CHAPTER XVIII

A New Look at America's Defenses

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual ways of preserving peace.

—Washington

Two and two continue to make four, in spite of the whine of the amateur for three or the cry of the critic for five.

—James McNeill Whistler

FROM the moment that the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb and built airplanes capable of carrying them over great distances, Americans realized that, as never before in history, they must thenceforth live under the specter of wholesale destruction. But multimegaton bombs and long-range missiles do not necessarily mean that we must live forever in disabling fear. For one thing, threats and challenge are not new. An analogy can be made, with some validity, between the life we lead today and that led by the American pioneers who made their homes, raised their families, plowed their fields, and lived a full life even under the never-ending threat of attack by hostile Indians. Today, though we know that there is a constant possibility, however remote, of an unprecedented holocaust, we still must be wise and courageous enough to live fully, confident in the knowledge that we have taken every reasonable step to deter aggression, and that we shall always be ready to defend liberty no matter what the price.

I have often been told that deep-seated concern over the possibilities of nuclear war persuaded many people to vote for me in 1952 who under other circumstances might have opposed the candidacy of a professional military man. Whatever the impact on the political campaign, however, my military background assured at least that as President I would hold certain definite convictions on national security. With some oversimplifi-
A NEW LOOK AT AMERICA'S DEFENSES

While the United States, centrally located and strong in productive power, provided mobile reserve forces of all arms, with emphasis on sea and air contingents.

In the early months of my administration the Korean War still dragged on; it would be difficult to effect major changes immediately. But thorough study could be undertaken without delay. An immediate task was to ensure an effective advisory mechanism concerned with all phases of national defense. The basic organ, the National Security Council, was already in existence. To ensure a breadth of viewpoint in considering security problems, I invited the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Budget, and the Director of the United States Information Agency to participate, in addition to the statutory members, in the advisory work of the council.

The brave statement "America can afford anything it needs for national security" was and is true; in the earliest days of my administration I made this plain. But I also emphasized that America could not afford to waste money in any area, including the military, for anything that it did not need. I knew from experience that there was much duplication among the three services in research and development, in procurement, and even in roles and missions—these last always at least partly self-assigned.

To aid in the elimination of waste and duplication in the armed services, I felt that some reorganization of the Pentagon was desirable. The result was a reorganization plan which had three basic objectives: (1) to strengthen civilian control by establishing clearer lines of responsibility; (2) to improve administrative procedure in the Department of Defense by eliminating unwieldy boards and committees and substituting instead responsible executive officials; (3) to provide mechanisms for better strategic planning. The plan was prepared with the benefit of a report from a study committee which Secretary Wilson had established as early as January 30, 1953.

This reorganization emphasized the position of the Secretary of Defense as my channel for communicating decisions to the defense establishment; likewise, it clearly recognized the legal responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as advisers to the President and to the Secretary of Defense in purely military matters.

The last part of the reorganization plan involved strengthening the

1 The "statutory" members comprised only the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. Others besides those mentioned, such as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, also attended.

2 Reorganization Plan Number Six, submitted to Congress on April 30, 1953. This took the form of an amendment to the National Security Act of 1949.
structure of the staff whose mission it was to serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, indirectly, the President and the Secretary of Defense. This Joint Staff was composed of officers assigned from the military services. They were, inescapably, too much under the divisive influence of the separate services from which they came. My objective was to take at least one step in divorcing the thinking and the outlook of the members of the Joint Staff from those of their parent services and to center their entire effort on national planning for the over-all common defense of the nation and the West. To accomplish this I directed that the selection of every military officer for service on the Joint Staff should require the approval of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Opposition developed in Congress to this plan because of a fear that we were setting up a "Prussian-style general staff." This notion was scarcely based on any real knowledge of Germany's pre-World War I staff concepts, and after I had succeeded in clarifying the matter for the Legislative leaders, Reorganization Plan Number Six went into effect on June 30, 1953.

As the leading civilian executives, we had what I considered a strong combination in the Pentagon. Secretary Wilson's top deputy was Roger M. Kyes, a bold, sharp-minded businessman with a great store of common sense. The Secretary of the Army was Robert T. Stevens; the Secretary of the Navy, Robert B. Anderson; and the Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Talbott—all men of considerable ability.

In the uniformed services the leadership changed during the first few months of my administration. However, this implied no dissatisfaction, on my part, with any of the officers who had been serving in these important posts. Indeed, I knew three of them intimately—General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs; General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff; and General Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff. I knew Admiral William M. Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations, by reputation—which was excellent. Bradley had been my classmate at West Point and my friend for all the years since. He served under me during World War II from early 1943 until its close in 1945. During the final eleven months of that period he commanded the Twelfth Army Group, which was composed entirely of American troops. In this position he had control of the largest exclusively American force of World War II.

The reason for the change was that during 1953 the terms of service of all of the incumbent Chiefs were to expire. General Vandenberg, unfortunately, had been afflicted with what turned out to be his last illness. He had been Chief of Staff of the Air Force since April of 1948 and was retired for disability on May 7, 1953, on which date the announcement was made of General Nathan F. Twining's appointment to succeed him. The term of General Bradley was to come to an end in August, as was that of General Collins. So, in mid-May, to avoid speculation about the identity of their successors, I announced the appointment of Admiral Arthur W. Radford as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and simultaneously, General Matthew B. Ridgway's appointment to replace Collins, both changes to become effective on August 15. Ridgway's appointment insured that the Army would continue to have as its head a man of proven leadership qualities, and at the same time it allowed me to elevate General Gruenther, with the hearty concurrence of the other nations of the NATO Alliance, from the post of Chief of Staff in Paris to that of Supreme Commander. To my mind, General Gruenther was, as I have indicated, the best-qualified officer in the service of the United States for this vital post.

On June 2 Admiral Robert B. Carney, who had served as the commander of the Sixth Fleet, attached to NATO, was named as Chief of Naval Operations to replace Admiral Fechteler, whose two-year term was expiring. The term of General Lemuel C. Shepherd, commandant of the Marine Corps, was not to expire until January 1, 1956.8

At about the time of the change-over in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, active fighting in Korea ended. This fact, along with the epochal developments which were transpiring in nuclear armaments, occasioned what Admiral Radford described in a talk late in the year as a "New Look."4 It happened that this term had a definite place in the parlance of the day; it had been coined to describe noticeable changes in the style of women's dresses (not entirely an improvement, some men felt). Thus the tag "New Look" probably suggested to many minds a picture of a far more radical change in the composition of our armed forces than was truly the case.

Conventionally the armed forces of the United States are thought of in terms of the specific services: the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and sometimes the Coast Guard. But a better approach in analyzing strategic requirements is to make what has been called in military terminology a "horizontal analysis," which simply means to examine our armed might in the light of tasks which must be performed and the forces and weapons available to perform them, regardless of parent service.

Thus modern combat forces (as contrasted with logistical support forces) can be classified as follows:

1) Nuclear retaliatory or strike forces, designed primarily for instant destruction of the enemy by large-scale nuclear attack. In the days of my

8 The commandant of the Marine Corps is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for matters pertaining to the Marine Corps.

4 At the Press Club, Washington, December 14, 1953.
first administration the bulk of this power was invested in the Air Force's Strategic Air Command, the backbone of which was the heavy intercontinental bomber, with the B-52 in the process of replacing the B-36. In addition, the Navy, with its attack carriers, made a contribution, particularly in the Far East.

(2) Forces deployed overseas. These forces, including land and tactical air forces, were stationed principally in Europe and the Far East. Their duty was to bolster our allies' defenses in those areas and to insure that the boundaries between freedom and slavery would not be moved to our disadvantage. In Europe these forces came under the command of the man in a U.S. post called CINCEUR, or Commander-in-Chief, Europe (who was also Supreme Commander for the Allied powers of Europe). The United States contribution was made up of the U. S. Seventh Army, the Ninth Air Force, and the Sixth Fleet, the last normally stationed in the Mediterranean.

In the Far East, at the close of the Korean fighting, was the U. S. Eighth Army in Korea, and the U. S. Fifth Air Force, the Seventh Fleet, and units of all services, stationed on the offshore island chain.

(3) Forces to keep the sea lanes open in the event of emergency. These forces, primarily Navy and Marine, were deployed in the Atlantic and Pacific.

(4) Forces to protect the United States from air attack. These consisted primarily of air-defense units, both Army and Air Force, assigned to the Continental Air Defense Command, with headquarters in Colorado. This command later became a combined command between the United States and the Canadians, and its title was changed to North American Air Defense Command.

(5) Reserve Forces. These forces, located primarily within the con-

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forces deployed overseas were all assigned to unified (more than one service) and specified (one service only) commands, whose commanders reported directly to the Secretary of Defense. The unified commands comprised European Command, headquarters in Paris; the Atlantic Command, headquarters in Norfolk; the Caribbean Command, headquarters in the Panama Canal Zone; the Far East Command, headquarters in Tokyo (later disestablished); the Pacific Command, headquarters in Honolulu; the Continental Air Defense Command, headquarters in Colorado Springs; and the Alaskan Command.

The specified commands included the Strategic Air Command; and the Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (whose commander was to serve primarily as the naval-component commander for the Commander-in-Chief, Europe).

The commands were not, however, all located overseas. The Strategic Air Command, a specified command, was deployed largely in the United States as a nuclear deterrent; Continental Air Defense Command, a unified command, was located almost entirely in the United States as a force to protect the United States from air attack.

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tinent of the United States, were normally left under the control of their respective service chiefs for training purposes. They consisted of Army divisions, Air Force and Navy wings and fleets, and supporting units.

Keeping these missions in mind, then, we might define the New Look, as first, a reallocation of resources among the five categories of forces, and second, the placing of greater emphasis than formerly on the deterrent and destructive power of improved nuclear weapons, better means of delivery, and effective air-defense units.

Other active combat units, including those deployed overseas and forces to keep the sea lanes open, were to be modernized and maintained at a maximum mobility and effectiveness, but with decreases in numerical strength. Supporting reserves in the United States, while important, were given a lower priority.

The New Look called for a new outlook by the men concerned. This was not easy to acquire, for, as it turned out, the reallocations resulted in an increase in the Air Force, whereas the bulk of the reductions were primarily in the Army and secondarily in the Navy. This came about partly because during the Korean War the Army had expanded far beyond its necessary peacetime size.

This change in emphasis came at a time when the administration was exerting every effort to cut the costs of government everywhere; therefore the two separate efforts came to be associated in many minds.

Protests against the planned changes came from many quarters. Numbers of people were merely prejudiced in favor of one service as against the other two; others were interested in producing, for example, equipment for the Army and Navy rather than for the Air Force; still others, in political life, disliked any closing down of military installations in their respective geographical constituencies. All were ready to accuse us of endangering military security for the political plaudits we might receive for reducing the budget.

I could not help being amused when I heard such accusations. Had their authors been present to listen to the emotional exposition of Senator Taft in April 1953 (when he charged that the defense expenditures I had recommended were at least 50 per cent too large and represented only the thinking of jingoistic and ambitious men in the services), they would have reconsidered their idea that we anticipated plaudits, to say the least. When some claimed I was planning to “wreck” the Army and Navy, I decided that anyone familiar with my background and sentiments would know that these charges did not deserve the dignity of a refutation.

Resistance, however, continued in varying degrees throughout 1954, even though I was proposing a defense establishment in which all three of the services were to remain far larger, stronger, and more effective than
ever previously in peacetime. For example, my proposed defense budget was three times that of 1950.

I directed that this concept of defense should be implemented with minimum delay. However, in order to attain the necessary wholehearted cooperation of the senior military officers, I did, from time to time, meet with the Joint Chiefs and other defense officials to review progress.

One important meeting of this kind was held in my office in early December 1954. I pointed out to the group, once again, that long-term security required a sound economy, that no predicted critical danger date could be taken as a decisive factor in the nation's defense planning, and that the only way the United States could be quickly knocked out was by surprise attack on its mainland. I went over, once more, all of the missions for which the armed forces would be responsible and the priorities that had been established.

I indicated the necessity of making a realistic appraisal of what the maintenance of an adequate but not extravagant defense establishment over an extended period of time (say, half a century) could mean to the nation, and urged that we do our best to create a national climate favorable to dynamic industrial effort. I said that, since there could not possibly be any large-scale deployment of military forces from the continental United States to overseas theaters during the first few months of a nuclear war, our requirements in ground forces, other than those already overseas, should be limited to reserves of sufficient strength to meet a "brush-fire" war in one—or at most, two—localities. If conflicts started in a number of places simultaneously, then we would automatically be in a major war, which was a different problem entirely. In this instance, I repeated, our objectives in the first phase of such a global war would have to be avert disaster, as we, in turn, released our nuclear stockpile on the aggressor. After that we would have time to go on to win.7

6 Secretary Wilson, Deputy Secretary Anderson, General Ridgway, General Twining, Admiral Carney, General Shepherd, and Colonel Goodpaster were present.

7 To give an idea of the shift in emphasis involved, the following figures might help:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manpower</th>
<th>December 1953</th>
<th>October 1954</th>
<th>June 1955</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy/Marines</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>920,000</td>
<td>870,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>930,000</td>
<td>960,000</td>
<td>970,000</td>
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Budget (in billions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year '54</th>
<th>Fiscal Year '55</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy/Marines</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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These views received varying degrees of concurrence. Admiral Carney, for one, reported that the Navy was tailoring its forces to follow these policies, increasing its early striking power and cutting back amphibious forces, not so necessary as formerly, in the early stages of hostilities. General Ridgway, however, recently returned from Europe, was deeply troubled about the security of United States forces then overseas. In event of war it would not be possible to support them quickly unless reinforcements of large size (perhaps ten divisions he felt) were constantly ready to sail at a moment's notice. In his opinion our deployed strength was inadequate, and our ready reserve units at hand too small.

I could not help being sympathetic. The safety of United States troops and their dependents in Europe was my concern as well. I stressed to General Ridgway that I had no intention of allowing Europe to be overrun, as it had been in 1940. But we knew that the Soviets maintained something in the neighborhood of 175 divisions active in Europe at all times. The United States had twenty divisions, only five of which were in Europe. Therefore, in view of the disparity in the strengths of the opposing ground forces, it seemed clear that only by the interposition of our nuclear weapons could we promptly stop a major Communist aggression in that area. Two more divisions or ten more divisions, on our side, would not make very much difference against this Soviet ground force.

But I was not pessimistic. My intention was firm: to launch the Strategic Air Command immediately upon trustworthy evidence of a general attack against the West. So I repeated that first priority must be given to the task of meeting the atomic threat, the only kind of attack that could, without notice, endanger our very existence.

I pointed out that no commander—no nation—even had, when conflict threatened, all the forces of all kinds that might be considered desirable. Therefore it was the responsibility of leadership—civil and military—to decide upon priorities. This done, the next task was to assure maximum efficiency in the forces calculated to be permanently necessary.

As time went on this doctrine came to be largely accepted in principle. But then there was raised another argument, based on the assumption that as a nuclear balance between the West and the East became foreseeable, the danger of atomic war would recede and our real problem would be to provide more ground forces and conventional support types to win small, brush-fire conflicts. In a climate of mutual deterrence, several of these "small wars" could conceivably occur simultaneously; therefore, it was asserted, we must greatly reinforce our conventional forces. The argument was based upon the premise that we would never, under any kind of circumstance, provocation, or aggression, employ our nuclear strength.
It was this kind of fear that later, in 1957 and 1958, saw disastrous bomber gaps in our defense establishment, and though that illusionary gap never existed, spent useless millions to fill it. Finally convinced of the falsity of their allegations, the prophets of doom changed to missiles—the gap here, they cried, was far worse and more fearsome than the earlier one. Again they were proved wrong; but proof of past error cannot still a present, senseless fear.

In my opinion this kind of solution was the product of timidity—a solution that began by seeing danger behind every tree or bush. This was also an unrealistic solution, one that required massive defense units of such size and capacity that no matter how universal and threatening the danger or how many the local “disturbances,” we could quickly defeat them by conventional means. I refused to turn the United States into an armed camp.

To emphasize my convictions, I stressed that the United States would not employ the same policies and resources to fight another war as were used in the Korean conflict. I saw no sense in wasting manpower in costly small wars that could not achieve decisive results under the political and military circumstances then existing. I felt that this kind of military policy would play into the hands of a potential enemy whose superiority in available military manpower was obvious. We should refuse to permit our adversary to enjoy a sanctuary from which he could operate without danger to himself; we would not allow him to blackmail us into placing limitations upon the types of weapons we would employ. Moreover, in the matter of brush-fire wars I pointed out that we would not try to maintain the conventional power to police the whole world, even though we would cooperate with our allies on the spot. The Communists would have to be made to realize that should they be guilty of major aggression, we would strike with means of our own choosing at the head of the Communist power.

If we were wise enough, and sufficiently self-confident to concentrate on making our defense establishment effective, flexible, and economical, rather than heavy, clumsy, and costly, I believed we could be both secure and prosperous.

When it came time to prepare budgets, it was particularly difficult to get the Joint Chiefs of Staff, collectively, to be guided by these policies. Each believed that although the sums allocated to the others were quite sufficient for national safety, the amounts approved for his own particular service were inadequate. The result was that budgetary decisions had to be made, rather than approved, at the civilian echelon. Thus the internal differences in our highest military mechanism tended to neutralize the advisory influence they should have enjoyed as a body.

Strategic deployment of forces, coordination among services, and manpower and budgetary problems, however, are not the only military matters of concern to a President. Equally important is the matter of how the research and development efforts of the Department of Defense are managed, for in the process of establishing sensible priorities for high-cost programs of this kind, the nature of the entire military posture is determined.

The most dramatic action in this field during the early years of my administration was, for all practical purposes, the beginning of research and development on ballistic missiles of intermediate and intercontinental range.

11 On August 20, 1956, I wrote to Everett Hazlett at some length on the subject. “Let us not forget that the Armed Services are to defend a ‘way of life,’ not merely land, property or lives. So what I need to make the Chiefs realize is that they are men of sufficient stature, training and intelligence to think of this balance—the balance between minimum requirements in the costly implements of war and the health of our economy...”

“. . . When each Service puts down its minimum requirements for its own military budget for the following year, and I add up the total, I find that they mount at a fantastic rate. There is seemingly no end to all of this. Yet merely ‘getting tough’ on my part is not an answer. I simply must find men who have the breadth of understanding and devotion to their country rather than to a single Service that will bring about better solutions than I get now.

“Strangely enough, the one man who sees this clearly is a Navy man who at one time was an uncompromising exponent of Naval power and its superiority over any other kind of strength. That is Radford. “I do not maintain that putting all of these people in one uniform would cure this difficulty—at least not quickly. But some day there is going to be a man sitting in my present chair who has not been raised in the military services and who will have little understanding of where slashes in their estimates can be made with little or no damage. If that should happen while we still have the state of tension that now exists in the world, I shudder to think of what could happen in this country.” [See Appendix M.]

Letters to Hazlett, a friend, appear throughout this volume. He and I were raised in the same town. After leaving high school, we decided to try for a military academy. We studied together for a year while both of us were holding down jobs. We questioned each other, using questions not of our own manufacture, but from the examinations used by the Academies in previous years. As it turned out, we were in the same class, that is, we were graduated in the same year. But Hazlett was in the Navy, and I in the Army. In later decades, as junior officers, we visited each other when we could, and I found myself writing letters to Swede Hazlett on all sorts of subjects. He was always a good person with whom to “let go.”
ranges. These vehicles, with their nuclear warheads, were destined to make previous concepts of warfare obsolete and could possibly reduce the duration of a modern war to a matter of hours. Our problem in the development of long-range ballistic weapons was complicated by prior neglect of their potential capabilities. For example, in fiscal year 1953, the United States spent only a million dollars on long-range ballistic missiles, less than it was spending to support the price of peanuts.

This lack of concern with the ballistic missile was undoubtedly partly the result of preoccupation with the aerodynamic missile, or pilotless aircraft. Development of the aerodynamic weapon could be expected to be quicker—and at that time it was thought to be more practical than the ballistic type, which had to leave and re-enter the earth's atmosphere. On two aerodynamic projects, the Snark and the Navajo, a great deal of time and money had already been used.

But then, through the conclusions and recommendations of the scientists, presented to me in 1954 and early 1955, it became clear that the matter of developing ballistic missiles was urgent. Indications were that the Soviets had been working on this type of weapon for a number of years, and our development programs were promptly accorded the highest priorities.

While it was easy to direct the Defense Department to go full speed ahead, it was not so easy to devise the best organization of the missile program itself. It might have been best, had it been feasible, to remove the whole missile program from the hands of the regular military services and to establish another “Manhattan Project,” similar to that through which the atomic bomb was developed during World War II. This scheme would have had the advantage of concentrating the best scientific minds on one set of programs and eliminating duplication and rivalry among the various service activities. However, by the time the urgency of the program became apparent, each of the services had already organized and was using experimental teams of scientists and engineers for missile development.

To tear up all of these organizations and to transplant the scientists, engineers, and officers already engaged in the business, seemed to me, to Secretary Wilson, and to my military-scientific advisers to promise more delay than would continuation of existing procedures.

12 Intermediate (IRBM): 1200–1500 miles. Intercontinental (ICBM): 5000 miles. The Army, in particular, had achieved a considerable head start in short-range (two-hundred-mile) ballistic missiles by importing from Germany a group of scientists and engineers headed by Dr. Wernher von Braun, who had developed the German V-2 rocket of World War II. This group was established at Huntsville, Alabama, where it continued work on these weapons which, being ballistic, of course supplied some knowledge and experience applicable to the longer range IRBMs and ICBMs.

This was a close decision. The problems of achieving coordination among services were severe. However, the urgent need for quick results dictated that this disadvantage be accepted. The decision was, I believe, the right one, although interservice rivalries in this field were by no means eliminated.

Another question was whether the priority to be accorded the IRBM deserved to be as high as the more glamorous ICBM. For the immediate military problem, I thought it was. I realized that the political and psychological impact on the world of the early development of a reliable IRBM would be enormous, while its military value would, for the time being, be practically equal to that of the ICBM, since the former, located on bases on foreign soil, could strike any target in Communist areas as well as could an ICBM fired from the United States. However, since in the long term the ICBM promised great advantages over the IRBM, I directed that both phases of the missile program should have the highest possible priority in the use of talent, money, and materials.

In early 1955 it came to my attention that the Navy, by combining techniques of which had already been proven, could now begin development of a new weapon system which would enable them eventually to fire a ballistic missile from a submerged nuclear submarine. The missiles would carry nuclear warheads and be of sufficient range to hit critical targets in the Sino-Soviet land mass. Thus it would constitute an almost invulnerable retaliatory capability, separate and apart from the missiles and planes located in the United States and on foreign bases. The project was undertaken at once, and before the end of my years in the White House, some of these highly valuable “Polaris” submarines were on station as a growing part of our nuclear deterrent.

I have pondered, on occasion, the evolution of the military art during the mid-fifties. The Army in which I was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1915 underwent phenomenal changes in the thirty years from then until the German surrender in 1945. Auto-firing guns, motor transport, fighter and bomber airplanes, tanks, and many types of rockets all came into common use. But those changes, startling as they were, faded into insignificance when compared to those of the postwar period, particularly during my first three years in the Presidency.

The project was undertaken at once, and before the end of my years in the White House, some of these highly valuable “Polaris” submarines were on station as a growing part of our nuclear deterrent.
New military developments, therefore, brought about important changes in the duties that absorbed the urgent and continuous attention of the President. The title of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces had become something real and critical even in peace. I was incessantly involved in basic decisions, planning, and meeting with Defense and Atomic Energy Commission officials to approve annual increments in the national atomic stockpile and its dispersal in far-flung posts around the globe. My every footstep was followed by a courier carrying a satchel filled with draft war orders to be issued by code number in case of emergency.

Our military structure and equipment were changing so rapidly that even the comforting old slogan "Tried and true" was gone. In its place had sprung up a disquieting new one: "If it works, it's obsolete."

FORMOSA DOCTRINE

... that the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

—FORMOSA RESOLUTION

AT about seven o'clock on the evening of September 3, 1954, the Army Signal Corps at the Summer White House in Denver brought me a message from Deputy Defense Secretary Robert B. Anderson, in Washington. It reported that at one forty-five that morning (Eastern Daylight Time), the Chinese Communists had begun a heavy artillery shelling of Quemoy Island off the Chinese coast. Though the shelling had diminished at about four-twenty in the morning, it was still, at last reports, continuing. Two Americans in uniform had been killed; fourteen were being evacuated.

At daybreak on September 4 (Quemoy local time), one report predicted, the Communists would launch an assault against Quemoy Island. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Stump, alerted, was moving carriers into position, to give support or to undertake a rescue.

The message from Anderson marked the commencement of a sequence of events which was to extend through nine months, threaten a split between the United States and nearly all its allies, and seemingly carry the country to the edge of war, thus constituting one of the most serious problems of the first eighteen months of my administration.