our armed forces. He lived in terror of an enemy attack. For him foreign policy meant keeping the antiaircraft units around Moscow on a twenty-four-hour alert.

After Stalin died it was an interesting challenge for us to try to deal with the foreign powers by ourselves. In 1955 we went abroad a number of times to meet with the representatives of the bourgeois states and to feel them out on various issues. Our trip to Geneva that year gave the bourgeois heads of state a chance to look us over. The Geneva meeting was a crucial test for us: Would we be able to represent our country competently? Would we approach the meeting soberly, without unrealistic hopes, and would we be able to keep the other side from intimidating us? All things considered, I would say we passed the test.

A word about the background of the Geneva meetings: Ever since Churchill gave his speech in Fulton calling for the capitalist countries of the world to encircle the Soviet Union, our relations with the West had been strained. I think it was actually Churchill's idea for the Western powers to open lines of communication with the new Soviet Government after Stalin's death and to do so quickly. Churchill believed that the West could take advantage of the fact that the new Soviet Government wasn't yet fully formed and would therefore be more vulnerable to pressure. The Western press was suddenly filled with articles urging a meeting of the four great powers. We, too, were in favor of such a meeting. It was our feeling in the Soviet leadership that after such a bloody war, we and the West could come to terms and agree among ourselves on rational principles of peaceful coexistence and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states.

Through diplomatic channels a place for the meeting, Geneva, and a date in the summer of 1955 were set. By that time Bulganin was already Chairman of the Council of Ministers. I think that one reason we were able to agree to the Geneva meeting at all was that Malenkov had by then been released from his duties as Chairman. As anyone who knew Malenkov will tell you, after Stalin's death he was completely without initiative and completely unpredictable. He was unstable to the point of being dangerous because he was so susceptible to the pressure and influence of others. It was no accident that he had

1. It is interesting to find Khrushchev using the term "encirclement" here. What he is referring to is the American policy of containment inaugurated after the sovietization of a great part of Central and Eastern Europe. From the Soviet side of the hill, defensive containment no doubt looked like potentially offensive encirclement.
I felt at the time of the Geneva meeting that the main thing was to preserve peace, but the Western powers were still reluctant to take even the basic measures necessary for laying the foundations of a secure peace. Therefore the Geneva meeting was probably doomed to failure before it even began. But it was still useful in a number of important respects. For one thing, it gave the leaders of the four great powers an opportunity to see each other at close quarters and to exchange views informally among themselves, usually over dinner after the official sessions.

Unfortunately, our own delegation found itself at a disadvantage from the very moment we landed at the Geneva airport. The leaders of the other three delegations arrived in four-engine planes, and we arrived in a modest two-engine Ilyushin [Il-14]. Their planes were certainly more impressive than ours, and the comparison was somewhat embarrassing.

There was a ceremony in honor of the four delegations at the airport, a military parade followed by an invitation for the head of each delegation to review the troops. An unpleasant incident occurred during this ceremony. Bulganin, as the head of our delegation, was supposed to step forward after the parade and inspect the honor guard. Just before he did so, a Swiss protocol officer suddenly stepped in front of me and stood with his back up against my nose. My first impulse was to shove him out of the way. Later I realized he had done this on the instructions of the Swiss government. He had been told to make sure that I couldn’t step forward with Bulganin to review the troops. I wasn’t permitted to join in that part of the ceremony, so the Swiss government very rudely had that man stand in front of me!

As we drove off to our residences, I noticed that Eisenhower’s bodyguards had to run along behind his car. This struck us as being extremely odd. For a man to keep up with a moving car is no mean trick, nor is it easy for a car to pace itself to a man on foot. Four years later I saw the same thing again when Eisenhower met me at the airport in Washington at the beginning of my visit to America. Once again, there were those hearty fellows from his personal bodyguard running along behind the car in which he drove me back into the city.

The Geneva meeting was not the first time I met Eisenhower. I’d
met him at the end of the war when he came to Moscow and was on the reviewing stand of the Lenin Mausoleum to view the Victory Parade on June 24, 1945. But that had been earlier in our careers, when Eisenhower was a general and I was head of the Ukrainian Party and State. Now, in Geneva ten years later, we met again as representatives of our respective countries. Before we had stood side by side on a reviewing stand together; now we were to sit on opposite sides of the negotiating table from each other.

If I had to compare the two American presidents with whom I dealt — Eisenhower and Kennedy — the comparison would not be in favor of Eisenhower. Our people whose job it was to study Eisenhower closely have told me that they considered him a mediocre military leader and a weak President. He was a good man, but he wasn’t very tough. There was something soft about his character. As I discovered in Geneva, he was much too dependent on his advisors. It was always obvious to me that being President of the United States was a great burden for him.

Our conversations with the American delegation were generally constructive and useful for both parties, although neither side changed its position substantially on any of the issues facing us. The United States in those days refused to make even the most reasonable concessions because John Foster Dulles was still alive. It was he who determined the foreign policy of the United States, not President Eisenhower. To illustrate that statement, I can describe something I observed at a plenary session in Geneva. The heads of all four delegations took turns chairing the plenary sessions, and when Eisenhower’s turn came, there was Dulles at his right. I was on Bulganin’s left, which put me right next to Dulles, or maybe there was an interpreter between us. In any case I watched Dulles making notes with a pencil, tearing them out of a pad, folding them up, and sliding them under President Eisenhower’s hand. Eisenhower would then pick up these sheets of paper, unfold them, and read them before making a decision on any matter that came up. He followed this routine conscientiously, like a dutiful schoolboy taking his lead from his teacher. It was difficult for us to imagine how a chief of state could allow himself to lose face like that in front of delegations from other countries. It certainly appeared that Eisenhower was letting Dulles do his thinking for him.

A word about Dulles. A few years later, when I led the Soviet delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Mr. Nehru asked me about Dulles. Nehru, by the way, was a most attrac-
tive person. He was always smiling and had such a gentle expression on his face. "Tell me, Mr. Khrushchev," he said, "how did you get along with Mr. Dulles in your negotiations in Geneva?" His question didn't surprise me; Nehru knew that Dulles's policies and our own were unalterably opposed. I answered that I had had a chance to talk with Dulles informally over dinner in Geneva and had found him to be a very dry character; we hadn't talked about anything much except what dishes we liked most.

Dulles often said that the goal of the United States was to push Socialism in Europe back to the borders of the Soviet Union, and he seemed to be obsessed with the idea of encirclement. He extended America's economic embargo of the Soviet Union to include a boycott on cultural exchange. Not even Soviet tourists and chess players were permitted to visit the United States. I remember, too, that when the US sponsored some sort of international convention of chefs, our own delegation wasn't allowed to attend.

However, I'll say this for him: Dulles knew how far he could push us, and he never pushed us too far. For instance, when the forces of our two countries confronted each other in the Near East during the events in Syria and Lebanon in 1958, Dulles stepped back from the brink of war. The reactionary forces of the United States and England pulled back their troops, partly under the pressure of world opinion but also partly as a result of Dulles's prudence. The prestige of the Soviet Union was enhanced in all the progressive countries of the world.

When Dulles died, I told my friends that although he had been a man who lived and breathed hatred of Communism and who despised progress, he had never stepped over that brink which he was always lamenting his passing.

Because Eisenhower brought his Secretary of Defense [Charles E. Wilson] with him to Geneva in 1955, we made a point of including our own Minister of Defense, Marshal Zhukov, in our delegation. Zhukov had been a friend of Eisenhower's during the war, and we thought their acquaintance might serve as the basis for conversations that would lead to an easing of the tension between our countries. We hoped that Eisenhower and Zhukov might have a chance to talk alone together and that they would exchange views about the need for peaceful coexistence. But that vicious cur Dulles was always prowling around Eisenhower, snapping at him if he got out of line. Dulles could not tolerate the idea of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union. Eisenhower, however, did give Zhukov a spinning reel and sent personal greetings to Zhukov's wife and daughter; but other than such pleasantries, nothing came of Zhukov's conversations with Eisenhower.

After the Geneva meetings got under way, Eisenhower suggested that after each plenary session we meet for refreshments so that we might end the day on a pleasant note. His idea was that if there had been any hard feelings or tensions aroused during the day's session, we could wash them away with martinis. I remember at one of these informal gatherings Eisenhower introduced me to [Nelson] Rockefeller, who was accompanying the American delegation as an advisor of some sort. There was nothing special about him as far as I could tell. He was dressed fairly democratically and was the sort of man who didn't make much of an impression one way or the other. When I met him, I said, "So this is Mr. Rockefeller himself!" and I playfully poked him in the ribs with my fists. He took this as a joke and did the same thing to me.

We were interested in talking to Rockefeller about the possibility of getting credit from the United States, something on the order of six billion dollars. But the Americans were already pressing us to repay them the money we owed them from the Lend-Lease. We told them we were willing to pay them a certain amount, but not all, of what we owed from the Lend-Lease if they would give us six billion dollars' credit. We had some discussions about this, but nothing ever came of it.

Our best relations in Geneva were with the French. Edgar Faure, whom we nicknamed "Edgar Fyodorovich," was a very prepossessing man who went out of his way to be friendly and hospitable toward us. However, in those days there was a rapid turnover in the French government, and therefore there was no point in paying serious attention to the French delegation to the Geneva meetings.

Our relations with the British delegation weren't quite as friendly as with the French, but the atmosphere of our conversations with Eden was certainly warm. Naturally he was following the same general line as the Americans, but he seemed to be more flexible and receptive to reasonable arguments. During dinner one evening Eden asked us, "What would you say if you were invited to make an official visit to Great Britain? Don't you think such a trip would be useful for both of

3. The remark about Nelson Rockefeller being dressed "fairly democratically" is a gem and throws a great deal of light on the Soviet image of the West.

4. Khrushchev's dismissal of the need to take M. Faure seriously, although he liked him, because French ministries kept on changing, is an interesting commentary on the limitations of Soviet governmental thinking.
our governments?” We said that it would indeed be useful and we would accept such an invitation with pleasure. We almost agreed then and there. The British were to issue us a formal invitation, and we would accept.

At the end of the Geneva meeting we prepared a joint statement setting forth the position of the four delegations. This statement was formulated in such a way as to leave each delegation with the possibility of interpreting it in its own way. The wording was the result of various compromises which allowed all of us to sign. We didn’t want to disperse without having anything to show for the meeting. On the other hand none of us wanted any point in the statement to be interpreted as a concession in principle or policy to the other side.

We stopped off in West Berlin on the way back to our Homeland, and there we joined the leaders of the German Democratic Republic and issued another joint statement. We were greeted with full honors in Berlin. Huge crowds of people came out to cheer us. I had been to Germany before, but this was the first time I had been there in an official capacity. I expected there to be some displays of hostility toward us, but there were none. There were a few sour faces, but not many. On the main we were welcomed enthusiastically. Our warm reception in Berlin reinforced our conviction that the Germans were fed up with making war, and that now they wanted to build strong, friendly relations with us.

We returned to Moscow from Geneva knowing that we hadn’t achieved any concrete results. But we were encouraged, realizing now that our enemies probably feared us as much as we feared them. They rattled their sabers and tried to pressure us into agreements which were more profitable for them than for us because they were frightened of us. As a result of our own showing in Geneva, our enemies now realized that we were able to resist their pressure and see through their tricks. They now knew that they had to deal with us honestly and fairly, that they had to respect our borders and our rights, and that they couldn’t get what they wanted by force or by blackmail. They realized that they would have to build their relations with us on new assumptions and new expectations if they really wanted peace. The Geneva meeting was an important breakthrough for us on the diplomatic front. We had established ourselves as able to hold our own in the international arena. Our success was confirmed by Eden’s invitation for us to pay a state visit to Great Britain.

The Geneva Summit

By the time he made his London visit with Bulganin in the spring of 1956, Khrushchev had already been to Peking in 1954, and in 1955 he had made his notorious tour of India as well as his pilgrimage to Belgrade and his journey to Geneva. He was becoming a seasoned traveler. He had the Twentieth Party Congress and the Secret Speech behind him, and even though Bulganin was Prime Minister, there was no question at all of who was in command—though it was not until the summer of 1957 that Khrushchev shattered the opposition, finally breaking Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and others. Khrushchev does not mention the fact that Malenkov, no longer Prime Minister but still a member of the Party Presidium, had made an earlier and very successful visit to England to prepare the way and take the country’s temperature. The arrival of Khrushchev and Bulganin was somewhat marred by the fact that they had sent the notorious police chief General Serov to supervise the security aspects of the great visit. The British press was loud in protest, and Serov had to go back to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev was never able to understand why the British disapproved of Serov.

The Labour government in England after the war had been fairly unfriendly toward the Soviet Union, and our efforts to develop good trade ties didn’t get very far. Our relations with Great Britain were only slightly improved after Stalin’s death, when the Labourites came to see us and opened discussion on various matters. Then the Conservatives replaced the Labourites, and Eden became Prime Minis-