These major plans were the topics which General Collins and General Vandenberg discussed with General MacArthur during their visit with him. They had also discussed the problem of meeting the needs of the Far East Command within the over-all requirements of national policy and the use of Allied troop elements in Korea.

General MacArthur agreed to the use of Allied troops within his command, even though he realized that an amalgamation of nationalities would make his job more difficult. He did, however, advise against accepting the offer of thirty-three thousand Chinese Nationalist troops made by Chiang Kai-shek. He offered the opinion that these troops would be of little effect in Korea; they were infantry, without artillery or other support elements, and of unknown quality. They would, he said, require extensive logistical support from us and, in fact, would be an albatross around our necks for months. Furthermore, it was his opinion that the diversion of this force from Formosa to Korea would leave a gap on that island that would invite attack. He suggested that he would himself go to Formosa and explain the situation to Chiang Kai-shek.

As for the plans for the counterattack, it seemed that General Collins had serious misgivings about it. The MacArthur plan was for two divisions to land by sea near Inchon, in the vicinity of Seoul, and for one regimental combat team to be air-dropped in the same area. At the same time, the forces in the Pusan beachhead would break out toward the north. It was a bold plan worthy of a master strategist.

To make this plan possible required, however, a considerable stepping up of the rebuilding of the armed forces, and almost every time he communicated with us the Far East commander asked for increased numbers of troops. The JCS would scrutinize these recommendations and then submit their proposals to the Secretary of Defense. Of course I was not asked to decide on each and every troop movement decision. Nevertheless, basic decisions which the law placed in my responsibility were often necessary. Thus, on July 31, I approved a recommendation that four National Guard divisions be called into active federal service.

Earlier, on July 19, I had asked Congress to remove the limitations on the size of the armed forces and had urged legislation to authorize the establishment of priorities and allocations of materials to prevent hoarding and requisitioning of necessary supplies. I then stated that it would be necessary to raise taxes and to restrict consumer credit, and that an additional ten billion dollars for defense would be needed.

An advance copy of this message was sent to General MacArthur to inform him of the approach that was being taken at home. He thanked me for this in a most courteous telegram.

On July 31 General MacArthur undertook the ying trip to Formosa that he had discussed with General Collins and General Vandenberg when they had visited him in Tokyo.

Our policy toward Formosa had been one of the topics discussed in Washington on July 27 at a meeting of the National Security Council. There was a recommendation from the Joint Chiefs before the Council that we grant all-out aid to the Chinese Nationalists so as to enable them to defend themselves against a possible Communist attack on the island. Many other phases of the situation were discussed. I approved three specific proposals: the granting of extensive military aid to Nationalist China; a military survey by MacArthur's headquarters of the requirements of Chiang Kai-shek's forces; and the plan to carry out reconnaissance flights along the China coast to determine the imminence of attacks against Formosa.

These decisions were communicated to General MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 3, and on the same day I telephoned him that I was sending Averell Harriman to Tokyo at once to discuss the Far Eastern political situation with him. Harriman's report on his meetings and conversations follows. (For reasons of brevity and for military security I have omitted portions of the Harriman memorandum.)

General MacArthur met me at Haneda Airport on our arrival at 9:45 A.M., August 6, 1950. He drove me to the guest house at the Embassy. As the window between the driver and his aide, and ourselves, was open, our conversation was general.

He described the satisfactory political development in Japan that was my last visit. He spoke of the great quality of the Japanese; his desire to work, the satisfaction of the Japanese in work, his respect for the dignity of work. He
compared it unfavorably to the desire in the United States for more luxury and less work.

He considered Communist infiltration into Japanese life was in no sense a threat as Communist ideas did not appeal to the Japanese, but, more importantly, it had the Russian label. The Japanese both feared and hated the Russians.

The reaction among the Japanese to our action in Korea was one of relief, as they interpreted it to mean that we would vigorously defend them against Russian invasion. They were not disturbed by our temporary difficulties, since they understood the military difficulties caused by the surprise attack. Their pride had been aroused by "his" confidence in them, shown by the withdrawal of most of the American troops. He could withdraw them all without any danger of disorder in Japan.

He arranged for me and the officers with me to attend the morning briefing at 10:30 at Headquarters, and that I should call on him at his office at 11:30. I had a 2½ hour talk with MacArthur in the morning: lunch with him and Mrs. MacArthur for the entire party, and then a further two-hour talk from 5:30 to 7:30 in the afternoon.

On Tuesday morning, after my return from Korea, we had a further four-hour talk before my departure.

The first 2½ hours included a military discussion at which Generals Ridgway and Norstad participated. General Almond also was present.

I will not attempt to divide the conversations chronologically, but largely by subject.

Our first talk on Sunday morning covered the military situation as he saw it. I explained to him that the President had asked me to tell him that he wanted to know what MacArthur wanted, and was prepared to support him as fully as possible. I asked MacArthur whether he had any doubts about the wisdom of the Korean decision. He replied, "absolutely none." The President's statement was magnificent. It was an historic decision which would save the world from communist domination, and would be so recorded in history. The commitment of our ground forces was essential, and victory must be attained rapidly.

MacArthur described his firm conviction that the North Korean forces must be destroyed as early as possible and could not wait for a slow build-up. He emphasized the political and military dangers of such a course; the discouragement that would come among the United Nations including the United States; the effect on Oriental peoples as well as on the Chinese Communists and the Russians. He feared that Russia and the Chinese Communists would be able to greatly strengthen the North Korean forces and that the time was of the essence, or grave difficulties, if not disaster, were ahead.

He did not believe that the Russians had any present intention of intervening directly, or becoming involved in a general war. He believed the same was true of the Chinese Communists. The Russians had organized and equipped the North Koreans, and had supplied some of the trained personnel from racial Koreans of the Soviet Union who had fought in the Red Army forces. The Chinese Communists had cooperated in the transfer of soldiers who had fought with the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria. These had not come over as units, but had been released in Manchuria, and

reorganized into North Korean forces after they had been transported to North Korea. Their leadership was vigorous. A number of Russian officers were acting as observers but undoubtedly giving direction. Their tactics had been skillful, and they were as capable and tough as any army in his military experience.

He described the difference between the attitude towards death of Westerners and Orientals. We hate to die; only face danger out of a sense of duty and through moral issues; whereas with Orientals, life begins with death. They die quietly, "folding their arms as a dove folding his wings, relaxing, and dying."

MacArthur could not see why we could not quickly recruit experienced combat non-commissioned officers, so badly needed, among the many who had served in the last war. He thought we could get the fast ships and airplanes to transport the needed troops rapidly. To think that we might fall in this, he said, "makes me feel sick in my stomach." (Both of these things he said on Tuesday morning.)

MacArthur wants maximum UN ground forces possible, as many as 30,000 or 40,000. He will take battalions (1,000 men) just as fast as they can come, with only their small arms. Actually, heavier artillery would be welcome, and he has no doubt of an overwhelming victory for the non-communist parties. The North Koreans will also vote for a non-communist government when they are sure of no Russian or communist intervention. He said there was no need to change the Constitution, which now provides for 100 seats for the North. Korea can become a strong influence in stabilizing the non-communist movement in the East.

MacArthur thinks highly of Ambassador Muccio. He said they worked together fully and effectively.

In my first talk with MacArthur, I told him the President wanted me to tell him he must not permit Chiang to be the cause of starting a war with the Chinese communists on the mainland, the effect of which might drag us into a world war. He answered that he would, as a soldier, obey any orders that he received from the President. He said that he had discussed only military matters with the Generalissimo on his trip to Formosa. He had refused to discuss any political subjects whenever the Generalissimo attempted to do so. The Generalissimo had offered him command of the Chinese Nationalist troops. MacArthur had replied that that was not appropriate, but that he would be willing to give military advice if requested by the Generalissimo to do so.

For reasons which are rather difficult to explain, I did not feel that we came to a full agreement on the way we believed things should be handled on Formosa and with the Generalissimo. He accepted the President's position
and will act accordingly, but without full conviction. He has a strange idea that we should back anybody who will fight communism, even though he could not give an argument why the Generalissimo’s fighting communists would be a contribution towards the effective dealing with the communists in China. I pointed out to him the basic conflict of interest between the U.S. and the Generalissimo’s position as to the future of Formosa, namely, the preventing of Formosa’s falling into hostile hands. Perhaps the best way would be through the medium of the UN to establish an independent government. Chiang, on the other hand, had only the burning ambition to use Formosa as a stepping-stone for his re-entry to the mainland. MacArthur recognized that this ambition could not be fulfilled, and yet thought it might be a good idea to let him land and get rid of him that way. He did not seem to consider the liability that our support of Chiang on such a move would be to us in the East. I explained in great detail why Chiang was a liability, and the great danger of a split in the unity of the United Nations on the Chinese-Communist-Formosa policies; the attitude of the British, Nehru and such countries as Norway, who, although stalwart in their determination to resist Russian aggression, did not want to stir up trouble elsewhere. I pointed out the great importance of maintaining UN unity among the friendly countries, and the complications that might result from any mis-steps in dealing with China and Formosa.

MacArthur would never recognize the Chinese Communists, even to the use of the veto in seating the Communists. He believes it would only strengthen the prestige of Mao Tse-tung’s government in China and destroy what he considers should be our objective; the splitting of the present supporters of Mao Tse-tung and the developing of strengthened resistance movements. He does not believe the Chinese want to come under Russian domination. They have historically opposed invasion from the North. We should be more aggressive than we have been so far as creating stronger dissension within China. I emphasized the importance of getting evidence on the participation of the Chinese Communists in supporting the North Korean attack and present operations. There will be considerable support in seating the Chinese Communists at the next meeting of the Assembly. I explained that if we could obtain real evidence of direct support for the North Koreans, this might be the reason by which we could prevent the seating of the Communists on the moral issue involved.

In all, I cannot say that he recognizes fully the difficulties, both within the world and within the East, of whatever moves we make within China in our position with the Generalissimo in Formosa. He believes that our policies undermine the Generalissimo. He has confidence that he can get the Generalissimo to do whatever he is asked to undertake; is prepared to deal with the political problems, but will conscientiously deal only with the military side, unless he is given further orders from the President.

He is satisfied the Chinese Communists will not attempt an invasion of Formosa at the present time. His intelligence and photographs show no undue concentration of forces, although they are building airstrips. He is convinced that the 7th Fleet plus the air jets from the Philippines and Okinawa, B-29’s and other aircraft at his disposal, can destroy any attempt which may be made. He believes that the Chinese National troops can be organized to fight effectively and destroy any Communist troops which might get through. Should the Chinese Communists be so foolhardy as to make such an attempt, it would be the bloodiest victory in Far Eastern history, and would strengthen favorably morale in the East.

He spoke about the problem of the island of Quemoy, close to the mainland. The Generalissimo claims to have 70,000 men there which is important from the standpoint of eventually landing on the mainland, but has no value to the U.S. The Generalissimo considers Formosa part of China. MacArthur didn’t see any evidence of a desire for independence so far, even among the Formosans he talked to, but perhaps that was natural at this stage. There were no soldiers on the streets and no curfew; no evidence to support the pessimistic reports that had come from the State Department.

MacArthur feels that we have not improved our position by kicking Chiang around, and hoped that the President would do something to relieve the strain that existed between the State Department and the Generalissimo. He suggested the President might reiterate his previous statements by threatening the Chinese Communists that he would withdraw the inhibition to attack the airfields on the mainland if the Chinese continued to do this work, or to build up their positions. I told him that if he wanted to make that recommendation to the President it was up to him, but I assured him that I would strongly recommended to the President against his doing so. I emphasized the overpowering importance of UN unity and that this would only give further trouble and give the Russians a chance to develop an entering wedge.

MacArthur strongly supports the development of strong forces in Europe, and further believes we should be more vigorous in strengthening the military forces to resist Communism in the East. He believes the Chinese Communists will not move their own troops south, but will train Indochinese and Burmese, equip them, and attempt to create by infiltration and support by well-equipped local Communist troops dissension, with the eventual hope of taking over these areas. Nehru, he believes, is concerned over the threat of communism, but is acting wrongly in thinking he will get anywhere by appeasement. "We should fight the communists everywhere—fight them like hell!" He considers the Truman Doctrine "great." It should be carried out more vigorously. We should organize economic assistance in the East as we have been doing in the Marshall Plan in Europe. Large sums are not required. This assistance should be capably directed. We should see that it gets to the people and corruption is avoided.

When he saw me off at the airport, he said loudly so that all could hear, "the only fault of your trip was that it was too short."

Attached to Harriman’s personal report was a memorandum of the military discussion as prepared by General Ridgway. This was a summary of a two-and-a-half-hour presentation in which General MacArthur had stated his need for additional combat ground forces, both American and Allied.

I had asked Harriman to visit MacArthur so that the general might be given a firsthand account of the political planning in Washington. There had been several of our top military leaders who had visited Tokyo and had discussed the strategy of the Far Eastern situation with
MacArthur, but Harriman, who, of all my advisers, had the best knowledge of the economic recovery program, was particularly qualified to pass to MacArthur the views I held with regard to our over-all foreign policy.

General MacArthur's visit to Formosa on July 31 had raised much speculation in the world press. Chiang Kai-shek's aides let it be known that the Far East commander was in fullest agreement with their chief on the course of action to be taken. The implication was—and quite a few of our newspapers said so—that MacArthur rejected my policy of neutralizing Formosa and that he favored a more aggressive method.

After Harriman explained the administration's policy to MacArthur, he had said that he would accept it as a good soldier. I was reassured. I told the press that the general and I saw eye to eye on Formosa policy.

To make doubly sure, on August 14 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General MacArthur, with my approval, that the intent of the directive to him to defend Formosa was to limit United States action there to such support operations as would be practicable without committing any forces to the island itself. No commitments were to be made to the National Government for the basing of fighter squadrons on Formosa, and no United States forces of any kind were to be based ashore on Formosa except with the specific approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I assumed that this would be the last of it and that General MacArthur would accept the Formosa policy laid down by his Commander in Chief. But I was mistaken. Before the month ended—on August 26—the White House Press Room brought me a copy of a statement which General MacArthur had sent to the commander in chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. This document was not to be read until August 28, but MacArthur's public relations office in Tokyo had handed it to the papers several days in advance, and when I first heard about it, on the morning of August 26, a weekly magazine was already in the mails with the full text.

The substance of the long message was that, "in view of misconceptions being voiced concerning the relationship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Pacific," the general thought it desirable to put forth his own views on the subject. He argued that the oriental psychology required "aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership," and "nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia." In other words, he called for a military policy of aggression, based on Formosa's position. The whole tenor of the message was critical of the very policy which he had so recently told Harriman he would support. There was no doubt in my mind that the world would read it that way and that it must have been intended that way.

It was my opinion that this statement could only serve to confuse the world as to just what our Formosa policy was, for it was at odds with my announcement of June 27, and it also contradicted what I had told Congress. Furthermore, our policy had been reaffirmed only the day before in a letter which, on my instructions, Ambassador Austin had addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie.

The subject of Formosa had been placed before the Security Council by the Russian delegation, which charged us with acts of aggression in aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and I had approved a State Department proposal that we counter this charge with a declaration that we were willing to have the United Nations investigate the Formosa question. Mr. Malik, the Russian delegate, was trying to persuade the Security Council that our action in placing the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Strait amounted to the incorporation of Formosa within the American orbit. Austin's letter to Trygve Lie had made it plain that we had only one intention: to reduce the area of conflict in the Far East. General MacArthur's message—which the world might mistake as an expression of American policy—contradicted this.

Of course, I would never deny General MacArthur or anyone else the right to differ with me in opinions. The official position of the United States, however, is defined by decisions and declarations of the President. There can be only one voice in stating the position of this country in the field of foreign relations. This is of fundamental constitutional significance. General MacArthur, in addition to being an important American commander, was also the United Nations commander in Korea. He was, in fact, acting for and on behalf of the United Nations. That body was then debating the question of Formosa, and its members—even those outside the Soviet bloc—differed sharply in their views regarding Formosa. It was hardly proper for the U.N.'s agent to argue a case then under discussion by that body.

I realized that the damage had been done and that the MacArthur message was in the hands of the press.

I gave serious thought to relieving General MacArthur as our military commander in the Far East and replacing him with General Bradley. I could keep MacArthur in command of the Japanese occupation, taking Korea and Formosa out of his hands. But after weighing carefully I decided against such a step. It would have been difficult
to avoid the appearance of a demotion, and I had no desire to hurt General MacArthur personally. My only concern was to let the world know that his statement was not official policy.

I had a meeting scheduled for that Saturday morning, August 26, with Dean Acheson, Louis Johnson, John Snyder, Averell Harriman, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I read this group the MacArthur statement and asked each of them if he had had any advance knowledge of it. It was a surprise and a shock to all. I then instructed Secretary Johnson to send a personal message to MacArthur telling him that I wanted him to withdraw the statement. This, I knew, would not prevent its distribution, but it would make clear that it had no official standing and that it had been taken back by the man who had written it.

On August 26, 1950, Secretary Johnson sent the following message to MacArthur:

"The President of the United States directs that you withdraw your message for National Encampment of Veterans of Foreign Wars, because various features with respect to Formosa are in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations."

General MacArthur complied with this directive at once, but I felt that I ought to supplement Secretary Johnson's telegram with a more detailed exposition of our policy. A clear summary of our Formosa position was contained in the letter which Ambassador Austin had written to Trygve Lie, and I decided to call this letter to MacArthur's attention. I knew that a copy had been sent to his headquarters, but it might well have been misplaced among the many papers reaching there from Washington. A personal letter from me would make certain that it would be read, I thought. This is the letter I wrote General MacArthur:

I am sending you for your information the text of a letter which I sent to Ambassador Austin dated August 27. I am sure that when you examine this letter, and the letter which Ambassador Austin addressed to Trygve Lie on August 25 (a copy of which I am told was sent your headquarters that night), you will understand why my action of the 26th in directing the withdrawal of your message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars was necessary.

General Collins and Admiral Sherman have given me a comprehensive report of their conversation with you and of their visit to the United Nations forces now fighting under your command in Korea. Their reports are most satisfactory and highly gratifying to me.

The text of the letter to Ambassador Austin referred to above follows:

"As I told you on the telephone this morning, I want to congratulate you on your able presentation of the views of the United States Government in the Security Council of the United Nations from the first onset of the aggression against the Republic of Korea. Throughout the entire course of the proceedings you have represented this Government with great effectiveness and in full accordance with my directions."

The letter which you addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations on August 25 on the subject of Formosa admirably sums up the fundamental position of this Government as it had been stated by me on June 27 and in my Message to the Congress on July 19. You have clearly and in full accord with the heart and essence of the problem. You have faithfully set down my views as they were then and as they are now.

"To the end that there be no misunderstanding concerning the position of the Government of the United States with respect to Formosa, it may be useful to repeat here the seven fundamental points which you so clearly stated in your letter to Mr. Lie."

1. The United States has not encroached on the territory of China, nor the United States taken aggressive action against China.

2. The action of the United States in regard to Formosa was taken at a time when that island was the scene of conflict with the mainland. More serious conflict was threatened by the public declaration of the Chinese communist authorities. Such conflict would have threatened the security of the United Nations forces operating in Korea under the mandate of the Security Council to repel the aggression of the Republic of Korea. They threatened to extend the conflict through the Pacific area.

3. The action of the United States was an impartial neutralizing action addressed both to the forces on Formosa and to those on the mainland. It was an action designed to keep the peace and was, therefore, in full accord with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. As President Truman so solidly declared, we have no designs on Formosa, and our action was not inspired by any desire to acquire a special position for the United States.

4. The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future.

5. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there.

6. The United States has a record through history of friendship for the Chinese people. We still feel the friendship and know that millions of Chinese appreciate it. We took the lead with others in the last United Nations General Assembly to secure approval of a resolution on the integrity of China. Only the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites did not approve that resolution.

7. The United States would welcome United Nations consideration of a case of Formosa. We would approve full United Nations investigation, one or on the spot. We believe that United Nations consideration would contribute to a peaceful, rather than a forceable solution of that problem.

"We do not believe that the Security Council need be, or will be, diverted from its consideration of the aggression against the Republic of Korea. There was a breach of the peace in Korea. The aggressor attacked, was condemned, and the combined forces of the United Nations are now in battle to repel the aggression."

"Formosa is now at peace and will remain so unless someone resorts to force.

"If the Security Council wishes to study the question of Formosa, we
shall support and assist that study. Meanwhile, the president of the Security Council should discharge the duties of his office and get on with the item on the agenda, which is the complaint of aggression against the Republic of Korea, and, specifically, the recognition of the right of the Korean Ambassador to take his seat and the vote on the United States resolution for the localization of the Korean conflict.

"These seven points accurately record the position of the United States. "In the forthcoming discussion of the problem in the Security Council you will continue to have my complete support."

"Sincerely yours,

Harry S. Truman"

The visit to Japan and Korea by General Collins and Admiral Sherman, to which I referred in my letter to MacArthur, marked an important phase in our effort in Korea. By early August, our forces there had been built up to a ground strength of sixty-five thousand men, sufficient to hold the Pusan beachhead and enough to give encouragement to offensive planning, and on August 10 the Secretary of Defense informed me that it was planned to send nearly two more divisions to Korea before September 25. Naval and air forces had been similarly increased and further build-ups were in preparation.

To provide the forces General MacArthur had called for, we had drawn on troop units in the continental United States, in Puerto Rico, in Hawaii, and had even brought some marines back from duty with the fleet units in the Mediterranean.

General Collins and Admiral Sherman had left for Tokyo on August 19 for their detailed conference on General MacArthur's plans for an offensive, and on their return they placed these plans before me for my information and advised me that the Joint Chiefs had approved the plans. It was a daring strategic conception. I had the greatest confidence that it would succeed.

My confidence was expressed in a broadcast I made to the nation on September 1. "Two months ago," I said, "Communist imperialism turned from the familiar tactics of infiltration and subversion to brutal attack on the small Republic of Korea. The friendly nations of the world faced two possible courses: To limit their action to diplomatic protests while the Communist aggressors swallowed up their victim; or to meet military aggression with armed forces. The second course is the one which the free world chose. Thus, for the first time in all history, men of many nations are fighting under a single banner to uphold the rule of law in the world. This is an inspiring fact."

I declared that our aims and intentions could be put down in eight points: "1. We believe in the United Nations and pledge ourselves to seek peace and security through that organization. 2. We believe that Koreans have a right to be free, independent, and united. 3. We do not want the fighting in Korea to spread into a general war; it will not spread unless Communist imperialism draws other armies and governments into the fight of the aggressors against the United Nations. 4. We hope in particular that the people of China will not be misled or forced into fighting against the United Nations and against the American people who have always been and still are their friends. 5. We do not want Formosa or any part of Asia for ourselves. 6. We believe in freedom for all of the nations of the Far East. 7. We do not believe in aggression or in preventive war. 8. Our men are fighting for peace today in Korea; we are working constantly for peace in the United Nations and in all the capitals of the world."

The decision to take the offensive in Korea made it necessary to consider on a high policy level what our subsequent course of action should be. This was done in National Security Council discussions which finally resulted in a policy statement that I approved on September 11, 1950.

The National Security Council recommended that our course of action would be influenced by three factors: action by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, consultation with friendly members of the United Nations, and the risk of general war.

General MacArthur was to conduct the necessary military operations either to force the North Koreans behind the 38th parallel or to destroy their forces. If there was no indication or threat of entry of Soviet or Chinese Communist elements in force, the National Security Council recommended that General MacArthur was to extend his operations north of the parallel and to make plans for the occupation of North Korea. However, no ground operations were to take place north of the 38th parallel in the event of Soviet or Chinese Communist entry.

A Joint Chiefs' directive based on this recommendation, which I approved, was sent to General MacArthur on September 15.

September 15 was D-Day at Inchon. The 1st Marine Division and the Army's 7th Infantry Division went ashore there and established a bridgehead. Then these two units, comprising the X Corps commanded by Major General Almond, moved toward Seoul in order to free the Korean capital of the enemy. Resistance was fanatical, but on September 28 the liberation of the city was complete, and on September 29 Syngman Rhee moved his government back. Earlier, on September 26, a juncture had been effected between elements of the 1st Cavalry Division of the Eighth Army, which had broken out of the Pusan perimeter,
and 7th Infantry Division troops from the Inchon area. The enemy was disorganized and badly shaken.

I sent a message of congratulations to General MacArthur:

"I know that I speak for the entire American people when I send you my warmest congratulations on the victory which has been achieved under your leadership in Korea. Few operations in military history can match either the delaying action where you traded space for time in which to build up your forces, or the brilliant maneuver which has now resulted in the liberation of Seoul. I am particularly impressed by the splendid cooperation of our Army, Navy and Air Force, and I wish you would extend my thanks and congratulations to the commanders of those services—Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Vice Admiral Charles T. Joy and Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer. The unification of our arms established by you and by them has set a shining example. My thanks and the thanks of the people of all the free nations go out to your gallant forces—soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen—from the United States and the other countries fighting for freedom under the United Nations banner. I salute you all, and say to all of you from all of us at home, 'Well and nobly done.'"

I had already given approval to new instructions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had transmitted to MacArthur on September 27, in which he was told that his military objective was "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces." In attaining this objective he was authorized to conduct military operations north of the 38th parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation there had been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of an intended entry, and no threat by Russian or Chinese Communists to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. He was also instructed that under no circumstances were any of his forces to cross the Manchuria or U.S.S.R. borders of Korea, and, as a matter of policy, no non-Korean ground forces were to be used in the provinces bordering on the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border. Similarly, support of his operations north or south of the 38th parallel by air or naval action against Manchuria or against U.S.S.R. territory was specifically ruled out.

The directive further instructed the Far East commander the action he should take in the event of Soviet entry into the conflict or entry by the Chinese Communists. It read:

"In the event of the open or covert employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th parallel, you should continue the action as long as action by your forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance."
munist regime, had called in the Indian Ambassador to Peiping, K. M. Panikkar, and had told him that if United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel China would send in troops to help the North Koreans. However, this action would not be taken if only South Koreans crossed the 38th parallel.

This message was at once transmitted to General MacArthur.

Similar reports had been received from Moscow, Stockholm, and New Delhi. However, the problem that arose in connection with these reports was that Mr. Panikkar had in the past played the game of the Chinese Communists fairly regularly, so that his statement could not be taken as that of an impartial observer. It might very well be no more than a relay of Communist propaganda. There was also then pending in the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations a resolution recommending that all appropriate steps be taken to insure stability throughout all of Korea. This resolution, if adopted, would be a clear authorization for the United Nations commander to operate in North Korea. The key vote on the resolution was due the following day, and it appeared quite likely that Chou En-lai’s “message” was a bald attempt to blackmail the United Nations by threats of intervention in Korea.

The possibility of Chinese intervention in Korea, however, could not be discounted, and I therefore instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a directive to General MacArthur to cover such an eventuality. The Joint Chiefs submitted their recommendation to me through the Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall, who had succeeded Louis Johnson on September 21, and I approved the following message to General MacArthur:

“In light of the possible intervention of Chinese Communist forces in North Korea the following amplification of our directive [of September 25] is forwarded for your guidance:

‘Hereafter in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announce-
ment, you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory.’ ”

This directive was sent to General MacArthur on October 9. In the meantime, however, I had reached another decision. I wanted to have a personal talk with the general.

The first and the simplest reason why I wanted to meet with General MacArthur was that we had never had any personal contacts at all, and I thought that he ought to know his Commander in Chief and that I ought to know the senior field commander in the Far East. I have always regretted that General MacArthur declined the invitations that were extended to him to return to the United States, even if only for a short visit, during his years in Japan. He should have come back to familiarize himself with the situation at home. This is something I have always advocated for our foreign service personnel—that they should spend one year in every four in their own country. Then they would understand what the home folks were thinking.

Events since June had shown me that MacArthur had lost some of his contacts with the country and its people in the many years of his absence. He had been in the Orient for nearly fourteen years then, and all his thoughts were wrapped up in the East. I had made efforts through Harriman and others to let him see the world-wide picture as we saw it in Washington, but I felt that we had had little success. I thought he might adjust more easily if he heard it from me directly.

The Peiping reports of threatened intervention in Korea by the Chinese Communists were another reason for my desire to confer with General MacArthur. I wanted to get the benefit of his firsthand information and judgment.

For a short time I thought of flying to Korea to pay our troops there a brief visit. I realized that MacArthur would feel that his place in those perilous days was near his forces and that he would hesitate to make the long trip across the ocean for what might be only a few hours’ talk. I suggested, therefore, that we meet somewhere in the Pacific, and Wake Island was agreed on as a good location.

I announced that I was going to meet General MacArthur over the weekend of October 13-17. The reason I chose this weekend was that I had agreed to speak on October 17 in San Francisco, where a little over five years earlier I had spoken at the signing of the United Nations Charter. Then, on October 24, I was scheduled to address the U. N. General Assembly in New York. Naturally I wanted to be able to include in these speeches a firsthand account from the United Nations commander, and, in this sense, the journey I had in mind would be taken on behalf of the United Nations as well.

I left Washington aboard the presidential plane Independence on the afternoon of October 11 on the first leg of the trip, which took us only as far as St. Louis. After an overnight stop there the flight was resumed at two-thirty in the afternoon of the twelfth, and six and three quarters hours later we landed at Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base in California. The first portion of our long flight across the ocean began shortly after midnight that night, but I had gone aboard the plane about an hour earlier and was asleep before the take-off. I woke up around five
o'clock in the morning—or at least my watch gave that time. I discovered when I went forward to the pilots' section, however, that by local time it was only three. I had breakfast and then went forward again and sat in the second pilot's seat as we approached the Hawaiian Islands. It was still dark, but at regular intervals the lights of ships could be seen below. These were the destroyers the Navy had stationed along my route—just in case a mishap occurred to the plane. Colonel Williams, the pilot, said that visibility was exceptionally fine that morning; in any case, I had a breath-taking view of the entire chain of islands rising slowly out of the western sky, tiny little dark points in a vastness of blue that I would not have believed if I had not seen it myself. Then slowly the specks of land took shape and were distinct islands. At last the plane passed Diamond Head, circled low over Pearl Harbor, and came in for a landing at Hickam Air Force Base.

I was welcomed by an official party headed by Governor Stainback, Admiral Radford, commander of the Pacific fleet, and other high officials, both military and civilian.

Later that morning Admiral Radford escorted me on a boat trip about Pearl Harbor. He showed me the remnants and reminders of the tragic day in 1941, and he also showed me the fine facilities that served as the base for our great Pacific fleet today. I had lunch at the Officers' Club at Pearl Harbor and made a brief speech to the guests. In the afternoon I visited Tripler General Hospital and talked to some of the wounded who were there from Korea. Between Pearl Harbor and the hospital I seemed to have passed from one epoch of history into another, and yet 1941 was less than ten years ago.

The Independence left Hickam Field a few minutes after midnight on Saturday, October 14. Again I had retired before the plane was airborne and slept most of the way. I was asleep when we passed the international dateline, and I did not know that favorable wind conditions had gotten us ahead of schedule so that the pilot had to cut speed in order not to get to Wake Island before the prearranged arrival time.

I got up an hour before landing time, had breakfast with some of the members of my party, and at six-thirty the plane rolled to a halt on the Wake Island landing field. It was dawn. By local time it was Sunday, October 15.

General MacArthur was at the ramp of the plane as I came down. His shirt was unbuttoned, and he was wearing a cap that had evidently seen a good deal of use. We greeted each other cordially, and after the photographers had finished their usual picture orgy we got into an old two-door sedan and drove to the office of the airline manager on the island.
end, in both North and South Korea, by Thanksgiving. This, he said, would enable him to withdraw the Eighth Army to Japan by Christmas. He would leave two divisions and the detachments of the other United Nations in Korea until elections had been held there. He thought this might be done as early as January and that it would then be possible to take all non-Korean troops out of the country.

Quite a bit of discussion followed about the aid Korea would need for rehabilitation once the conflict had been concluded, and both General MacArthur and Ambassador Muccio answered questions which were put to them by me and other members of my party. When Secretary Pace asked General MacArthur what the Army or ECA could do to help him, the general said, without any hesitation, that he did not know of any commander in the history of war who had ever had more complete and adequate support than he had received from all agencies in Washington.

I remember that we talked about the prisoners our forces had taken, and the general said that they were the happiest Koreans in all Korea. They were well fed and clean, and though they had been captured as North Korean "Communists," they were really no different from other Koreans.

Then I gave MacArthur an opportunity to repeat to the larger group some of the things he had said to me in our private meeting.

"What are the chances," I asked, "for Chinese or Soviet interference?"

The general's answer was really in two parts. First he talked about the Chinese. He thought, he said, that there was very little chance that they would come in. At the most they might be able to get fifty or sixty thousand men into Korea, but, since they had no air force, "if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter."

Then he referred to the possibilities of Russian intervention. He referred to the Russian air strength, but he was certain that their planes and pilots were inferior to ours. He saw no way for the Russians to bring in any sizable number of ground troops before the onset of winter. This would leave the possibility of combined Chinese-Russian intervention, he observed, with Russian planes supporting Chinese ground units. This, he thought, would be no danger: "It just wouldn't work," he added, "with Chinese Communist ground and Russian air."

Most of the later discussion was given over to the subject of Japan. MacArthur expressed himself strongly in favor of a Japanese peace treaty and approved especially of the State Department draft. He also said, in reply to a question from me, that he thought a Pacific pact would be a good idea but that it would mean very little because the Asian nations had no military strength and therefore any agreement like that would be a one-way street, with the United States giving the Pacific nations a guarantee without getting much of anything in return. He thought a presidential statement would accomplish just as much as an pact in that area.

This formal conference ended at a little after nine o'clock. General MacArthur then had further discussions on technical matters with Secretary Pace and General Bradley, while Ambassador Muccio talked with the State Department officials in the party.

General MacArthur was anxious to return to Tokyo, and we decided, therefore, to leave Wake Island before lunch. The time differential between Wake Island and Tokyo would have thrown the general's return into the night hours if we had stayed and had lunch together, as I had planned.

I awarded General MacArthur a fourth Oak Leaf Cluster to his Distinguished Service Medal and also made an award to Ambassador Muccio. Then the general and I looked over the communiqué which General Bradley and Ambassador Jessup had drawn up, and MacArthur initialed it to indicate that it expressed his views.

As we returned to our planes I told MacArthur that I thought we had had a most satisfactory conference and that I hoped our next meeting would not be too long delayed. We shook hands, and he wished me "Happy landings" as I went aboard the Independence.

The return trip took us back across the international dateline on our way to Hawaii. It had been Sunday, October 15, when I left Wake Island, but it was Saturday, October 14, once again when I disembarked from the plane at Hickam Air Force Base. In this manner, although I just spent Sunday on Wake Island, it was Sunday again the next day. Most of the day was given over to work on the speech I would deliver in San Francisco. We had a lunch at a beach reservation and a drive to some of the scenic spots of the islands in the afternoon. The trip from Hawaii to San Francisco was made on Monday, October 16. It was the following evening when I spoke in the San Francisco Opera House. I reported to the American people on the Wake Island landing, and talked about Korea as a symbol of United Nations action. "I have just returned from Wake Island," I said, "where I had a very satisfactory conference with General Douglas MacArthur."

"I understand that there has been speculation about why I made this trip. There is really no mystery about it. I went because I wanted to and talk to General MacArthur. The best way to see him and talk him is to meet him somewhere and talk to him.
There is no substitute for personal conversation with the commander in the field who knows the problems there from first-hand experience. He has information at his fingertips which can be of help to all of us in deciding upon the right policies in these critical times.

I went out to Wake Island to see General MacArthur because I did not want to take him far away from Korea, where he is conducting very important operations with great success. Events are moving swiftly over there now, and I did not feel that he should be away from his post too long.

At the same time I believed my trip to Wake Island would give emphasis to the historic action taken by the United Nations on Korea. For Korea has become the symbol of the resistance of a united humanity against aggression.

I also felt that there was pressing need to make it perfectly clear—by my talk with General MacArthur—that there is complete unity in the aims and conduct of our foreign policy.

I have come back from this conference with increased confidence in our long-range ability to maintain world peace.

At Wake Island we talked over the Far Eastern situation and its relationship to the problem of world peace. I asked General MacArthur for his ideas on the ways in which the United States can most effectively assist the United Nations in promoting and maintaining peace and security throughout the Pacific area.

We discussed Japan and the need for an early Japanese peace treaty. Both of us look forward with confidence to a new Japan which will be peaceful and prosperous.

General MacArthur told me about the fighting in Korea. He described the magnificent achievements of all the United Nations forces serving under his command. Along with the soldiers of the Republic of Korea these forces have now turned back the tide of aggression. More fighting men are coming from free nations all over the world. I am confident that these forces will soon restore peace to the whole of Korea.

We here at home in America naturally take special pride in the superb achievements of our own soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen. They have written a glorious new page in military history. We can all be proud of them.

It is also a source of pride to us that our country was asked to furnish the first commander of United Nations' troops. It is fortunate for the world that we had the right man for this purpose—a man who is a very great soldier—General Douglas MacArthur.

Now I want Wake Island to be a symbol of our unity of purpose for world peace. I want to see world peace from Wake Island west all the way around and back again. I want to see world peace from Wake Island east all the way east and back again—and we are going to get it!

The United Nations action in Korea is of supreme importance for the peoples of the world.

For the first time in history the nations who want peace have taken arms under the banner of an international organization to put down aggression. Under that banner, the banner of the United Nations, they are succeeding. This is a tremendous step forward in the age-old struggle to establish the rule of law in the world. . . .

Today as a result of the Korean struggle the United Nations is stronger than it has ever been. We know now that the United Nations can create a system of international order with the authority to maintain peace.

When I met with General MacArthur we discussed plans for coming the task of bringing peace to Korea. We talked about the plans for establishing a "united, independent, and democratic" government for Korea in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

It has been our policy ever since World War I to achieve these results for Korea.

Our sole purpose in Korea is to establish peace and independence. Our troops will stay there only so long as they are needed by the United Nations for that purpose. We seek no territory or special privileges in Korea or anywhere else. We have no aggressive designs in any country in the Far East or elsewhere. And I want to be perfectly clear to the whole world.

Our country in the world which really wants peace has any reason for the United States of America.

The only victory we seek is the victory of peace.

The United Nations forces in Korea are making spectacular progress. But the fighting is not yet over. The North Korean communists refuse to acknowledge the authority of the United Nations. They continue to put up stubborn, but futile, resistance.

The United Nations forces are growing in strength and are now far better than it has ever been. We know now that the United Nations can bring victory to Korea.

Here, in San Francisco, five years ago, we hoped that the Soviet Union would cooperate in this effort to build a lasting peace.

But communist imperialism would not have it so. Instead of working with other governments in mutual respect and cooperation, the Soviet Union attempted to extend its control over other peoples. It embarked on a new colonialism—Soviet style. This new colonialism has already brought under its complete control and exploitation many
countries which used to be free countries. Moreover, the Soviet Union has refused to cooperate and has not allowed its satellites to cooperate with those nations it could not control.

"In the United Nations, the Soviet Union has persisted in obstruction. It has refused to share in activities devoted to the great economic, social, and spiritual causes recognized in the United Nations Charter. For months on end, it even boycotted the Security Council.

"The Soviet Union and its colonial satellites are maintaining armed forces of great size and strength. In both Europe and Asia, their vast armies pose a constant threat to world peace. So long as they persist in maintaining these forces and in using them to intimidate other countries, the free men of the world have but one choice if they are to remain free. They must oppose strength with strength.

"This is not a task for the United States alone. It is a task for the free nations to undertake together. And the free nations are undertaking it together.

"In the United Nations, Secretary of State Dean Acheson has proposed a plan for 'Uniting For Peace,' to make it possible for the General Assembly to act quickly and effectively in case of any further outbreak of aggression.

"Now, the Soviet Union can change this situation. It has only to give concrete and positive proof of its intention to work for peace. If the Soviet Union really wants peace, it must prove it—not by glittering promises and false propaganda, but by living up to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

"If the Soviet Union really wants peace, it can prove it—and could have proved it on any day since last June 25—by joining the rest of the United Nations in calling upon the North Koreans to lay down their arms at once.

"If the Soviet Union really wants peace, it can prove it by lifting the Iron Curtain and permitting the free exchange of information and ideas. If the Soviet Union really wants peace, it can prove it by joining in the efforts of the United Nations to establish a workable system of collective security—a system which will permit the elimination of the atomic bomb and the drastic reduction and regulation of all other arms and armed forces.

"But until the Soviet Union does these things, until it gives real proof of peaceful intentions, we are determined to build up the common defensive strength of the free world. This is the choice we have made. We have made it firmly and resolutely. But it is not a choice we have made gladly. We are not a militaristic nation. We have no desire for conquest or military glory."
Arthur did not have great confidence in the Korean Army at that time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had instructed MacArthur that in his advance north he should not place non-Korean elements near the Manchurian and Soviet borders. But in his order to his commanders the general provided for the drive to the north to be spearheaded by American units. After the border was reached, South Koreans were to take their places “where feasible.” The Joint Chiefs, expressing concern, asked MacArthur the reasons for this change.

In his answer General MacArthur said that the ROK forces were not of sufficient strength to accomplish the initial security of North Korea and that he considered it essential to use more seasoned and experienced commanders. MacArthur said he saw no conflict in his orders and the directive given him which stated: “We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel.” MacArthur added, “I am fully cognizant of the basic purpose and intent of your directive, and every possible precaution is being taken in the premises. The very reverse, however, would be fostered and tactical hazards might even result from other action than that which I have directed. This entire subject was covered in my conference at Wake Island.”

While MacArthur’s forces were moving north without too much opposition, there was considerable speculation about the likelihood of the Chinese Communists taking some action in North Korea. On October 20 the CIA delivered a memorandum to me which said that they had reports that the Chinese Communists would move in far enough to safeguard the Suiho electric plant and other installations along the Yalu River which provided them with power. The State Department’s reaction to this report was to suggest that General MacArthur issue a statement to the United Nations that he did not intend to interfere with the operations of the Suiho and other power plants. The Joint Chiefs said that such an announcement would be undesirable from a military point of view. When the situation was placed before me, I instructed the Joint Chiefs to communicate the State Department’s suggestion to MacArthur, asking if he had any objection to the issuing of such a statement. General MacArthur felt, however, that he did not wish his hands tied in such a manner, and the statement was therefore not issued.

It is very doubtful that it would have made any difference anyhow. As we were later to learn, the Chinese Communists had already started their move into North Korea, although it was not until October 31 that we gained evidence that they were in the battle area and actually fighting against the United Nations forces.
and as usual I planned to cast my ballot in Independence. That morning I received an urgent call from Dean Acheson. The Secretary of State was calling from a conference in Washington with the Under Secretary of Defense, Robert Lovett, and the matter before them was of such importance that they felt an immediate decision was necessary.

This was the situation and developments as Acheson reported to me over the telephone. Under Secretary of Defense Lovett had come to his office, Acheson said, at ten o’clock to tell him that a message had just been received from the Air Force commander in the Far East, Lieutenant General Stratemeyer. MacArthur had ordered a bombing mission to take out the bridge across the Yalu River from Sinuiju (Korea) to Antung (Manchuria). Ninety B-29’s were scheduled to take off at one o’clock Washington time to take part in this mission. Lovett had told Acheson that from an operational standpoint he doubted whether the results to be achieved would be important enough to outweigh the danger of bombing Antung or other points on the Manchurian side of the river.

Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointed out that we had a commitment with the British not to take action which might involve attacks on the Manchurian side of the river without consultation with them. He also told Mr. Lovett that the State Department had presented MacArthur’s report on Chinese Communist intervention to the United Nations and that an urgent meeting of the Security Council had been requested. At this meeting we would try to get a resolution adopted calling on the Chinese Communists to cease their activities in Korea; this was necessary in order to maintain U.N. support for any further action to be taken. Mr. Rusk also mentioned the danger of involving the Soviets, especially in the light of the mutual-assistance treaty between Moscow and Peiping.

Acheson went on to say that Lovett and he had agreed that this air action ought to be postponed until we had more facts about the situation there. Lovett then called Marshall, who agreed that the attack was unwise unless there was some mass movement across the river which threatened the security of our troops. Then Lovett called the Air Force Secretary, Mr. Finletter, and instructed him to tell the Joint Chiefs what Mr. Rusk had set forth and to tell them that he (Lovett) and Acheson both felt that this action should be postponed until they were able to get a decision from me.

I told Acheson that I would approve this bombing mission only if there was an immediate and serious threat to the security of our troops. Acheson said that nothing had been heard from MacArthur since his last report, and that report had contained no statement of any further developments across the river but had spoken only of reserves on the Chinese side. I told Acheson that we would have to find out why MacArthur suddenly found this action necessary and told him to have Lovett issue instructions accordingly.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff carried out my instructions in a message that went out at eleven-forty Washington time, only an hour and twenty minutes before the planes were to take off from their Japanese bases. In the message that was sent, MacArthur was advised that this action was urgently being given to the Korean situation at the operational level. He was informed that there was a commitment not to take action affecting Manchuria without consultation with the United Nations and that an urgent meeting of the Security Council was to be held, and that until further orders all bombing of targets within ten miles of the Manchurian border should be postponed. Meanwhile, I should forward his estimate of the situation and his reasons for the bombing of the Yalu River bridges.

This was MacArthur’s reply:

6 November

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bring about retaliatory moves; damaged planes might be forced to land in territory beyond our control. But since General MacArthur was on the scene and felt so strongly that this was of unusual urgency, I told Bradley to give him the "go-ahead."

This was the message sent MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs:

"The situation depicted in your message (of November 6) is considerably changed from that reported in last sentence your message (of November 4) which was our last report from you. We agree that the destruction of the Yalu bridges would contribute materially to the security of the forces under your command unless this action resulted in increased Chinese Communist effort and even Soviet contribution in response to what they might well construe as an attack on Manchuria. Such a result would not only endanger your forces but would enlarge the area of conflict and U.S. involvement to a most dangerous degree.

"However in view of first sentence your message (of November 6) you are authorized to go ahead with your planned bombing in Korea near the frontier including targets at Sinuiju and Korean end of Yalu bridges provided that at time of receipt of this message you still find such action essential to safety of your forces. The above does not authorize the bombing of any dams or power plants on the Yalu River.

"Because of necessity for maintaining optimum position with United Nations policy and directives and because it is vital in the national interests of the U.S. to localize the fighting in Korea it is important that extreme care be taken to avoid violation Manchurian territory and airspace and to report promptly hostile action therefrom.

"It is essential that we be kept informed of important changes in situation as they occur and that your estimate as requested in our [message of November 6] be submitted as soon as possible."

On this day, November 6, General MacArthur issued a communique in Tokyo in which he announced that his forces were now faced by a new and fresh army backed up by large reserves and adequate supplies within easy reach of the enemy but beyond the limits of the present sphere of military action.

The Central Intelligence Agency also now supplied me with an estimate of the situation based on their sources of information. It reported that there might be as many as two hundred thousand Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria and that their entry into Korea might stop the United Nations advance and actually force the United Nations forces to withdraw to defensive positions farther south. The estimate concluded by pointing to one inescapable fact: With their entry into Korea, the Chinese Communists had staked not only some of their forces but also their prestige in Asia. It had to be taken into account they knew what risks they were taking; in other words, that they were ready for general war.

General MacArthur's estimate of the situation arrived in two messages on November 7. In the first of these messages MacArthur referred back to his initial appraisal (of November 4) of the Chinese intervention and concluded that he had been confirmed in his belief that this was not a full-scale intervention by the Chinese Communists. He noted the possibility that the intervening forces might be reinforced at a point rendering our resumption of advance impossible and even drawing a movement in retrograde. He was planning, he said, again to assume the initiative in order to take "accurate measure . . . of my strength." And he went on to say: "I deem it essential to execute bombing of the targets under discussion as the only resource left to prevent a potential buildup of enemy strength to a point threatening the safety of the command. This interdiction of enemy advance in Korea is so plainly defensive that it is hard to believe that it would cause an increase in the volume of local interdiction or, of itself, provoke a general war.

The inviolability of Manchuria and Siberia has been a cardinal interest of the U.S. It is essential that we be kept informed of important changes in situation as they occur and that your estimate as requested in our message of November 6 be submitted as soon as possible."

The second message from MacArthur read:

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to listen to more than military judgments, and my decisions had to be made on the basis of not just one theater of operations but of a much more comprehensive picture of our nation's place in the world.

We were in Korea in the name and on behalf of the United Nations. The “unified command” which I had entrusted to Douglas MacArthur was a United Nations command, and neither he nor I would have been justified if we had gone beyond the mission that the United Nations General Assembly had given us.

There was no doubt in my mind that we should not allow the action in Korea to extend into a general war. All-out military action against China had to be avoided, if for no other reason than because it was a gigantic booby trap.

The Central Intelligence Agency’s estimate of the situation was that the Russians were not themselves willing to go to war but that they wanted to involve us as heavily as possible in Asia so that they might gain a free hand in Europe.

I asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give their views on the military significance of the Chinese Communists’ intervention in Korea. This is what they recommended:

1. Every effort should be expended as a matter of urgency to settle the problem of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea by political means, preferably through the United Nations, to include reassurances to the Chinese Communists with respect to our intent, direct negotiations through our Allies and the Interim Committee with the Chinese Communist Government, and by any other available means.

2. Pending further clarification as to the military objectives of the Chinese Communists and the extent of their intended commitments, the missions assigned to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, should be kept under review, but should not be changed.

3. The United States should develop its plans and make its preparations on the basis that the risk of global war is increased.

General Marshall, as Secretary of Defense, concurred in these conclusions.

At a meeting on November 9 the National Security Council held a full discussion of these views of the Joint Chiefs and of the general problems created by the Chinese intervention. I was unable to attend this meeting but was given a report of the proceedings afterward.

General Bradley stated at this meeting that there were three possible intentions of the Chinese Communists with which we would have to reckon. First, it was possible that the Chinese desired only to set up a buffer area that would protect their interests in the power facilities along the Yalu River. If this were the case, then negotiations might be

...
a twenty-mile demilitarized zone, ten miles on each side of the Yalu.
He went on to say that the trouble with any such proposal, of course,
would be that the Communists would insist on all foreign troops leaving
Korea, and thus abandon Korea to the Communists.

When Secretary Acheson summarized this discussion, he pointed out
that it was agreed that General MacArthur’s directive should not now
be changed and that he should be free to do what he could in a military
way, but without bombing Manchuria. At the same time, the State
Department would seek ways to find out whether negotiations with the
Chinese Communists were possible, although one problem was that
we lacked any direct contacts with the Peiping regime through diplo-
matic channels.

The situation in Korea, it should be pointed out, was not the only
instance of a new aggressiveness on the part of Communist China. There
was evidence that the Communist rebel forces in Indo-China were re-
ceiving increasing aid and advice from Peiping. Also, in the last days of
October, Communist China had moved against the ancient theocracy
of Tibet.

We were seeing a pattern in Indo-China and Tibet timed to coincide
with the attack in Korea as a challenge to the Western world. It was
a challenge by the Communists alone, aimed at intensifying the smolder-
ing anti-foreign feeling among most Asian peoples.

Our British allies and many statesmen of Europe saw in the Chinese
moves a ruse to bring to a halt American aid in the rebuilding of Europe.
They knew that nothing had hurt world Communism worse than the
policy of the United States: aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall
Plan, the decision to hold fast in Berlin, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. The Kremlin could never communize Europe as long as
the United States stood ready to back it. The first commandment of Soviet foreign policy has always been to
divide the enemies of the Soviet Union, and the unity that United States
leadership had created in Europe was the most important target for
world Communism’s attack.

I had no intention of allowing our attention to be diverted from the
unchanging aims and designs of Soviet policy. I knew that in our age,
Europe, with its millions of skilled workmen, with its factories and
transportation network, is still the key to world peace.

There have been, and there are, men in the United States, some
well-meaning, some misguided, some malicious, who would have us
believe that we must impose our way of life on the people of Asia even
at the cost of letting Europe go. I cannot agree. But partisans of this
point of view are vocal, and they have the means to make themselves
heard. The Senate is a great sounding board. The speeches of the Asia-
advocates in the Senate and elsewhere receive wide publicity and
never fail to arouse fear in the minds of our friends abroad. During my
residency our policy was never dictated by any other nation, however
friendly to us. We maintained a deep devotion to the ideal of peace—
to peace through the United Nations, peace by working with others who
shared our aims and our attitudes.

The month of November 1950 saw us, therefore, occupied in three
times, so far as Korea was concerned. One was to reassure our allies
in Europe, especially the British and the French, that we had no inten-
tion of widening the conflict or of abandoning our commitments in
Europe for new entanglements in Asia. The second was in the United
States, where we sought the maximum support for our resistance
against the Chinese intervention in Korea, without, however, pushing
a U.N. toward military sanctions against Peiping—which would have
got war. The third effort was directed toward ascertaining the
strength and the direction and aim of the Chinese Communist effort.

General MacArthur started his Eighth Army on a major attack on
November 24. He announced that it was a “general offensive . . . to
the west,” and he told one of his commanders to tell the troops
they would be home by Christmas! Previously, on November 6
7, he had sounded an alarm in his messages to Washington that
were to portend impending disaster. But now, apparently, the grave
sger did not exist, since he announced victory even before the first
started marching.

Yet on the same day a national intelligence summary of the CIA
been made available to General MacArthur which stated that the
Chinese Communists would “at a minimum” increase their operations
in Korea, seek to immobilize our forces, subject them to prolonged
pressure, and maintain the semblance of a North Korean state in being.
also stated that the Chinese possessed sufficient strength to force the
United States military to withdraw to defensive positions.

The intelligence summary proved correct. By November 28 it was
clear that the Eighth Army had run up against vastly larger forces and
the X Corps, on the east coast, was in what the communiqué
ers like to call a “fluid situation”—which is a public relation man’s
way of saying that he can’t figure out what’s going on!
Now, no one is blaming General MacArthur, and certainly I never
blamed for the failure of the November offensive. He is no more to be
cused for the fact that he was outnumbered than General Eisenhower
and charged with the heavy losses of the Battle of the Bulge. But—
after lies the difference between the Eisenhower of 1944 and the
MacArthur of 1950—I do blame General MacArthur for the manner in which he tried to excuse his failure. In the first place, there was no need for him to proclaim this as an "end-the-war" offensive. If he knew that the forces opposing him were not so strong that they could stop him, then certainly his earlier message to the Chiefs of Staff had been wrong. But if he had been right earlier in November, then he could hardly have expected to score an easy victory now.

Perhaps these inconsistencies were to be expected, MacArthur had many times in World War II announced victory while his troops still faced the stiffest part of the battle. But there was no excuse for the statements he began to make to certain people as soon as the offensive had failed. Within a matter of four days he found time to publicize in four different ways his view that the only reason for his troubles was the order from Washington to limit the hostilities to Korea. He talked about "extraordinary inhibitions . . . without precedent in military history" and made it quite plain that no blame whatsoever attached to him or his staff.

The record shows, however, that General MacArthur himself reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on November 6 and 7, that the Chinese had intervened in Korea in strength. He had himself furnished us the information that there were sizable reserves across the Yalu River. He had requested—and been given—permission to bomb the bridges across which these reserves might flow into Korea.

Of course he had been denied authority to bomb bases in Manchuria and to engage in "hot pursuit" of enemy planes fleeing from Korea into Manchuria. The State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in agreement that it would be desirable to have U.N. approval for such a policy and therefore, with my approval, inquiries were made of all United Nations countries that had forces in Korea. Without exception, they indicated strong opposition. Indeed, they also stressed their wish that no non-Korean units should be placed in the area immediately adjacent to the Yalu River if our offensive should carry us that far.

There was no doubt that we had reached a point where grave decisions had to be made. If we chose to extend the war to China, we had to expect retaliation. Peiping and Moscow were allies, ideologically as well as by treaty. If we began to attack Communist China, we had to anticipate Russian intervention. Of course we wanted no war on any scale. But neither did we or the world want Communist slavery. And the question now was whether we had actually reached the point where this slavery so threatened us that we had to move to the destruction of cities and the killing of women and children.
who had said there was no danger of Chinese intervention. At Wake Island he had told me categorically that he had no evidence that a massed intervention was threatening. More important still, he had told me that he could easily cope with the Chinese Communists if they actually came in. He had said that if the Communists from China tried to retake Pyongyang they would be inviting slaughter.

Even before he started his ill-fated offensive of November 24, he still talked as if he had the answer to all the questions. But when it turned out that it was not so, he let all the world know that he would have won except for the fact that we would not let him have his way.

This was simply not true. General MacArthur had been given fullest information on the reasons for our policy. He had told numerous visitors to his Tokyo office, including Harriman, and he had told me at Wake Island that he understood these reasons although he did not believe in them. Of course every second lieutenant knows best what his platoon ought to be given to do, and he always thinks that the higher-ups are just blind when they don't see his way. But General MacArthur—and rightly, too—would have court-martialed any second lieutenant who gave press interviews to express his disagreement. I should have relieved General MacArthur then and there. The reason I did not was that I did not wish to have it appear as if he were being relieved because the offensive failed. I have never believed in going back on people when luck is against them, and I did not intend to do it now. Nor did I want to reprimand the general, but he had to be told that the kinds of public statements which he had been making were out of order.

This was the background for the order of December 5.

By that time a new point of disagreement had come up between General MacArthur and the defense chiefs. On November 28 General MacArthur had reported that he was changing his plans from the offensive to the defensive as provided for in the directives which he had been given. In his message on this subject he made the statement that "we face an entirely new war. . . ." His message said, "The resulting situation presents an entire new picture which broadens the potentialities to world embracing consideration beyond the sphere of decision by the theatre commander. This command has done everything humanly possible within its capabilities but is now faced with conditions beyond its control and its strength."

On the following day General MacArthur submitted a recommendation that we go back and take up the offer made seven months earlier by Chiang Kai-shek of thirty-three thousand Chinese Nationalist troops for Korea. At that time he himself had advised against using these troops. His recommendation now was, of course, in line with his view that the Korean action had become a war with Communist China. I brought the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after a lengthy conference in which the Department and Defense Department took part, to call MacArthur's attention to the international implication of his recommendation, and the following message was sent on November 29 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"Your proposal is being considered. It involves world-wide consequences. We shall have to consider the possibility that it would disrupt the united position of the nations associated with us in the United Nations, and have us isolated. It may be wholly unacceptable to the Commonwealth countries to have their forces employed with Nationalist Chinese. It might extend hostilities to Formosa and other areas. Incidentally, our position of leadership in the Far East is being most seriously compromised in the United Nations. The utmost care will be necessary to avoid the disruption of the essential Allied line-up in that organization."

Of course the situation in Korea was the subject of many long and serious discussions in my office. The future of our policy, not only in Korea, but in Europe as well, was at stake, and we spent a good deal of time searching for the answers to the tremendous problems before us. But we were not merely worrying over General MacArthur's lack of discretion.

On November 28, when the bad news from Korea had changed from rumors of resistance into certainty of defeat, I called a special meeting of the National Security Council. My own first knowledge of the extent of the damage that the Chinese were inflicting on our troops had come at nine that morning, when General Bradley had telephoned me a report from General MacArthur. General Bradley and the Chiefs of Staff had been in session all the day before, examining the situation, they felt that while it was serious they were doubtful that it was a catastrophe as our newspapers were leading us to believe.

General Bradley, however, stressed the danger that might arise if the Communists decided to use their air potential. It was our information that there were at least three hundred bombers on fields in nearby Manchuria. These bombers could hurt us badly, both by attacks on the right and by surprise raids on our closely jammed planes on Korean airfields. Despite these facts, General Bradley said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe that General MacArthur should be authorized to use airfields in Manchuria.

I asked if there was any way to lessen the damage we might suffer in a sudden attack by the Chinese Communists, and General Eisenhower said there was none, short of moving our planes back to
Japan. This, of course, would mean a considerable slowing up of our own military operations.

I asked Secretary of Defense Marshall for his comments on the situation, and he reported that the civilian heads of the services, too, had been in conference all day as a result of the developments in Korea. They had talked over what new requirements this would place on the procurement and supply of both men and matériel. A second military supplemental budget estimate was ready, and it was Marshall’s opinion, as he had made clear to me earlier that day, that it ought to be sent over to Congress at once. I was therefore able to inform the meeting that the Budget Director had already been instructed by me on this point.

General Marshall then talked about the diplomatic aspects of the situation, saying he thought it essential for the United States to go along with the United Nations approach to the Korean question, even if going along with the United Nations meant some difficult problems for us. He said that he felt it essential for us to keep a unanimity of approach in the U.N. He was emphatic on one point, on which he said the three service Secretaries agreed as the most important: that we should not get ourselves involved either individually or with the United Nations in a general war with China. Marshall said he did not think it was likely that the U.N. would get us “in such a fix,” but he thought we should recognize that there were some people at home who seemed to want all-out action against China.

Bradley said this reflected the Joint Chiefs’ thinking too. If we allowed ourselves to be pulled into a general war with China, it would be impossible to continue the build-up of forces in Europe. Secretary Pace added that it was important that everyone in the room understand that we had only the 82nd Airborne Division available at home and that the National Guard units that had been called into federal service would not be ready for combat until the middle of March.

At this point Vice-President Barkley broke in. The Vice-President did not often speak in these NSC meetings, and this was an indication of the worry and concern felt by the members of the Senate with whom he associated daily. What Barkley wanted to know was whether it was true that General MacArthur had made the statement that “the boys will be home by Christmas,” adding that this seemed incredible. Did MacArthur know what was going on, he asked, and how could a man in his position be guilty of such an indiscretion?

Secretary Lovett and Secretary Pace explained that MacArthur had “officially” denied the statement but that there was no doubt that he had made it. Secretary Pace had heard him make a similar statement to the National Security Council in conference. Pace added that it was important that everyone recognize that we had only the 82nd Airborne Division available at home and that the National Guard units that had been called into federal service would not be ready for combat until the middle of March.

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Barkley was still upset. “This is an incredible hoax,” he exclaimed. Acheson told him that, whatever we might think of the statement, we would have to be very careful not to pull the rug out from under the general. We simply could not afford to damage MacArthur’s prestige. But Barkley still felt deeply perturbed.

There was discussion then of the number of replacements MacArthur would need and what we might be able to send him. General Collins said he thought that a line could be held in Korea. The X Corps in the past was in a precarious position but probably could be pulled back to safety.

I asked Dean Acheson then to comment on the situation from his point of view, and the Secretary of State began with the statement that the events of the last few hours had moved us very much closer to the danger of general war. There had always been evidence of some Chinese participation in Korea, of course, but now we had an open, powerful, offensive attack. He said that we needed to bear in mind that the Soviet Union was behind one of the Chinese and North Korean moves and that we had to think of all that happened in Korea as world matters. We should never lose sight of the fact that we were facing the Soviet Union all around the world.

Of course, Acheson continued, if we openly accused the Soviet Union of aggression, the United Nations would be demolished. If we came out and pointed a finger at the Soviet Union, it would serve no purpose, because we could do nothing about it. To make the accusation, however, and then to do nothing about it would only weaken our world position. If we proposed action against the Kremlin, on the other hand, we might find ourselves alone, without allies.

As for the Chinese Communists, Acheson went on, we ought to draw a line and not try to walk both sides of the street. There was no use denying that they were fighting us, so we had better stir up trouble for them. There were a number of ways in which that could be done besides playing with Chiang.

As for the conflict in Korea, the Secretary of State was of the opinion that we should find some way to end it. If we went into Manchuria and bombed the airfields there with any degree of success, “Russia
would cheerfully get in it.” We had banked our entire foreign policy on the idea of keeping Russia contained, and we had succeeded in repulsing her attempts to break out. If we allowed the Russians now to trap us inside their perimeter, however, we would run the risk of being sucked into a bottomless pit. There would be no end to it, and it would bleed us dry. The Russians had tried to lure us into traps time and again. This one differed only in being bigger than the earlier ones.

Averell Harriman, who took part in the meeting, said that we ought to give careful attention to the mood of the free world. We had to maintain our leadership, and the immediate appointment of a supreme commander for the NATO powers would prove that. The free nations would stick with us if they felt sure that we were going to stick with them.

I said that it would be easier to convince the free world if some of our press were not so anxious to prove the contrary. Three of our biggest publishers, I think, were dividing our people and leading the world to believe that the American people had no confidence in their government. The campaign of vilification and lies and distortion of facts in so many of our papers was the greatest asset the Soviets had.

I told the National Security Council that I had thought at first that I ought to go before Congress and address a special session but that I did not now think this would be right. Korea was a United Nations matter, and our country should not make an individual approach to it.

The Cabinet met shortly after this meeting adjourned, and again Korea was discussed. The members of the Cabinet were briefed by General Bradley and by Dean Acheson on the most recent developments, and again we talked over the damage that had been done to the nation’s international position by the reckless charges and the rumormongering of the recent political campaign.

A lot of hard work was put in during the next few days to re-evaluate our plans and programs and to prepare for the next steps that would have to be taken. Most of my occasional callers had to give way to a steady stream of the top officials of the government. At the press conference on Thursday, November 30, I made a statement for publication that was intended to reflect our concern and also our determination.

“Recent developments in Korea,” the prepared copies of this statement read, “confront the world with a serious crisis. The Chinese Communist leaders have sent their troops from Manchuria to launch a strong and well-organized attack against the United Nations forces in North Korea. This has been done despite prolonged and earnest efforts to bring home to the Communist leaders of China the plain fact that neither the United Nations nor the United States has any aggressive intentions toward China. Because of the historic friendship between the people of the United States and China, it is particularly shocking to us to think that Chinese are being forced into battle against our troops in the United Nations command.

“The Chinese attack was made in great force, and it still continues. It has resulted in the forced withdrawal of large parts of the United Nations command. The battlefield situation is uncertain at this time. We may suffer reverses as we have suffered them before. But the forces of the United Nations have no intention of abandoning their mission in Korea.

“The forces of the United Nations are in Korea to put down an aggression that threatens not only the whole fabric of the United Nations, but all human hopes of peace and justice. If the United Nations yields to the forces of aggression, no nation will be safe or secure. If aggression is successful in Korea, we can expect it to spread throughout Asia and Europe to this hemisphere. We are fighting in Korea for our own national security and survival.

“We have committed ourselves to the cause of a just and peaceful world order through the United Nations. We stand by that commitment.

“We shall meet the new situation in three ways. We shall continue to work in the United Nations for concerted action to halt this aggression in Korea. We shall intensify our efforts to help other free nations strengthen their defenses in order to meet the threat of aggression elsewhere. We shall rapidly increase our own military strength.

“In the United Nations, the first step is action by the Security Council to halt this aggression. Ambassador Warren Austin is pressing for such action. We shall exert every effort to help bring the full influence of the United Nations to bear on the situation in Korea.

“Some had hoped that the normal peaceful process of discussion and negotiation, which is provided through the United Nations, could be successfully entered into with the present Chinese Communist delegation Lake Success. There is, however, no indication that the representatives of Communist China are willing to engage in this process. Instead of discussing the real issues, they have been making violent and wholly baseless statements of the type which have often been used by the Soviet representatives in an effort to prevent the Security Council from acting.

“We hope that the Chinese people will not continue to be forced or deceived into serving the ends of Russian colonial policy in Asia. I am certain that, if the Chinese people now under the control of the Communists were free to speak for themselves, they would denounce this aggression against the United Nations.

“Because the new act of aggression in Korea is only a part of a
world-wide pattern of danger to all the free nations of the world, it is more necessary than ever before for us to increase at a very rapid rate the combined military strength of the free nations. It is more necessary than ever that integrated forces in Europe under a Supreme Command be established at once.

"With respect to our own defense, I shall submit a supplemental request for appropriations needed immediately to increase the size and effectiveness of our armed forces. The request will include a substantial amount for the Atomic Energy Commission in addition to large amounts for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

"I expect to confer tomorrow with Congressional leaders and ask them to give urgent consideration to these new appropriations.

"This is a time for all our citizens to lay aside differences and unite in firmness and mutual determination to do what is best for our country and the cause of freedom throughout the world. This country is the keystone of the hope of mankind for peace and justice. We must show that we are guided by a common purpose and a common faith."

The congressional leaders met with me in the Cabinet Room at eleven o'clock the next day, December 1. Present from the Senate, besides the Vice-President, were McKellar, Connally, Lucas, Tydings, Russell, Thomas of Utah, Wherry, Bridges, Gurney, and Wiley; from the House, the Speaker and Representatives McCormack, Vinson, Richards, Cannon, Mahon, Taber, Easton, Short, Halleck, and Arends. With me were Acheson, Marshall, Lovett, Bradley, Harriman, Lawton of the Bureau of the Budget, Bedell Smith, Admiral Souers, and James Lay of the National Security Council.

General Bradley gave the congressmen a full description of the current military situation in Korea, and I invited them to address questions to the general. Senators Connally, Gurney, Wiley, and Bridges took the lead in the questions that followed: How many planes were there? What was the distance from here to there? and so forth. Then Senator Wherry again wanted chapter and verse for everything men would give. He was antagonistic and abrupt in his manner.

General Smith then set up a huge chart that showed the Soviet Union, its satellites and its neighboring areas. He showed how the events in Korea tied in with events in Europe. The Russians had just completed large-scale maneuvers, with over half a million men taking part. They had concentrated on river crossing and airborne operations. The Russians had also recently consolidated their Siberian forces under a single, unified command. This was unusual for them and deserved watching.

The Central Intelligence chief then gave some figures on the state

"Congress and gave them the figures of the supplemental appropriation request, adding that I would be available to answer any questions that anyone might have about this request, and so would the members of my staff and administration. But I wanted to stress that speed was essential if these new funds were to be of any use to us in the present critical international situation.

I said that our entire effort had been bent in the direction of preventing this affair in Korea from becoming a major Asiatic war. We were in a position to assume the burdens of a major war, but most of all, I did not wish to have any part in the killing of millions of innocents would surely happen if the fighting was allowed to spread.

Meanwhile, the picture in Korea was not getting any brighter. On December 3 MacArthur reported as follows:

3 Dec 50

From: MacArthur Joint Chiefs of Staff

The X Corps is being withdrawn into the Hamhung area as rapidly as possible. The situation with the Eighth Army becomes increasingly critical. General Walker reports, and I agree with his estimate, that he cannot hold Pyongyang area and under enemy pressure, when exerted, will unquestionably be forced to withdraw to the Seoul area. There is no practicability, would any benefit accrue thereby, to attempt to unite the forces of the Eighth Army and the X Corps. Both forces are completely outnumbered and their junction would, therefore, not only not produce added strength, but actually jeopardize the free flow of movement that arises from the two

Thus logistical lines of naval supply and maneuver.
As I previously reported, the development of a defense line across the waist of Korea is not feasible because of the numerical weakness of our forces as considered in connection with the distances involved; by the necessity of supplying the two parts of the line from ports within each area; and by the division of the area into two compartments by the rugged mountainous terrain running north and south. Such a line is one of approximately 120 air miles with a road distance of approximately 150 miles. If the entire United States Force of seven divisions at my disposal were placed along this defensive line it would mean that a division would be forced to protect a front of approximately 20 miles against greatly superior numbers of an enemy whose greater strength is a potential for night infiltration through rugged terrain. Such a line with no depth would have little strength, and as a defensive concept would invite penetration with resultant envelopment and piecemeal destruction. Such a concept against the relatively weaker North Korean Forces would have been practicable, but against the full forces of the Chinese Army is impossible.

I do not believe that full comprehension exists of the basic changes which have been wrought by the undisguised entrance by the Chinese Army into the combat. Already Chinese troops to the estimated strength of approximately 26 divisions are in line of battle with an additional minimum of 200,000 to the enemy rear and remnants of the North Korean Army are being reorganized in the rear and there stands, of course, behind all the entire military potential of Communist China.

The terrain is of a nature to diminish the effectiveness of our air support in channelizing and interrupting the enemy supply system; it serves to aid the enemy in his dispersion tactics. This, together with the present limitation of international boundary, reduces enormously the normal benefit that would accrue to our superior air force.

With the enemy concentration inland, the Navy potential is greatly diminished in effectiveness; amphibious maneuver is no longer feasible and effective use of naval gunfire support is limited. The potentials, therefore, of our combined strength are greatly reduced and the comparison more and more becomes one of relative combat effectiveness of ground forces.

It is clearly evident, therefore, that unless ground reinforcements of the greatest magnitude are promptly supplied, this Command will be either forced into successive withdrawals with diminished powers of resistance after each such move, or will be forced to take up beachhead bastion positions which, while insuring a degree of prolonged resistance, would afford little hope of anything beyond defense.

This small command actually under present conditions is facing the entire Chinese nation in an undeclared war and unless some positive and immediate action is taken, hope for success cannot be justified and steady attrition leading to final destruction can reasonably be contemplated.

Although the command up to the present time has exhibited good morale and marked efficiency, it has been in almost unending combat for five months and is mentally fatigued and physically battered. The combat effectiveness of the Republic of Korea Forces now at our disposal is negligible; for police and constabulary uses they would have some effectiveness. The other foreign army contingents, whatever their combat efficiency may be, are in such small strength as to exercise little influence. Each United States