had ruled out simultaneous broadcasts, and I took this method of suggesting that each of us should issue a statement instead.

Sometime during that busy morning I received a message from Prime Minister Churchill in response to my message of six days before in which I had suggested closer co-operation by Admiral Mountbatten, supreme commander of Allied forces in Southeast Asia, with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, commander of the China Theater.

"We are willing," Churchill's message read, "to give full and fair trial to the arrangements you have been good enough to propose. If difficulties arise I am sure you would wish me to present them to you. Orders have been given in accordance with this message to Admiral Mountbatten."

At the same time another message from the Prime Minister approved the text of the proposed three-power message to be issued when the British, Russian, and American troops filed in Germany.

"Thank you," he cabled, "for your draft message on link-up. I can think of no improvement. It will do good to the troops to hear it."

At noon I held an important policy meeting on our relations with Soviet Russia. Ambassador Harriman had just returned from his post in Moscow, and with Secretary of State Stettinius, Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, and Charles E. Bohlen, the department's Russian expert, he attended the conference in my office.

I thanked Harriman for the vital service he had performed in connection with inducing Molotov to attend the San Francisco conference. I expressed the hope that he would return to Moscow and continue his excellent work there when the San Francisco conference was over. Then I asked him to tell us what the most urgent problems were in relation to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, Harriman replied, had two policies which they thought they could successfully pursue at the same time. One was the policy of co-operation with the United States and Great Britain, and the second was the extension of Soviet control over neighboring states by independent action. He said that certain elements around Stalin misinterpreted our generosity and our desire to co-operate as an indication of softness, so that the Soviet government could do as it pleased without risking challenge from the United States.

In Harriman's opinion the Soviet government had no wish to break with the United States, because they needed our help in their reconstruction program. He felt, for this reason, we could stand firm on important issues without running serious risks. Harriman outlined a number of specific difficulties which he encountered at his post at Moscow, pointing out the deterioration of the Soviet attitude since the Yalta conference.

At this point I stopped Harriman to say that I was not afraid of the Russians and that I intended to be firm. I would be fair, of course, and anyway the Russians needed us more than we needed them.

Harriman replied that there were some quarters in Moscow that believed it was a matter of life and death to American business to increase our exports to Russia. He made it clear that he knew this to be untrue but that a number of Russian officials nevertheless believed it. I declared that it was ridiculous for the Russians to think this, and I repeated that we intended to be firm with the Russians and make no concessions from American principles or traditions in order to win their favor. I said that the only way to establish sound relations between Russia and ourselves was on a give-and-take basis.

Ambassador Harriman continued that, in his judgment, we were faced with a "barbarian invasion of Europe." He was convinced that Soviet control over any foreign country meant not only that their influence would be paramount in that country's foreign relations but also that the Soviet system with its secret police and its extinction of freedom of speech would prevail. In his opinion we had to decide what our attitude should be in the face of these unpleasant facts.

He added that he was not pessimistic, for he felt that it was possible for us to arrive at a workable basis with the Russians. He believed that this would require a reconsideration of our policy and the abandonment of any illusion that the Soviet government was likely soon to act in accordance with the principles to which the rest of the world held in international affairs. Harriman observed that obviously in any international negotiations there is give-and-take, and both sides make concessions.

I agreed, saying I understood this and that I would not expect one hundred per cent of what we proposed. But I felt we should be able to get eighty-five per cent.

Harriman then outlined the issues involved in the Polish question. It was his belief that Stalin had discovered that an honest execution of the Crimea decision would mean the end of the Soviet-backed Lublin control over Poland. With this in mind he felt that it was important for us to consider what we should do in the event that Stalin rejected the proposals contained in the joint message Churchill and I had sent, and if Molotov proved adamant in the negotiations here in Washington.

Harriman then asked how important I felt the Polish question to be in relation to the San Francisco conference and our participation in the proposed United Nations Organization.

I replied emphatically that it was my considered opinion that, unless settlement of the Polish question was achieved along the lines of the Crimea decision, the treaty of American adherence to a world organi-
zation would not get through the Senate. I said I intended to tell Molotov just that in words of one syllable.

Secretary Stettinius asked if I would want the conversation on Poland to continue in San Francisco if Molotov arrived late in Washington and there was not sufficient time for a full discussion among the British, Russian, and American foreign ministers. I said I hoped it would not interfere with the work of the conference, but he had my approval to proceed that way.

Harriman then asked whether or not we would be disposed to go ahead with the world organization plans even if Russia dropped out.

I replied that the truth of the matter was that without Russia there would not be a world organization.

Before concluding the meeting I said that I was trying to catch all the intricacies of our foreign affairs and that I would look, of course, to the State Department and our ambassadors for information and help.

I ended the meeting by saying, “I intend to be firm in my dealings with the Soviet government,” and asked Harriman and Stettinius to see me again before my meeting with Molotov.

Before leaving, Harriman took me aside and said, “Frankly, one of the reasons that made me rush back to Washington was the fear that you did not understand, as I had seen Roosevelt understand, that Stalin is breaking his agreements. My fear was inspired by the fact that you could not have had time to catch up with all the recent cables. But I must say that I am greatly relieved to discover that you have read them all and that we see eye to eye on the situation.”

“I am glad,” I said, “that you are going to be available to our delegation in San Francisco. And keep on sending me long messages.”

I then called a special press conference to announce that I was appointing Charles G. Ross as my press and radio secretary effective May 15.

Charlie was a native of Independence, Missouri, and had been a classmate of mine in the Independence High School in the class of 1901. I informed the White House correspondents that Mr. Joseph Pulitzer, publisher of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, had granted Ross a two-year leave of absence.

Charlie then telephoned from my desk to our former schoolteacher, Miss Tillie Brown, at Independence to tell her about his appointment. Although frail, she became quite excited and in a high voice said, “You and Harry have made good, and I am very proud of you.” I got on the phone to say I was reporting to my teacher. She was flustered and had too many kind things to say.

Many foreign missions on their way to attend the San Francisco conference had already arrived in the United States, and most of them were now in Washington. All were busy in the capital preparing for the conference. I had arranged for a reception at Blair House to welcome the heads of the missions. The reception was at four o’clock in the afternoon, and as I greeted them I expressed my pleasure at meeting them. I said that it was my hope that our relationship would continue “on the same cordial plane, nationally and with the world, as it is between you and me.”

On the following morning, April 21, I went directly to the Map Room for my daily briefing on the war situation. German resistance was collapsing on all fronts. There was a rumor from Switzerland that Hitler had left Berlin. There could be no doubt that the end of the war in Europe was in sight.

During the morning I met with Secretary Stettinius and handed him a letter of instructions to take with him to San Francisco. We had discussed this matter previously and had decided that it would be helpful if he had such a written directive from me which he could use publicly if necessary.

“My dear Mr. Secretary,” these instructions began, “As you are aware, at the Crimean Conference President Roosevelt on behalf of the Government of the United States agreed that at the San Francisco Conference the United States would support a Soviet proposal to admit the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the White Russian Soviet Socialist Republic to initial membership in the proposed International Organization.

“You have explained to me that in agreeing to support the proposal of the Soviet Government on this question President Roosevelt felt that the importance of the Ukraine and White Russia among the Soviet Republics and their contribution to the prosecution of the war and the untold devastation and sacrifices which their people have undergone in the cause of the United Nations entitled them to special consideration.

“The decision as to the admission of these two Republics as initial members in the proposed International Organization is of course a matter for the Conference itself to decide. In the loyal execution at the Conference of the obligation assumed on this question by President Roosevelt on behalf of the United States Government, I direct you to cast the vote of the United States in favor of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics as initial members of the International Organization.”

After Secretary Stettinius left, I met with Senator Carl Hatch and then with Ambassador Harriman, who was followed by Fred M. Vinson, the War Mobilization Director. The next appointments were with the heads and assistants of the offices of the White House.

Although it was Saturday and I had already seen him once, Secretary Stettinius personally brought me a memorandum that afternoon.
Mr. Molotov will arrive this evening and sleep at Great Falls, Montana,” it read. “The take-off time tomorrow morning is uncertain but it is now rather definite, weather permitting, that he will reach Washington Sunday evening. I shall notify Mr. Connelly by telephone immediately after Mr. Molotov arrives in order that he may receive your instructions as to when you desire to receive him.”

I then handed Stettinius a message to be transmitted to Stalin:

“Referring to arrangements for making an announcement of the linking up of our armies in Germany, I will see that General Eisenhower is given instructions to inform the Soviet, British and United States Governments at earliest possible date when an announcement may be made by the three Chiefs of Government of the Soviet-Anglo-American Armies meeting in Germany.

“In order that the announcement may be made simultaneously in the three capitals, I would like to have your agreement that the hour of the day recommended by Eisenhower be twelve o'clock noon Washington time.”

Returning to Blair House, I wrote to my mother and sister.

Dear Mamma & Mary, Well I've been the President for nine days. And such nine days no one ever went through before, I really believe. The job started at 5:30 on the afternoon of the 12th. It was necessary for me to begin making decisions an hour and a half before I was sworn in, and I've been making them ever since.

The two high points in the whole nine days were the appearance before Congress on Monday and the press conference on Tuesday. Evidently from the comments in all the papers and magazines both appearances were successful.

But it is only a start and we'll see what develops. It has been necessary to talk to all the people you read about—Byrnes, Hopkins, Baruch, Marshall, King, Leahy, and all the Cabinet collectively and one at a time. I've seen a lot of Senators and Representatives too.

Tomorrow we are going to church at the Chapel at Walter Reed Hospital, and I'm going to call on Gen. Pershing. He's bedfast now, and I thought I ought to go say hello to my first World War commander.

Surely appreciated your letter. You both have done fine under this terrible blow. Just keep yourselves well and don't worry. When we get into the White House, we'll send for you, and you can pay us a visit. They are painting and cleaning house now, and it will be some time before we get moved in.

Love to you both.

Harry

On Sunday, April 22, I attended church at the Walter Reed Hospital and visited General Pershing. I wanted to pay my respects to him.

I invited Secretary Stettinius, Ambassador Harriman, Mr. James Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State, and Mr. Bohlen to Blair House in prepara-

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President and that I would do everything I could to follow along that path.

In response Molotov declared that the government and the people of the Soviet Union shared that hope, and he was sure they could work out successfully any difficulty which lay in the path. I agreed that we must work out these difficulties.

The Russian Foreign Minister expressed the belief that a good basis for agreement existed in the Dumbarton Oaks and the Crimea decisions, and I replied that I stood firmly by those decisions and intended to carry them out. I said that I wanted to bring up at this point that the most difficult question relating to the Crimea decision was the Polish matter. The proper solution was of great importance because of the effect on American public opinion.

Molotov expressed his understanding of that point but contended that the matter was even more important for the Soviet Union. Poland, he said, was far from the United States but bordered on the Soviet Union. The Polish question was therefore vital to them. And here again he added that he thought the Crimea decisions provided a suitable basis for a solution.

I agreed, but I pointed out that in its larger aspects the Polish question had become for our people the symbol of the future development of our international relations. I said that there were a number of minor matters which I hoped that he, together with Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius, would settle here in Washington. Molotov replied that he thought an agreement could be easily reached on these points, provided the views of the Soviet Union were taken into consideration. He said the Soviet government attached the greatest importance to the San Francisco conference and that, with the military developments of recent weeks, political questions had taken on greater importance. I agreed, pointing out that this was one of the reasons I wanted to talk to him.

Molotov asserted that the discussions between the three heads of state had always been fruitful and had led to good agreements. He inquired whether the agreements in regard to the Far Eastern situation made at Yalta still stood. They did, I replied, and again I repeated that I intended to carry out all the agreements made by President Roosevelt. I expressed the hope that I would meet with Marshal Stalin before too long, and Molotov replied that he knew the marshal was eager to meet with me.

Molotov then left with Stettinius to join Eden in talks at the State Department.

I spent most of Monday morning, April 23, meeting with different congressmen, including the Missouri delegation from the House. I also met with a group of forty Democratic senators, former colleagues of mine, who renewed their pledge of support. Then J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation called at eleven-thirty and was followed by the Postmaster General, Frank Walker. After Walker came the District of Columbia commissioners and, finally, Brigadier General Frank T. Hines, head of the Veterans Administration.

In connection with Molotov's visit I held an important conference at two o'clock with my chief diplomatic and military advisers. Those present included Secretary of State Stettinius, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, Assistant Secretary of State Dunn, Ambassador Harriman, General Deane, and Mr. Bohlen.

We discussed Russia and the Polish problem, and Stettinius reported that though Molotov had arrived Sunday in apparent good spirits, which he had maintained even after his Blair House talk with me, overnight the atmosphere had changed. At the evening meeting with Eden in the State Department great difficulties had developed over the Polish question. Moreover, a continuance of the foreign ministers' meeting this morning had produced no improvement. In fact, a complete deadlock had been reached on the subject of carrying out the Yalta agreement on Poland.

The Secretary pointed out once more that the Lublin, or Warsaw, government was not representative of the Polish people and that it was now clear that the Russians intended to try to force this puppet government upon the United States and England. He added that it had been made plain to Molotov how seriously the United States regarded this matter and how much public confidence would be shaken by failure to carry out the Crimea decision.

It was now obvious, I said, that our agreements with the Soviet Union had so far been a one-way street and that this could not continue. I told my advisers that we intended to go on with the plans for San Francisco, and if the Russians did not wish to join us, that would be too bad. Then, one by one, I asked each of those present to state his views.

Secretary Stimson said that this whole difficulty with the Russians over Poland was new to him, and he felt it was important to find out what the Russians were driving at. In the big military matters, he told us, the Soviet government had kept its word and the military authorities of the United States had come to count on it. In fact, he said they had often done better than they had promised. On that account he felt that it was important to find out what motives they had in connection with those border countries and what their ideas of independence and democracy were in areas they regarded as vital to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Stimson remarked that the Russians had made a good deal of trouble on minor military matters and it had sometimes been necessary
in these cases to teach them manners. In this greater matter, however, it was his belief that without fully understanding how seriously the Russians took this Polish question we might be heading into very dangerous waters, and that their viewpoint was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that before World War I most of Poland had been controlled by Russia.

Secretary Forrestal expressed the view that this difficulty over Poland could not be treated as an isolated incident—that there had been many evidences of the Soviet desire to dominate adjacent countries and to disregard the wishes of her allies. It was his belief that for some time the Russians had been under the impression that we would not object if they took over all of Eastern Europe, and he said it was his profound conviction that if the Russians were to be rigid in their attitude we had better have a showdown with them now rather than later.

Ambassador Harriman, in replying to Mr. Stimson's question about issues and motives, said he felt that when Stalin and Molotov had returned to Moscow after Yalta they had learned more of the situation in Poland and had realized how shaky the provisional government was. On that account they had come to realize that the introduction of any genuine Polish leader such as Mikołajczyk would probably mean the elimination of the Soviet hand-picked crop of leaders. It was his belief, therefore, that the real issue was whether we were to be a party to a program of Soviet domination of Poland. He said obviously we were faced with the possibility of a break with the Russians, but he felt that, properly handled, it might still be avoided.

At this point I explained that I had no intention of delivering an ultimatum to Mr. Molotov—that my purpose was merely to make clear the position of this government.

Mr. Stimson then said he would like to know how far the Russian reaction to a strong position on Poland would go. He said he thought that the Russians perhaps were being more realistic than we were in regard to their own security.

Admiral Leahy, in response to a question from me, observed that he had left Yalta with the impression that the Soviet government had no intention of permitting a free government to operate in Poland and that they would have been surprised had the Russians behaved any differently. In his opinion, the Yalta agreement was susceptible to two interpretations. He added that he felt it was a serious matter to break with the Russians but that he believed we should tell them that we stood for a free and independent Poland.

Stettinius then read the part of the Yalta decision relating to the formation of the new government and the holding of free elections and said he felt that this was susceptible of only one interpretation.

General Marshall said he was not familiar with the political aspects of the Polish issues. He said from the military point of view the situation in Europe was secure but that we hoped for Soviet participation in the war against Japan at a time when it would be useful to us. The Russians had it within their power to delay their entry into the Far Eastern war until we had done all the dirty work. He was inclined to agree with Mr. Stimson that the possibility of a break with Russia was very serious.

Mr. Stimson observed that he agreed with General Marshall and that he felt the Russians would not yield on the Polish question. He said we had to understand that outside the United States, with the exception of Great Britain, there were few countries that understood free elections; that the party in power always ran the elections, as he well knew from his experience in Nicaragua.

Admiral King inquired whether the issue was the invitation to the Lublin government to San Francisco.

I answered that that was a settled matter and not the issue. The issue was the execution of agreements entered into between this government and the Soviet Union. I said that I intended to tell Mr. Molotov that we expected Russia to carry out the Yalta decision as we were prepared to do for our part.

Ambassador Harriman then remarked that while it was true that the Soviet Union had kept its big agreements on military matters, those were decisions it had already reached by itself, but on other military matters it was impossible to say they had lived up to their commitments. For example, over a year ago they had agreed to start on preparations for collaboration in the Far Eastern war, but none of these had been carried out.

General Deane said he felt that the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific war as soon as it was able, regardless of what happened in other fields. He felt that the Russians had to do this because they could not afford too long a period of letdown for their people, who were tired. He said he was convinced after his experience in Moscow that if we were afraid of the Russians we would get nowhere, and he felt that we should be firm when we were right.

I thanked the military leaders and said I had their points of view well in mind. Then I asked Stettinius, Harriman, Dunn, and Bohlen to stay behind to work out subjects for my next talk with Molotov, which was scheduled for five-thirty.

When Molotov arrived, Secretary Stettinius, Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Bohlen, and Admiral Leahy were with me in my office. Molotov was accompanied by Ambassador Gronyko and interpreter Pavlov.

Unlike the evening before, there was little protocol, and after greeting the Russian Foreign Minister and his associates, I went straight to the
point. I was sorry to learn, I said, that no progress had been made in solving the Polish problem.

Mr. Molotov responded that he also regretted that fact.

I told him that the proposals which were contained in the joint message from Churchill and me and which had been transmitted to Moscow on April 16 were eminently fair and reasonable. We had gone as far as we could to meet the proposals of the Soviet government as expressed in the message from Marshal Stalin on April 7. The United States Government, I pointed out, could not agree to be a party to the formation of a Polish government which was not representative of all Polish democratic elements. I said bluntly that I was deeply disappointed that the Soviet government had not held consultations with representatives of the Polish government other than the officials of the Warsaw regime.

I told Molotov that the United States was determined, together with other members of the United Nations, to go ahead with plans for the world organization, no matter what difficulties or differences might arise with regard to other matters. I pointed out that the failure of the three principal allies who had borne the brunt of the war to carry out the Crimea decision with regard to Poland would cast serious doubt upon their unity of purpose in postwar collaboration.

I explained to Molotov that in Roosevelt’s last message to Marshal Stalin on April 1 the late President had made it plain that no policy in the United States, whether foreign or domestic, could succeed unless it had public confidence and support. This, I pointed out, applied in the field of economic as well as political collaboration. In this country, I said, legislative appropriations were required for any economic measures in the foreign field, and I had no hope of getting such measures through Congress unless there was public support for them. I expressed the hope that the Soviet government would keep these factors in mind in considering the request that joint British and American proposals be accepted, and that Mr. Molotov would be authorized to continue the discussions in San Francisco on that basis.

I then handed him a message which I asked him to transmit to Marshal Stalin immediately.

“There was an agreement at Yalta,” this communication read, “in which President Roosevelt participated for the United States Government, to reorganize the Provisional Government now functioning in Warsaw in order to establish a new government of National Unity in Poland by means of previous consultation between representatives of the Provisional Polish Government of Warsaw and other Polish democratic leaders from Poland and from abroad.

“In the opinion of the United States Government the Crimea decision on Poland can only be carried out if a group of genuinely representative democratic Polish leaders are invited to Moscow for consultation. The United States Government cannot be party to any method of consultation with Polish leaders which would not result in the establishment of a new Provisional Government of National Unity genuinely representative of the democratic elements of the Polish people. The United States and British Governments have gone as far as they can to meet the situation and carry out the intent of the Crimea decisions in their joint message delivered to Marshal Stalin on April 18th.

“The United States Government earnestly requests that the Soviet Government accept the proposals set forth in the joint message of the President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin, and that Mr. Molotov continue the conversations with the Secretary of State and Mr. Eden in San Francisco on that basis.

“The Soviet Government must realize that the failure to go forward at this time with the implementation of the Crimea decision on Poland would seriously shake confidence in the unity of the three governments and their determination to continue the collaboration in the future as they have in the past.”

Molotov asked if he could make a few observations. It was his hope, he said, that he expressed the views of the Soviet government in stating that they wished to co-operate with the United States and Great Britain as before.

I answered that I agreed, otherwise there would be no sense in the talk we then were having.

Molotov went on to say that he had been authorized to set forth the following point of view of the Soviet government:

1. The basis of collaboration had been established, and although inevitable difficulties had arisen, the three governments had been able to find a common language and that on this basis they had been settling these differences.

2. The three governments had dealt as equal parties, and there had been no case where one or two of the three had attempted to impose their will on another and that as a basis of co-operation this was the only one acceptable to the Soviet government.

I told him that all we were asking was that the Soviet government carry out the Crimea decision on Poland.

Mr. Molotov answered that as an advocate of the Crimea decisions his government stood by them and that it was a matter of honor for them. His government felt that the good basis which existed was the result of former work and that it offered even brighter prospects for the future.
The Soviet government, he added, was convinced that all difficulties could be overcome.

I replied sharply that an agreement had been reached on Poland and that there was only one thing to do, and that was for Marshal Stalin to carry out that agreement in accordance with his word.

Molotov said that Marshal Stalin, in his message of April 7, had given his views on the agreement, and added that he personally could not understand why, if the three governments could reach an agreement on the question of the composition of the Yugoslav government, the same formula could not be applied in the case of Poland.

Replying sharply again, I said that an agreement had been reached on Poland and that it only required to be carried out by the Soviet government.

Mr. Molotov repeated that his government supported the Crimea decisions but that he could not agree that an abrogation of those decisions by others could be considered a violation by the Soviet government. He added that surely the Polish question, involving as it did a neighboring country, was of very great interest to the Soviet government.

Since Molotov insisted on avoiding the main issue, I said what I had said before—that the United States Government was prepared to carry out loyally all the agreements reached at Yalta and asked only that the Soviet government do the same. I expressed once more the desire of the United States for friendship with Russia, but I wanted it clearly understood that this could be only on a basis of the mutual observation of agreements and not on the basis of a one-way street.

"I have never been talked to like that in my life," Molotov said.

I told him, "Carry out your agreements and you won't get talked to like that."

CHAPTER 7

In the final rush of our armies into Germany a problem arose which required the exchange of views among Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. This involved the zones of occupation in Germany which had been agreed upon by the three powers at London in the European Advisory Commission in January 1945.

As our armies poured into Germany, it was impossible to have them meet at precisely the lines earlier designated, and many of our troops had overrun those lines. It was therefore necessary to get agreement among Great Britain, Russia, and ourselves on new directives to the military so that our forces could be rearranged in accordance with the plan of occupation.

This was the problem Churchill had in mind when he sent me his message of April 18. After consultation with my military advisers I cabled Churchill a suggested message that the two of us might send to Stalin.

"The approaching end of German resistance makes it necessary that the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union decide upon an orderly procedure for the occupation by their forces of the zones which they will occupy in Germany and Austria." I therefore proposed, first, that our troops in both Germany and Austria should retire to their respective zones "as soon as the Military situation permits." Second, I suggested that in order to avoid confusion, each commander, when he felt himself prepared to occupy any portion of his proper zone that was held by other Allied troops, should inform his own government of the sector he was prepared to occupy. And thirdly, I proposed that the government concerned should then consult the other two in order that the necessary