutual limitations on antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses and the ABM Treaty of 1972 that formalized that acceptance.

Western partisans of the Pugwash movement have long argued that the interchange between scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain generated important ideas that found their way into formal arms-control treaties, contributed to an improvement in East–West relations, and helped avert a nuclear war. The Norwegian Nobel Committee drew a similar conclusion when it awarded its Peace Prize to Pugwash and its longtime director, Joseph Rotblat, in 1995. Scholarly assessments have been more cautious, describing cases of success as well as failure in the Pugwash scientists’ efforts to influence Soviet and US policy.21

The partial opening of Soviet-era archives has allowed for some evaluation of the impact on Soviet decisionmaking of the scientists’ arguments. It has also yielded some self-assessments by Soviet Pugwashites. In September 1972, for example, Mikhail Millionshchikov, then chair of the Soviet Pugwash delegation, drafted a report to the ruling presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in anticipation of the fifteenth anniversary of the Pugwash movement. Millionshchikov clearly wanted to impress the academy officials enough to encourage them to continue sponsoring the Soviet delegation. He wrote: “In fifteen years the participants of this movement have examined many important proposals having substantial significance for the resolution of problems of disarmament and the achievement of a reduction in international tensions. Several of these proposals later became subjects of examination at

20 On the origins of the SADS group, see Bernd W. Kubbig, “Communicators in the Cold War: The Pugwash Conferences, the US-Soviet Study Group and the ABM Treaty,” PRIF Reports No. 44, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (Frankfurt am Main, Germany, October 1996).
the government level and were used in working out international agreements and treaties.” Among the agreements that, in Millionshchikov’s view, resulted from Pugwash proposals, he lists the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the limited test-ban treaty, international agreements banning the deployment of weapons of mass destruction on the ocean floor, the biological weapons convention, the ABM treaty, and SALT I.24

Even accounting for hyperbole, Millionshchikov’s list of what he considers Pugwash’s accomplishments is impressive. Perhaps more interesting is that Millionshchikov valued Pugwash – and particularly the bilateral Soviet-American meetings – for exactly the same reasons his US colleagues did: the unofficial nature of the discussions, the importance of personal contacts, the common language and way of approaching problems that the Soviet and US scientists seemed to share, and the prospect that insights and ideas from the discussions would reach governments: “The importance of the Pugwash meetings consists precisely in the fact that a dialogue takes place there between people who know the problems well and who can unofficially inform those government bodies which deal with these problems through state-to-state channels.” He stressed the participation at past Pugwash meetings of US presidential advisers such as George Kistiakowsky, Jerome Wiesner, Walt Rostow, and Henry Kissinger.23

The end of détente and the revival of transnationalism

By the beginning of the second decade of Brezhnev’s rule – the mid-1970s – the transnational activists’ successes had virtually put them out of business. Arms negotiations between the superpowers became a normal part of their relations and were handled by professional diplomats and politicians, working full-time, rather than by scientists and other “amateurs.” By the end of the 1970s, however, neither side’s expectations about détente had been fulfilled. The desire on the part of some Soviet leaders to use détente as an excuse for reducing Soviet military spending proved futile. Arms control, even at its most successful, had done little to restrain the costs of the arms race. From the perspective of the US government, attempts to use détente to impose a code of conduct on Soviet behavior in the Third World were equally discouraging. Two events in December 1979 epitomized the dual disappointments of détente: the decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deploy a new generation of US intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The sharp deterioration of East–West relations inspired the transnational amateurs to reactivate their contacts.24

Participants in the Dartmouth Conferences had considerable experience of working during periods of US-Soviet tension. Indeed, one of its early meetings took place in October 1962, in the midst of the Cuban missile crisis. Topics at Dartmouth meetings over the years included the Vietnam War, US involvement in Central America, Soviet intervention in Angola, and prospects for peace in the Middle East. In the 1980s, Soviet policy in Afghanistan became a regular topic of discussion. Soviet participants came to understand the seriousness of official US concern about the matter, persuaded by US interlocutors who had earned their trust over the course of many years.25

Although transnational efforts to promote disarmament slackened in the 1970s as the United States and the USSR pursued formal negotiations on arms control, many of the networks had remained in place. Doty, for example, continued to pursue discussions on arms control in the context of the Dartmouth Conferences, even as the activities of his Soviet-American Disarmament Study group ceased. Other US scientists maintained contacts with Soviet counterparts both professionally in pursuit of their scholarly research and politically as they supported colleagues, such as Andrei Sakharov, Iuri Orlov, and others, who had become persecuted as dissidents.26

The deterioration of East–West relations in the late 1970s, the failure of the United States to ratify the SALT II treaty, and especially the bellicose policies of President Ronald Reagan’s administration in the early 1980s revived the transnational linkages of the past and created new ones.

During the 1980s, the main actors on the Soviet side were scientists affiliated with various institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences who formally organized themselves into the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace.

23 Ibid., esp. 9-10.
24 For background on the demise of détente in the 1970s, see the chapters in this volume by Nancy Mitchell, Olav Njolstad, and Vladislav M. Zubok.
25 Voorhees, Dialogue Sustained.

years later the second official, Anatolii Cherniaev, became Mikhail Gorbachev’s top aide for international affairs and a strong advocate of the ‘new thinking’ on foreign policy.28

Starting in the 1970s, another professional group began to play a role similar to that of the scientists: medical doctors. In the United States, physicians had been active in the movement for a nuclear-test ban in the early 1960s, prompted by concerns about the health consequences of nuclear testing and of nuclear war itself. Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) was founded in Boston in 1961 and was reinvigorated at the end of the 1970s.29 By December 1980, PSR had “gone transnational,” when physicians from the United States and the Soviet Union met in Geneva to found the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), an organization that eventually came to include some 200,000 members in eighty countries and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985. The award recognized the important contributions IPPNW had made in promoting a transnational dialogue on the threat of nuclear war.30 Among its achievements were the first uncensored television broadcasts in the Soviet Union detailing the consequences of a nuclear war — secured through the intercession of Brezhnev’s personal physician years before Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost liberalized the media. Indeed, much of the success of the international physicians’ movement in influencing the Soviet leadership is owed to the relationship between two of the world’s leading cardiologists, Bernard Lown of Harvard and Evgenii Chazov, the “Kremlin doctor.”

While the transnational physicians’ movement set the moral tone for new disarmament efforts in the early 1980s, the transnational coalition of scientists explored practical measures for slowing the arms race. One of the key figures

28 The first official, Sergei Trapeznikov, was a notorious Stalinist and opponent of most reforms, internal and external. See Cherniaev, Moia zhizn’ i moe vissia, 241, 248-49; and Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchov and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchov through the Eyes of His Adviser, trans. by Daphne Skillen (New York: Scribner’s, 1991), 238-39. Cherniaev was well suited to support the renewal of transnational contacts between scientists. His first published article was an obituary of Professor Frederic Joliot-Curie, the famous French physicist and original signatory of the Russell–Einstein Manifesto that founded the Pugwash movement; see Cherniaev, Moia zhizn’ i moe vissia, 227.


in the Soviet scientists' movement of the 1980s was Evgenii Velikhov, a nuclear and plasma physicist, head of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, and a vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences from 1977. His role was very much like Millionshchikov's of a decade earlier. As an academy official, Velikhov was in a good position to organize research projects and conferences in the Soviet Union as well as maintain international contacts. With some background in military research, and a particular expertise in lasers, he maintained a certain degree of credibility among those Soviet officials skeptical of efforts at disarmament. In 1982, Velikhov became head of the Soviet delegation to the meetings of CISAC. He took over in the wake of the death of Nikolai Inozemtsev, the previous head. Inozemtsev had been a social scientist, director of the Institute for the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), a veteran of the Prague group around the journal Problemy mira i sotsializma. Because Brezhnev had great respect for him, Inozemtsev played a major role in promoting East–West détente within the Soviet Union. 31

When Velikhov took over the CISAC delegation, he wanted to involve more scientists and asked Roald Sagdeev to join. Sagdeev, another prominent plasma physicist, directed the USSR's Space Research Institute and was particularly active in discussions on the militarization of space. He took over as chair of the Soviet delegation in 1986 and served until 1990. In 1987, he invited Andrei Sakharov, recently released from internal exile in Gorkii on Gorbachev's orders, to join the group and attend the October 1987 CISAC meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania. 32

Several other scientists played particularly important roles in the early 1980s. Andrei Kokoshin was trained as an engineer at the Bauman Institute in Moscow before pursuing a career in politics and history. He became deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada (ISKAN), headed by Georgii Arbatov. The son and grandson of military officers, Kokoshin served as an important link to reformers in the Soviet armed forces. Aleksei Arbatov, son of the ISKAN director, worked as a political scientist at IMEMO, and was a strong advocate of developing a cadre of knowledgeable civilian analysts competent to propose alternatives to official military policies formulated by the Soviet armed forces. Arbatov and Kokoshin, as political scientists, had long worked on issues related to the arms race – particularly analyses of US and NATO military policy.

In addition to the US-Soviet contacts, the 1980s witnessed a proliferation of transnational relations between various groups and individuals in Europe and the Soviet Union. These included elite-level contacts, as represented most notably by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, or the Palme Commission, as it was often called after its chair, the late Swedish prime minister Olof Palme. Links between Soviet academics and officials and members of West European social democratic and "Eurocommunist" parties (especially in Italy) proved important for the transmission of ideas. 33

Although its impact did not become evident until Gorbachev came into office in 1985, the Palme Commission did much of its work during the late Brezhnev era. The commission intended to do for the area of international security what the Brandt Commission on North–South relations had done for international economic development: present a thorough assessment of the current state of affairs and proposals to address it. The Palme Commission’s work began in 1980 and continued through the next several years of deteriorating US–Soviet relations and increasing concerns about the risks of nuclear war. The commission consisted, in addition to the chair, of sixteen prominent political figures from as many countries throughout the world. Former US secretary of state Cyrus Vance participated, as did Academician Georgii Arbatov from the Soviet Union. Retired general Mikhail Mil'shtein. Arbatov’s colleague at the Institute of the USA and Canada, served as an adviser. 34

The Palme Commission took advantage of the fact that its leading members were former politicians and government officials. When the commission convened in Moscow in June 1981, for example, Olof Palme held a personal meeting with Brezhnev. 35 During a plenary session, the Commission

32 Author interview with Roald Sagdeev, College Park, MD, March 1994.
members held discussions with prominent representatives of the Soviet foreign and military establishments – Soviet first deputy foreign minister Georgii Kornienko and first deputy chief of the General Staff Marshal Sergei Akhромеев. Soviet authorities were already well aware of the Palme foreign and military establishments Soviet first deputy foreign minister Two other forms of transnational activity characterized the later years of the Cold War: the early 1980s witnessed efforts to a continent-wide disarmament movements, such as END, that tried to forge relations with the European peace movement, as envisioned by the founders of the Cold War Disarmament, London, 1980; E. P. Thompson, and Dan Smith (eds.), Beyond the Cold War (New York: Pantheon, 1985); Jean Stead and Danielle Grunberg, Moscow Independent Peace Group (London: Merlin Press, 1982).

Transnational peace movements and citizen diplomacy

Two other forms of transnational activity characterized the later years of the Cold War: the early 1980s witnessed efforts to forge a continent-wide European peace movement, as envisioned by the founders of the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement, which would link concern for peace with the defense of human rights. In the United States, attempts to establish direct contacts between Soviet and US citizens included “sister-city” relationships and large-scale events intended to improve relations between the two countries by having ordinary people get to know each other better.

For Soviet authorities of the Brezhnev period, not all transnational relations were alike. They were particularly suspicious of representatives of popular disarmament movements, such as END, that tried to forge relations with human-rights activists in the East and act independently of any government’s influence. The Soviet government and its official Soviet Peace Committee evidently appreciated the efforts of European activists against the deployment of US Pershing II and cruise missiles to Europe in the early 1980s. But END’s criticism of Soviet SS-20 missiles was unwelcome. Evidence from the archives of the East German Staatssicherheitsdienst (Stasi) and elsewhere reveal efforts, similar to those of the 1950s, to influence Western peace movements to adopt a more pro-Soviet position. The controversy over deployment of the so-called enhanced-radiation weapon, or neutron bomb, provided an opportunity in 1978. The Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) and the Stasi transferred funds to West European Communists and sympathizers active in peace movements, particularly in the Netherlands and West Germany. Efforts to influence the West European peace movements to adopt a pro-Soviet line, or even refrain from criticizing Soviet weapons programs, proved largely unsuccessful. In the Netherlands, for example, agents targeted the Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad, the Interchurch Peace Council or IKV, the largest Dutch peace organization. Yet the IKV defied Soviet wishes by denouncing the SS-20 missiles along with their NATO counterparts. Revelations from Stasi files created a sensation in Britain in 1999 when it was revealed that various figures in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the END movement were paid Stasi informants. The news came as no surprise, however, to the more independent-minded activists of the British peace movement. One informant “outed” by the archival documents, for example, was Vic Allen, an academic at the University of Leeds, a prominent CND activist. Yet Allen, a member of the British Communist Party, was well known for his sympathies towards the Soviet Union. As British home secretary Jack Straw (who as a law student at was well acquainted with Allen) put it in a parliamentary debate when the scandal broke, “it was obvious beyond a peradventure that he was an apologist for the East German regime and all its works, and we did not need the Stasi to tell us that 30 years later.” According to Joan Ruddock, a Labour MP and former chair of CND, it was precisely Allen’s pro-Soviet positions that limited his efforts to influence the organization to tilt toward Moscow. As she recalled in an interview in 1999, “CND was an open, democratic organisation and our opposition to Soviet weapons meant we would never have gone in that direction.” Indeed, Ruddock demonstrated the popularity of the independent position when she defeated Allen in a vote for the CND leadership in 1985. As she explained, “he certainly had no influence on national CND, and as a pro-Soviet could never have succeeded to the chair.”
If the Soviet authorities were disappointed in their inability to sway West European activists toward a pro-Soviet position, they were downright alarmed about Western efforts to support independent peace activists in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Forging contacts with organizations such as Moscow's Trust Group and Hungary's Peace Group for Dialogue became a major focus of the activities of END and the Dutch IKV, for example.41 The Hungarian authorities allowed the Dialogue group to exist for a time, according to Mary Kaldor, a prominent END leader, "because Western peace activists convinced Hungarian officials that the existence of an independent peace movement in the East would help in the campaign against new missile deployments." In 1984, however, once the United States succeeded in deploying its new missiles despite popular protests, the Hungarian government broke up the independent peace group.42

41 De Graaf, "Detente from Below."


bilateral programs for scientific collaboration, also constituted forms of transnational contact between citizens of each country.\footnote{Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003); Carl Kaysen, chair, US National Academy of Sciences, Review of US–USSR Intercalamy Exchanges and Relations (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1977).}

Assessments of transnational influence

In his comprehensive study of the Dartmouth Conferences, James Voorhees suggests that there are two ways of assessing the impact of transnational organizations on the policy of governments: “by examining either the direct influence by such communities on state policy or their indirect influence, that is, their ability to influence the climate of opinion in which policy is made.”\footnote{Voorhees, Dialogue Sustained, 333.} Many of the transnational organizations active in East–West relations enjoyed one or both kinds of influence. The international physicians’ movement, for example, by broadcasting its annual conferences uncensored and in full on Soviet television, raised awareness of the nuclear peril not only among the populace at large, but also among elite policymakers.\footnote{Soviet officials interviewed in Steven Kull, Burying Lenin: The Revolution in Soviet Ideology and Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), 18.} Gorbachev alluded to the effect of such “consciousness-raising” when he presented IPPNW copresident Bernard Lown a copy of the 1987 INF Treaty eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles. He inscribed it as follows: “Dear Bernard! I want to thank you for your enormous contribution in preventing nuclear war. Without it and other powerful antinuclear initiatives, it is unlikely that this treaty would have come about.”\footnote{Matthew Evangelista, Unearmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 376.} Voorhees argues that the Dartmouth meetings also deserve credit for convincing the Soviet side of the possibility of a deal on intermediate-range forces, despite the seemingly propagandistic nature of Reagan’s initial “zero-option” proposal. He also points to a number of specific instances of influence on matters related to the Middle East. It is not unreasonable to argue that the Dartmouth process, with its years of joint exploration of regional conflict resolution, and the Afghan war in particular, made it easier for the Soviet side to contemplate the withdrawal of its troops from that country, eventually implemented under Gorbachev’s insistence.

A number of other important arms-control initiatives would be hard to explain without taking into account the role of transnational organizations. For a long time, Reagan’s pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) posed a stumbling block to Soviet negotiators who were unwilling to make reductions in offensive nuclear forces at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) as long as the United States sought to build a defensive “shield.” US activists, such as Jeremy Stone and Frank von Hippel, convinced Gorbachev that, if nuclear disarmament went forward, it would undermine US popular support for building expensive and technically dubious defense systems. Under their influence, Gorbachev ordered the “de-linking” of the talks on intermediate and strategic forces and paved the way for the success of the INF and START treaties.\footnote{Ibid., ch. 15.} The unprecedented degree of onsite inspection of military bases and production facilities mandated by those treaties also owes a substantial debt to transnational activism. The very first onsite verification of a Soviet arms-control measure was the product of a nongovernmental transnational initiative: in 1986 scientists from the US National Resources Defense Council, Federation of American Scientists, and the Soviet Scientists’ Committee set up seismic monitoring equipment near the Soviet nuclear-test range in Kazakhstan to verify compliance with the unilateral halt to Soviet underground explosions.\footnote{Ibid., chs. 13 and 16.}

Even the transnational links that most discomfited the Soviet leadership starting in the mid-1970s appear to have exerted a certain influence. Daniel Thomas writes, for example, of the Helsinki Watch committees that emerged to call attention to the legal obligations adopted by the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe in the wake of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. By engaging in acts of “civil obedience” – the public exercise of the legal rights that their governments sought to deny them – these activists bolstered the international norms that a reformist Soviet leadership came to recognize as legitimate.\footnote{Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Archie Brown’s chapter in this volume.} These norms even included what Gorbachev and Shevardnadze called “freedom of choice” – the freedom of the peoples of Eastern Europe to choose their form of government and even to decide whether they wanted their countries to belong to the Soviet-dominated military alliance anymore. Backed up by a noninterventionary, “nonoffensive defense” policy and substantial unilateral reductions in Soviet armed forces in Europe – both the brainchildren of transnational activists – Gorbachev’s pledge, made in a
speech to the United Nations in December 1988, gave the green light to the popular movements that brought the Cold War division of Europe to a peaceful end.53

To argue about the influence of transnational organizations on the end of the Cold War is not to ignore other important contributing factors. Those that figure in most explanations include deteriorating Soviet economic performance, the pressures of a US policy of “peace through strength” and the attendant military buildup, and the personalities of key leaders, such as Gorbachev and Reagan.54 The role of even material factors such as military forces and economic conditions is not straightforward, however. Policymakers’ perceptions and values influence how they judge and deal with military threats and economic decline.55

Consider the economy, for example. Gorbachev and his reformist colleagues were undoubtedly motivated by economic concerns, but contrary to a “peace through strength” interpretation, their concern was as much for the overall well-being of the Soviet Union and its citizens as for narrow considerations of military capability. In some respects, the reformers benefited from the perception of economic crisis – it gave a sense of urgency to their efforts – but the economic situation did not determine the nature of Gorbachev’s initiatives. Economic conditions were always poorly correlated with periods of Soviet retrenchment or moderation. The most antagonistic Soviet policies toward the outside world were pursued by Stalin in the early postwar period at a time when the Soviet economy was in ruins. By contrast, a sense of economic optimism during the late 1950s had emboldened Stalin’s forces and economic conditions is not straightforward, however. Policymakers’ perceptions and values influence how they judge and deal with military threats and economic decline.56

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A similar indeterminacy confronts arguments about the effect of US military pressure and the Reagan buildup.56 Political and military leaders rarely agree on the nature of an external threat or the proper means to counter it. The Soviet Union during the Gorbachev years witnessed a wide range of views among policymakers about the degree to which the United States and NATO Europe should be seen as implacable enemies of the USSR and about the wisdom of pursuing unilateral initiatives of restraint in order to win their trust. Many of the ideas for winding down the arms race and ending the Cold War came from transnational networks that brought together Soviet reformers with Western proponents of arms control, disarmament, and human rights. They were not ideas imposed or even advocated by the United States. Indeed, US and NATO military authorities expressed no interest in theories of nonoffensive defense, developed by European peace researchers, and the US government rejected the Soviet Union’s appeals to join its moratorium on nuclear testing (for fear that it might hinder development of nuclear components of an SDI system). Yet these ideas and initiatives captured public attention and provided the normative context for transforming the Cold War relationship, even if they met resistance by hardliners in Gorbachev’s own government. Through his control of the domestic agenda and relying upon the authority of his position as top Communist leader in an extremely hierarchical system, Gorbachev was able to implement, without substantial domestic opposition, the ideas that brought the Cold War to an end.

Transnational actors played an important role in developing and promoting those ideas. Members of the international physicians’ movement sounded the alarm about the health consequences of nuclear war; scientists associated with Pugwash and its bilateral offshoots developed specific proposals for lowering the risks of nuclear confrontation; scholars in peace research institutes promoted far-reaching schemes for nonviolent resolution of the East–West conflict in Europe and the Third World; citizen diplomats fostered cultural and social contacts while peace activists forged transnational links with defenders of human rights. Few foresaw the peaceful end of the Cold War, yet many worked for decades to achieve it. However crowded the stage of Cold War history, transnational actors have earned their place on it.

56 Consider, for example, Beth A. Fischer’s chapter in this volume.


19. Transnational organizations and the Cold War

The activities of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and International Affairs have been documented by its founding member and longtime head, Joseph Rotblat, in Scientists in the Quest for Peace: A History of the Pugwash Conferences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972), in publications of the organization’s proceedings and in accounts drawing on Pugwash archives and interviews with participants. See Sandra Inson Butler, “The Origins of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto,” Pugwash History Series, no. 1 (May 2005), and Bernd W. Kubbig, “Communicators in the Cold War: The Pugwash Conferences, the US-Soviet Study Group and the ABM Treaty,” PRIF Reports, 44, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (Frankurt am Main, Germany, October 1996). Russian accounts include Yu. A. Ryzhov and M. A. Lebedev, “RAS Scientists in the Pugwash Movement,” Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 75, 3 (2005), 271-77.

Bibliographical essay


Aside from the several authors interested in the subject of nuclear weapons and their radioactive contamination consequences, no scholars have explicitly addressed Cold War links to environmental history. Other aspects of the full picture have to be pieced together from fragments found here and there. So any bibliography will have to be long on nuclear weapons, where there is a literature, and short elsewhere.

