July 22 was Sunday, but we had decided to continue the daily conferences without interruption. During the morning, accompanied by my old friend, Colonel and Monsignor Tiernan, and my military and naval aides, I attended Protestant church service in the Colosseum Building, a former film laboratory in the Babelsberg area. This service was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Nelson. An hour later I attended a second service in the same building, a Catholic mass conducted by Colonel Tiernan. I returned to the Little White House for lunch, and shortly thereafter Prime Minister Churchill called on me and we conferred for about an hour. After attending to some urgent mail for Washington, I left for Cecilienhof Palace and called to order the sixth meeting of the conference at 5 P.M.

Our discussion was resumed where it had left off the day before, with the question of Poland’s western frontier and Prime Minister Churchill restating his reasons for refusing to accept Stalin’s proposal to cede the eastern territory of Germany to Poland. Stalin, in turn, challenged the Prime Minister’s reasoning with the same arguments he had previously advanced.

I then read a portion of the Yalta Declaration concerning Poland’s western frontier and reminded them that this agreement had been reached by President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill. I added that I was in complete accord with it and wished to make the point clear that Poland now had been assigned a zone of occupation in Germany without any consultation among the three powers. While I did not object to Poland being assigned a zone, I did not like the manner in which it had been done. Our main problem here, I repeated, was that of the occupation of Germany by the four authorized powers. That, I said, was my position yesterday, that was my position today, and that would be my position tomorrow.

Stalin said that if we were not bored with the question of frontiers he would like to point out that the exact character of the Yalta decision was that we were bound to receive the opinion of the Polish government on the question of its western frontiers. As we were not in agreement with the Polish proposal, we should hear the representatives of the new Polish government. If the heads of government did not wish to hear them, then the foreign ministers should hear them.

Stalin said that he wished to remind Mr. Churchill, as well as others who had been at the Crimean conference, that the view held by the President and Mr. Churchill with regard to the western frontier and with which he did not agree was that the line should begin from the estuary of the Oder and follow the Oder to where it is joined by the Eastern Neisse. He had insisted on the line of the Western Neisse. The plan proposed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, said Stalin, left the town of Stettin on the German side, as well as Breslau and the region west of Breslau.

At this point Stalin walked around the table and showed me this line on a map.

Stalin said the question to be settled was that of the frontier and not that of a temporary line. We could settle the matter, and we could put it off, but we could not ignore it.

Churchill agreed that the matter could not be settled without the Poles, unless, of course, we accepted the Polish proposal. Stalin then turned to me and said that in regard to my observation that a fifth country was now occupying Germany, he wished to state that if anyone was to blame, it was not just the Poles—circumstances and the Russians were to blame.

I replied that that was exactly what I had been talking about. I then agreed that the Polish representatives could come to Potsdam and be heard by the foreign ministers, who would report to us.

It was now agreed that as presiding officer I should issue an invitation to the Poles to send representatives to the foreign ministers’ meeting at Potsdam in an effort to reach some kind of practical solution to the problem of boundaries which could last until the matter was finally settled at the peace conference.

Molotov now brought up the subject of trusteeships and said that the San Francisco conference had settled, in principle, a trusteeship system,
and there was now the question of the disposition of specific territories, such as Italy's colonies and also, perhaps, Korea.

Molotov went on to say that he had learned from the foreign press that Italy had lost its colonies, and the question was who had received them, and where had this matter been decided? Churchill replied by referring to the heavy losses which the British had suffered and the victories which the British Army had achieved by “conquering alone all of the colonies of Italy except Tunis.”

I turned to the Prime Minister and repeated, “All?”

Churchill explained that when he referred to Italian colonies he meant Libya, Cyrenaica, and Tripoli. The British had conquered these at a time when they were under heavy attacks and were without help, he said, at least during the early part. Molotov interjected that Berlin had been conquered by the Red Army.

Churchill, ignoring Molotov, continued, saying that they were not expecting any gain out of this war. British losses had been terrible, although not so heavy in human life as those of their gallant Soviet ally. They came out of the war, however, a great debtor to the world. In spite of the heavy losses they had suffered, they had made no territorial claims—no Koenigsberg—no Baltic states—nothing. With regard to the Italian colonies, he said he regarded Italy as having lost them, but this did not preclude the peace conference from considering whether some of these colonies should be restored to Italy. He was not declaring himself in favor of restoration but was willing to discuss it. At present, Churchill said, the British held these colonies. He wanted to know who wanted them. If there were claimants, said Churchill, they should put forward their claims.

I said that the United States did not want them, nor did we want a trusteeship over them.

Molotov said that the Soviet proposal had been submitted in writing and that they would like the conference to consider them. Churchill asked what did the Soviet allies want? Did Stalin wish to put forward a claim to one of these Italian colonies?

Stalin replied that they would like to learn whether this conference was going to deal with the question of whether Italy was to lose these colonies. In such an event, they could decide to what states they would be transferred for trusteeship.

Churchill said he had not considered the possibility of the Soviet Union desiring a large tract of the African shore. If that were the case, it would have to be considered in relation to many other problems.

Stalin declared that at San Francisco the Soviet delegation had stated that they were anxious to receive mandates for certain territories, and the matter was now set forth in the Russian paper.

I pointed out that the Soviet proposal was a matter for the foreign ministers to discuss and that I had no objection to this.

Churchill said he had no objection either, and it was agreed that the question of trusteeships be referred to the foreign ministers. We turned our attention to the question of Turkey.

Churchill said there was an admitted need to modify the old Montreux Convention regarding Turkey, and he had frequently expressed his readiness to welcome an arrangement for the free movement of Russian ships through the Black Sea and back. But he wished to impress on Marshal Stalin the importance of not alarming Turkey. Turkey was very much alarmed, he said, by a strong concentration of Bulgarian and Soviet troops in Bulgaria, by continuous attacks in the Soviet press, and by the conversations between the Turkish Ambassador and Mr. Molotov in which modifications of Turkey's eastern frontier were mentioned, as well as a Soviet base in the straits.

Molotov explained that the Turkish government had taken the initiative through the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow and had proposed an alliance with Russia. In 1921, he said, a portion of Russian territory had been torn from Soviet Armenia and Soviet Georgia, and he had insisted that this question be settled before the conclusion of a treaty of alliance.

Churchill challenged the right of the Russians to consider the matter of the Black Sea straits as one in which no one had a voice except themselves and Turkey. Molotov replied that similar treaties had existed between Russia and Turkey in the past, and he cited the treaties of 1805 and 1833.

Churchill said he would have to ask his staff to look up these ancient treaties. He said that the British were not prepared to push Turkey to accept such proposals from Russia.

I said that I was not ready to express an opinion and suggested that we defer consideration of the question until necessary study could be given to it. This was agreed to.

After an exchange between Churchill and Molotov on the question of the treatment of Russian prisoners in Italy, I adjourned the meeting.

We met the following day, July 23, for the seventh meeting of the conference. The agenda for that day involved four controversial territories: Turkey, Koenigsberg, Syria and Lebanon, and Iran. Other questions which had been passed over or referred to the foreign ministers were in the drafting stage or still under study by heads of state, the secretaries, and boards of experts assembled at Potsdam. Military talks were going on between the Chiefs of Staff. The sessions of the Big Three were only a part of the continuous round of discussions and consultations which were going on at all hours in the area of the conference.
Churchill spoke first, reaffirming his position that he could not consent to the establishment of a Russian base in the straits, adding that he did not think Turkey would agree to that proposal.

Stalin declared that Churchill had been mistaken in saying that the Russians had frightened the Turks by concentrating too many troops in Bulgaria. Russia had fewer troops in Bulgaria, he said, than the British had in Greece. Churchill inquired how many Stalin thought the British had in Greece. Stalin replied, “Five divisions.” Churchill said there were only two.

Stalin inquired about armored units and asked how strong the British divisions were.

Churchill said they had about forty thousand troops altogether in Greece.

Stalin replied that they had only about thirty thousand in Bulgaria.

Churchill said he hoped that the meeting would hear Field Marshal Alexander, as he preferred that he give the figures, to which Stalin replied that he was not seeking for accuracy and that he believed Churchill “one hundred per cent.” But the Turks, with twenty-three divisions of their own, had nothing to fear from the Russians, he said. He explained that, as to the rectification of the frontier, perhaps it was the possible restoration of the prewar frontiers that had existed under the Czar that had frightened the Turks. He said that he had in mind the area of Kars, formerly in Armenia, as well as Ardahan, formerly in Georgia, and asserted that rectification of the frontier would not have been brought up at all if the Turks had not suggested an alliance with Russia. An alliance meant that both countries would defend mutually the frontiers between them and, in the Russian opinion, the frontiers in the area mentioned were incorrect, and they told the Turks that these would have to be rectified in the event of an alliance. If this was not agreeable to the Turks, he said, the question of an alliance would be dropped. He would like to know what there was to be afraid of.

With regard to the Black Sea straits, Stalin said Russia regarded the Montreux Convention as inimical. Under this treaty, he complained, Turkey had the right to block the straits not only if Turkey were at war but if it seemed to Turkey that there was a threat of war. The result was, he continued, that a small state supported by Great Britain held a great state by the throat and gave it no outlet. He could imagine what commotion there would be in England if a similar regime existed in Gibraltar or in the Suez Canal, or what a commotion there would be in the United States if such a regime existed with regard to the Panama Canal. The point at issue, he concluded, was to give Soviet shipping the possibility to pass to and from the Black Sea freely. As Turkey was too weak to guar-

antee the possibility of free passage in case complications arose, the Soviet Union would like to see the straits defended by force.

I said that the attitude of the American government was that the Montreux Convention should be revised. I thought, however, that the straits should be a free waterway open to the whole world and that they should be guaranteed by all of us. I had come to the conclusion, I said, after a long study of history, that all the wars of the last two hundred years had originated in the area from the Black Sea to the Baltic and from the eastern frontier of France to the western frontier of Russia. In the last two instances the peace of the whole world had been overturned—by Austria in World War I and by Germany in this war. I thought it should be the business of this conference and of the coming peace conference to see that this did not happen again.

I announced that I was presenting a paper proposing free access to all the seas of the world by Russia and by all other countries. I was offering as a solution of the straits problem the suggestion that the Kiel Canal in Germany, the Rhine-Danube waterway from the North Sea to the Black Sea, the Black Sea straits, the Suez Canal, and the Panama Canal be made free waterways for the passage of freight and passengers of all countries, except for the fees for their necessary operation and maintenance.

I went on to say that we did not want the world to engage in another war in twenty-five years over the straits or the Danube. I said that our only ambition was to have a Europe that was sound economically and that could support itself. I wanted to see a Europe that would make Russia, England, France, and all other countries in it secure, prosperous, and happy, and with which the United States could trade and be happy as well as prosperous. I felt that my proposal was a step in that direction.

I said that the question of territorial concessions was a Turkish and Russian dispute which they would have to settle themselves and which the marshal had said he was willing to do. But the question of the Black Sea straits, I pointed out, concerned the United States and the rest of the world.

Churchill expressed agreement with Stalin's proposal for revision of the Montreux Convention to give Russia freedom of navigation in the straits by merchant and warships alike in peace and war. He said he also agreed with my proposal that this should be guaranteed by all of us. A guarantee by the great powers and the powers interested would certainly be effective. He earnestly hoped that the marshal would accept this alternative in contrast to that of a base in the straits in close proximity to Constantinople.

With regard to the other waterways, the British were in full accord
with the general line that I had taken in my statement. Churchill thought
that the Kiel Canal should certainly be free and open and guaranteed by
all the great powers. He attached great importance to the free navigation
of the Danube and the Rhine. He felt that there was a great measure of
agreement among the three powers on this subject.

I said there was no doubt concerning agreement on the question of
revising the Montreux Convention.

Stalin said he wished to withhold any statement of opinion regarding
my proposal, since he would want to read it attentively before discussing
it. Stalin next brought up the question of the city of Koenigsberg, point­
ing out that this question had been discussed at the Teheran conference.
The Russians complained that all their seaports in the Baltic froze over
for a period each year and that they felt it necessary to have at least one
ice-free port at the expense of Germany. Stalin added that the Russians
had suffered so much at the hands of Germany that they were anxious to
have some piece of German territory as some small satisfaction to tens of
millions of Soviet citizens. This had been agreed to, he said, by Roosevelt
and Churchill at Teheran, and he was anxious to see this agreement
approved at this conference.

I said that I was ready to agree in principle, although it would be neces­
sary to study the population affected and other related questions. Church­
ill also agreed to the concession of an ice-free port to Russia. The only
question, he said, was that of the legal occasion to transfer. The Soviet
draft on this subject, he pointed out, would require each of us to admit
that East Prussia did not exist and also to admit that the Koenigsberg
area was not under the authority of the Allied Control Council in Ger­
many. The draft, he pointed out, would commit us to the recognition of
the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union. He pointed out that
all these matters really belonged to the final peace settlement, but he
wished to assure the marshal of his continued support of the Russian
position in that part of the world. Stalin agreed that the matter would be
settled at the peace conference and added that Russia was satisfied that
the British and American governments approved.

Molotov then announced that the Russian delegation wished to submit
a paper on the question of Syria and Lebanon and proposed that the
situation in these two countries be considered by a four-power conference
of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and
France, with the consent of France to be first obtained.

Churchill said that the burden of defending Syria and Lebanon had
fallen upon the shoulders of the British. At the time they entered Syria
and Lebanon to throw out the Germans and the troops of Vichy, he said,
they had made an arrangement with the French in which they both recog­
nized Syria and Lebanon. The British, he pointed out, had told General
de Gaulle that the moment he made a satisfactory treaty with Syria and
Lebanon the British would withdraw their troops. He explained that if
the British withdrew their troops now, it would lead to the massacre of
the French civilians and the small number of troops there. This, he
warned, would cause a great outbreak of turbulence and warfare in the
Arab world which might affect Egypt too, and thus seriously endanger
communication lines through the Suez Canal which were now being used
by the Allies in the war against Japan. He expressed confidence that an
agreement could be reached with the French in which de Gaulle should
guarantee the independence of Syria and Lebanon and which would re­
sure for the French some of their cultural and commercial interests in
this territory. He summed up his remarks by stating that the British would
not welcome a proposal for a four-power conference on this question, which
concerned only Britain, France, and the areas of Syria and Lebanon.
The whole burden had been borne by the British, except for diplo­
matic approval of the United States which they had enjoyed. The British
would not welcome the whole matter being reviewed by a body of this
kind. Of course, if the United States wanted to take their place, that
would be a different matter.

I replied, "No, thanks."

I pointed out that when this controversy arose there had been an ex­
change of correspondence between the Prime Minister and myself. The
Prime Minister had offered to keep British troops in that region to stop
the outbreak of war, I explained, and I had asked him to do so immedi­
ately in order to protect our line of communication to the Far East
through the Suez Canal. I thought, however, that no country should have
a special privilege such as that being considered for France. The French,
i said, did not deserve a special position after the way they had stirred up
all this trouble. All countries should have equal rights, I stated.

Stalin replied by noting our reluctance to have the matter discussed by
a four-power group and then withdrew the Russian proposal.

This brought us to the last point on the agenda for the day—the situa­
tion in Iran.

Churchill said that the British had submitted a paper on the subject,
and he would like to hear the views of the others.

Stalin remarked that the British proposals were based on the presum­
tion that the term for the presence of Allied troops in Iran had expired.
The Soviets were proceeding on the assumption, he said, that the term
would not expire until after the termination of the war against Japan. He
pointed out that this was stipulated by the treaty. Nevertheless, he said,
the Soviet delegation concurred with the proposal that troops be withdrawn from Teheran, and he suggested that we let it go at that.

I said that we had been ready to withdraw for a long time but that we had many supplies in Iran and wished to guard them for use in the war against Japan.

Stalin said that the Russian delegation had no objection to the presence of American and British troops in Iran, but he felt that troops in Teheran might be withdrawn.

I said I thought there were no American troops in Teheran.

Stalin said that, even if there were, the Russians had no objection. He proposed that they confine themselves to the immediate withdrawal from Teheran.

Churchill said that the British were anxious to have the removal of troops continue on both sides because they had promised to withdraw when the German war was over.

Stalin said that he would have to think this over. The treaty, he said, required that troops be withdrawn not later than six months after the termination of the war with Germany and her associates, and that included Japan. They had until six months after the completion of the war with Japan. This gave us plenty of time, Stalin said.

Churchill suggested that we accept the proposal to withdraw from Teheran and that we let the foreign ministers take another look at the matter when they met.

I observed that the United States was proceeding with its withdrawal because we needed our troops in the Far East. I estimated that we could be out of Iran in sixty days.

Stalin then remarked that the United States was fully entitled to look after her supplies. "So as to rid the United States of any worries," he added, "we promise you that no action will be taken by us against Iran."

I thanked the marshal for this statement.

At this point British Field Marshal Alexander entered the room and shook hands with Marshal Stalin and with me. The conversation that followed had to do with the occupation of Vienna, a subject that had first come up during our fourth session. Churchill observed that with respect to the zones allotted to British and American troops, it appeared that in the British zone of Vienna there were five hundred thousand people. They would not be able to undertake the feeding of these five hundred thousand, he said, because the feeding grounds of Vienna lay to the east of the city. He suggested, therefore, a provisional arrangement under which the Russians would go on feeding them until a more permanent arrangement could be worked out. Field Marshal Alexander then supplied some additional information on the food situation in Vienna.

I said that there were about three hundred and seventy-five thousand people in our zone and that our transport system was almost totally engaged in handling supplies in the Japanese war and in supplying Italy, France, Russia, and other countries in Europe.

Stalin asked several questions and informed us that there was a temporary agreement with the Austrian government of Dr. Renner under which the Russians were going to supply some food to the Austrians. He promised to look further into the matter and to let us know within a few days what additional help he could give in the feeding of the Austrian capital.

Churchill then brought up the matter of the British elections. He informed Stalin and me that Mr. Attlee and he would have to be in London on the following Thursday for the elections and that they would take Eden with them. They would be back for the evening sitting on July 27. "Or some of us will be back," he added. He asked if we could meet on the Wednesday morning before his departure. This was agreed to, and it was also agreed that the foreign ministers would continue to meet and that, in Eden's absence, Sir Alexander Cadogan would represent him.

The meeting then adjourned, and at eight o'clock that evening I walked with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy to Churchill's residence, where we attended a state dinner given by the Prime Minister in honor of Generalissimo Stalin and myself.

The following morning—it was July 24—Admirals Leahy and King and Generals Marshall, Arnold, and Somervell accompanied me to the British headquarters to go over the military strategy for the next stages of the war with Japan.

On the British side, in addition to Churchill, there were Lord Leathers, the Minister of War Transport; Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke; Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles F. A. Portal; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham; General Sir Hastings L. Ismay; Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson; and Major General R. E. Laycock.

The British and American Chiefs of Staff had held daily meetings since our arrival at Potsdam and now placed before us the draft of their final report to Churchill and me. We examined it paragraph by paragraph. The unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible moment was the main objective of the strategy. Churchill and I approved the report in full. Some of the main strategic aims as stated in this report were:

In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist, by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations
against objectives other than the Japanese home islands as will contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese-occupied territory if required; in cooperation with other Allies to establish and maintain, as necessary, military control of Germany and Austria.

The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith would be the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources would be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion would be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations would be undertaken which might hazard the success of, or delay of, these main operations;

Russian entry into the war against Japan should be encouraged. Such aid to her war-making capacity as might be necessary should be provided;

Such measures as might be necessary and practicable should be taken in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan;

The control of operation strategy in the Pacific theater would remain in the hands of the United States Chiefs of Staff;

The United States Chiefs of Staff would provide the British Chiefs of Staff with full and timely information as to their future plans and intentions;

In the event the U.S.S.R. entered the war against Japan, the strategy to be pursued should be discussed between the parties concerned;

The British Pacific Fleet would participate as at present planned;

A British very long range bomber force of 10 squadrons, increasing to 20 squadrons when more airfields became available, participate;

It was agreed that the appropriate British commanders and staff should visit Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur and draw up with them a plan for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff;

For the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower, the planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan should be 15 November 1946 and this date should be adjusted periodically to conform to the courses of the war.

That same day, in the afternoon, the Combined Chiefs met for the first and only time with the Russian Chiefs of Staff: General Antonov, the Red Army Chief of Staff; Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov of the People's Commissariat for the Navy; and Marshal of Aviation Fallalev, the Chief of the Soviet Air Staff. Antonov was accompanied by his deputy, Lieutenant General Slavin. Admiral Leahy presided at the meeting, and later he and General Marshall gave me a detailed report.

The primary purpose was to co-ordinate strategy in the Far East, an important step toward bringing Russia into the war on our side. General Antonov reported that Soviet troops were being concentrated in the Far East in order to be ready to start operations against the Japanese in the latter half of August. The exact date, he informed our military leaders, would depend on the satisfactory completion of the negotiations with the Chinese.

Antonov defined the Russian objective in the Far East to be the destruction of the Japanese in Manchuria and the occupation of the Liaotung Peninsula. After the defeat of the Japanese, he said, it was the intention of the Soviets to withdraw all Russian troops from Manchuria.

General Marshall then informed the Russians of the general disposition of Japanese troop strength as known to us. He gave them a very general picture of our position in the Pacific and discussed some possible courses of action open to the Japanese. Admiral King and General Arnold discussed the effect of sea and air activities against the Japanese forces.

General Antonov showed particular interest in any intentions we might have to undertake operations against the Kuriles or in Korea. He was told by Admiral King that we would not be able to operate against the Kuriles but that a line of communications could be maintained through that island chain without the seizure of any of the islands.

General Marshall stated that we had no present plans for amphibious operations against Korea. From our point of view, he explained, such a move would require an undue amount of shipping, and it was the belief of our experts that Korea could be brought under control without difficulty once our aircraft could operate from fields on the Japanese island of Kyushu.

Admiral Leahy reported that the meeting was friendly.

Another meeting was held two days later, on July 26, but with only the Americans and the Russians present. The primary purpose was to receive the Russian answers to a number of questions of detail which General Marshall had given them. In their answers the Russians agreed to the establishment of weather stations at Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk and, although initially reluctant, they agreed at the meeting that American personnel should man these stations.

Agreement was also reached on lines to mark off areas of operation for the respective air and naval forces. These ran generally from the northern tip of Japan across extreme northern Korea. No lines were set up for land operations since it was not anticipated by our military leaders that we would carry out operations to Korea.

The two military groups also agreed to exchange liaison groups, including a Soviet military mission in Washington, and to make designated ports and airfields in Siberia available to our units for repair needs and emergency use. The Russians took pains to point out that all these agreements would become effective only upon Russia's entry into the war against Japan, but the general atmosphere of this meeting, like the one before, was one of co-operation and friendship.

At the eighth session of the heads of government, on July 24, we were again dealing with the question of peace treaties and interim arrangements with Italy and the other satellites. I had agreed to include the
eastern satellites in a redraft of my original proposal, and this new version was now placed before us by Secretary Byrnes.

The bitterest debate of the conference now developed, the point at issue being that Stalin wanted us to recognize the puppet governments he had installed in the satellite countries overrun by the Russian armies.

Stalin said an abnormal distinction was being drawn between Italy and the other satellite states, as if Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland belonged in the category of leprous states. In such a distinction he saw a danger that attempts would be made to discredit the Soviet Union and asked whether the Italian government was any more democratic or responsible than the governments of the other countries. No democratic elections had been held in Italy, he said.

I replied to Stalin that everybody had free access to Italy—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and other nations—but we had not been able to have free access to Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and had not been able to get information concerning them. When Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary were set up on a basis giving us free access to them, I declared, then we would recognize them, but not sooner. I said I was asking for the reorganization of the other satellite governments along democratic lines, as had been agreed upon at Yalta.

Stalin objected to the words “responsible and democratic governments” in the draft, saying that they should be deleted, since they served to discredit these countries. I pointed out that this language was necessary to show that the only way in which they could obtain our support for entry into the United Nations was for them to have democratic governments. Stalin said that these were not fascist governments. There was a far less democratic government in Argentina, he pointed out, which in spite of this had been admitted to the United Nations.

Churchill said he would like to put in a plea for Italy. He said he had considerable sympathy for Italy because there was no censorship there, there had been a considerable growth of freedom, and now the north was going to have democratic elections. He did not see why the Big Three should not discuss peace with them. With regard to Rumania, and particularly to Bulgaria, he added, the British knew nothing. Their mission in Bucharest, he asserted, had been penned up with a closeness approaching internment.

Stalin broke in to ask if it were really possible for Churchill to cite such facts that had not been verified.

Churchill said that the British knew this by their representatives there. Stalin would be very much astonished, he stated, to read a long catalogue of difficulties encountered by their mission there. An iron fence, he charged, had come down around them.

Stalin interrupted to exclaim, “All fairy tales.” Churchill rejoined that statesmen could call one another’s statements fairy tales if they wished. He expressed complete confidence in his representatives in Bucharest and said that the conditions in the British mission there had caused him the greatest distress.

I stated that, in the case of the United States, we had been much concerned about the many difficulties encountered by our missions in Rumania and Bulgaria.

The exchange continued sharp and lengthy, and I suggested that the question again be referred to the foreign ministers for redrafting.

Next on the agenda was a renewal of the discussion regarding the Black Sea straits. I inquired if my paper on inland waterways had been considered.

Stalin remarked that this paper did not deal with the question of Turkey and the straits but dealt with the Danube and the Rhine. The Soviet delegation, he said, would like to receive a reply to their proposal of a Russo-Turkish treaty regarding the Black Sea straits. I replied that it was my wish that the two questions be considered together.

Stalin said he was afraid that we would not be able to reach an agreement in regard to the straits, since our views differed so widely. He suggested that we postpone the question and take up the next one.

Churchill said he understood that it was agreed that freedom in the Black Sea straits should be approved and guaranteed by the Big Three and other powers. He observed that my proposal to join in an organization to free the waterways of the world was, to his mind, a remarkable and important fact.

I stated that the Prime Minister had clearly presented the position of the United States in this matter and agreed with him that this would be a big step.

Churchill said he hoped that the guarantee proposed by the President would be considered by Stalin as more than a substitute for fortification of the straits.

Molotov asked if the Suez Canal was operated under such a principle. Churchill rejoined that it was open in war and in peace to all.

Molotov asked whether the Suez Canal were under the same international control as was proposed for the Black Sea straits.

Churchill observed that this question had not been raised.

Molotov retorted, “I'm raising it.” If it was such a good rule, he said, why not apply it to the Suez?
Churchill explained that the British had an arrangement with which they were satisfied and under which they had operated for some seventy years without complaints.

Molotov charged that there had been a lot of complaints. "You should ask Egypt," he said.

Eden intervened to point out that Egypt had signed the treaty with England.

Molotov said that the British had asserted that international control was better.

Molotov did a lot of talking at Potsdam. He and Stalin, along with Trotsky and Lenin, were among the old Bolsheviks of the 1917 Revolution. Molotov would take the bit in his teeth and talk as if he were the Russian state, until Stalin would smile and say a few words to him in Russian, and he would change his tune.

I often felt that Molotov kept some facts from Stalin or that he would not give him all the facts until he had to. It was always harder to get agreement out of Molotov than out of Stalin. Where Stalin could smile and relax at times, Molotov always gave the impression that he was constantly pressing.

Churchill said that the suggestion of international control of the inland waterways had been made to meet the Russian position that Russia should be able to move freely in and out of the Black Sea, and that his government was prepared to join in a guarantee with other nations and was prepared to press it on Turkey. Freedom of the seas could be attained in this way without trouble to Turkey, he said. He agreed that the question must be put off, but he hoped that the "tremendous fact that they had heard at this meeting" should not be underestimated by their Russian friends.

I said I wished to make clear my understanding of an international guarantee of the freedom of the straits; it meant that any nation had free ingress for any purpose whatever. I did not contemplate any fortifications of any kind, I added.

We agreed that each of us would study the problem of the straits.

Before proceeding with any further business, I pointed out that the conference would have to be wound up in not more than a week or ten days and that a communiqué would have to be prepared. I proposed that a committee be appointed to start working on it and suggested that the foreign ministers make a proposal to us on the following day.

I stated that I was anxious to do as much work as possible, because when there was nothing more upon which we could agree I was returning home. I had a great deal of business waiting for me in Washington, I added.
The Poles were all in agreement, he reported, that about one and one-half million Germans were left in the area in the west which was under discussion.

I observed that this was true. I added that the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, had talked with the Poles and expected to have more talks with them.

Churchill said that he thought the question of transfer of populations from Germany and Czechoslovakia and Poland should be discussed. He pointed out that the Poles were evacuating Germans from an occupational zone. This area was part of the Russian zone, and Poles were driving the Germans out. He felt that this ought not to be done without consideration being given to the question of food supply, reparations, and other matters which had not yet been decided. The result was that the Poles had little food and fuel, he said, and that the British had a mass of population thrown on them.

Stalin remarked that we should appreciate the position in which the Poles found themselves. They were taking revenge on the Germans, he said, for the injuries the Germans had caused them in the course of centuries. Churchill pointed out that their revenge took the form of throwing the Germans into the American and British zones to be fed.

I expressed full agreement with the Prime Minister that this should not be tolerated. If the Poles were to have a zone, I repeated, this matter should be considered very carefully. The occupying powers of Germany were Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and the United States. If the Poles were in a zone, they were responsible to the Soviet Union for it. I stated that I wanted to be as helpful as I could, and the position I had taken was that the frontier should be fixed at the peace conference.

At this point I thought it necessary to tell what my powers as President were with respect to the question of the treaty of peace. When we were discussing matters appropriate for inclusion in the peace treaties, I stated, I wanted all to understand that under the Constitution of the United States a treaty could be concluded only with the consent of the United States Senate. I assured them that when I supported a proposal at the conference I would use my best efforts to support the matter when it came up for consideration in the Senate. This did not preclude, however, my coming back and saying that I considered the political sentiment in the United States was such that I could not press the matter without the danger of injuring our mutual relations. I explained that I was making these remarks not in order to change the basis of any discussion with my colleagues, nor to change the basis upon which the discussions with President Roosevelt had been held, but to make clear what my constitutional powers were. I had to consider these matters, I continued, from the standpoint of the people of the United States, and I wished to be able to be in a position to get the best arrangements approved by the Senate. I concluded by saying that I was convinced that world peace could be maintained only by the cooperation of the three major powers present at the table.

Stalin inquired if my remarks referred only to the peace treaties or to the whole discussion. I replied that I was referring only to those agreements or treaties that had to go to the Senate for ratification. I had large war powers, I pointed out, but I did not wish to abuse these powers to the point where they might endanger the conclusion of peace. Furthermore, I explained, I always wanted to have the full support of the American people for my policies.

Stalin said that he understood. Churchill, I know, understood.

Stalin took the position that, in the discussion of German supplies and production, coal and steel were much more important than food. Stalin pointed out that their revenge took the form of throwing the Germans into the American and British zones to be fed.

Churchill replied that the British themselves were short of coal because they were exporting to Holland, France, and Belgium. They were denying themselves to supply those countries; the coming winter would be the most nearly fireless one of the war for the people of England.

Stalin replied that the Russian situation was still worse than that of the British. The Russians had lost more than five million men in this war and were short of coal and other things. He was afraid, he said, that if he started describing the situation in Russia he would make Churchill burst into tears.

Churchill insisted that he was still eager to barter coal from the Ruhr in exchange for food for the German population, and Stalin agreed that this question must be discussed. Churchill replied that he did not expect a decision today but he hoped for one soon. Furthermore, he did not think we should consider that we had yet solved the major problems. So far as he was concerned we had only exchanged views.

A few more interchanges followed, and Churchill, referring to his departure the following day for the British elections, announced that he had finished.

"What a pity," Stalin quipped.

"I hope to be back," Churchill replied.

Stalin remarked in reply that, judging from the expression on Mr. Attlee's face, he did not think Mr. Attlee was looking forward to taking over Churchill's authority.
With the end of the ninth meeting the conference was adjourned until the return of the British delegation from England.

At the time Churchill left for London, we were still without an answer from Chiang Kai-shek. The message to him had met with more than its share of difficulties. First there had been a delay in its transmission at the Honolulu communications center. Then heavy traffic between Honolulu and Guam had slowed its way. But it had finally reached Hurley at 8:35 P.M. Chungking time.

Ambassador Hurley radioed that the statement to the Japanese people had been delivered to Prime Minister Soong, but the generalissimo was out of Chungking, in the mountains across the Yangtze River. He said the message would be translated and delivered to Chiang that night. Hurley then described the difficulty of reaching Chiang: "The translation was not finished until after midnight. We then had difficulty in procuring a ferry across the Yangtze. The prime minister declined to go out to Yellow Mountain with me in the night. This morning, K. C. Wu, Assistant Minister of Foreign Relations, accompanied me to the Generalissimo's residence at Yellow Mountain. The Generalissimo read the translation carefully, and then K. C. Wu interpreted my explanation of the necessity for immediate concurrence. The Generalissimo was kindly and courteous throughout. After he had told me that he concurred in the proclamation, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, the Minister of Information, arrived at the conference. It became necessary to explain the whole situation again to Wang. Incidentally, Wang is to succeed the Prime Minister as Minister of Foreign Relations. When Chiang Kai-shek had approved the message of concurrence, we found the telephone out of order. It was necessary for me to return to Chungking to contact facilities to make transmission to you."

Chiang Kai-shek had concurred with one reservation: He wanted us to change the order in which we listed the heads of the three sponsoring governments in order to put him ahead of the British Prime Minister, because it would help him at home. The proclamation was changed to accommodate Chiang Kai-shek.

At nine-twenty on the night of July 26 I issued the joint proclamation from Berlin. This was the ultimatum that came to be known as the "Potsdam Declaration." I directed the Office of War Information in Washington to begin immediately to get this message to the Japanese people in every possible way. Here is the Proclamation:

**PROCLAMATION BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS, UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND CHINA**

1. We—the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war:

2. The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

3. The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

4. The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

5. Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

6. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on a course of war. Wherever the Japanese people, through their governments, have been misled by such elements, they must be brought to account. The political and economic systems of Japan must be destroyed in order to make those responsible for such actions answerable to the Japanese people.

7. Until such a new order is established and until the Japanese surrender, Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

8. The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

9. The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

10. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but that the authority and influence of those who have misled and deceived the Japanese people shall be destroyed, and that the Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights of all the Japanese people, will be guaranteed.

11. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, and distinction from control of, raw materials shall be permitted.

12. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been establishment in Japan of security for all Allied interests and observance of the terms of the Cairo Declaration by Japan.

Volume One: Year of Decisions • 391
lished in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

(13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

As there was no meeting on July 26, I left early in the morning by plane for Frankfurt. General Eisenhower, Lieutenant General Wade H. Haislip, Major General Harold R. Bull, and Brigadier General Doyle O. Hickey greeted me and the members of my party at the airport in Frankfurt.

I began my inspection of the various units of the 3rd Armored Division under General Hickey’s command as we drove through Frankfurt in an open car. The various units were lined up alongside the road for a distance of approximately thirty miles.

Arriving at the town of Heppenheim, I was greeted by an honor guard from the 84th Infantry Division, known as the “Railsplitters.” This division was under Major General A. R. Bolling’s command. After the honors, the hundred-piece band of the 84th Division softly played “The Missouri Waltz” while I inspected the guard of honor. After addressing a few remarks to the guard, I entered General Eisenhower’s armored car and with General Bolling we began the long drive to the latter’s headquarters in Weinheim.

The route led through several very picturesque little German villages that seemed to be totally unscathed by the ravages of war. As a war reminder, however, there remained signs along the road that read, “Mine-swept to ditch.”

Just before noon we arrived at General Bolling’s headquarters, a beautiful château that had formerly been the home of German royalty. The house was handsomely furnished, and apparently nothing had been altered to change its original appearance. In one corner of the main room hung a red flag inscribed, “Russian 32nd Cavalry Smolensk Division Greets the 84th Railsplitter Division,” which the Soviets had presented to General Bolling when the two Allied divisions had met on the Elbe.

After luncheon at General Bolling’s headquarters, where I visited with a cousin of mine, Colonel L. W. Truman, General Bolling’s chief of staff, I resumed my inspection of the 84th Division. In the first group were about four hundred and fifty men, all from Missouri. As I walked down the line I singled out several of the men to inquire what their home towns were and to discover what mutual acquaintances we might have.

After a brief talk to the group I ended by telling them that I did not want to keep them in the hot sun any longer to listen to me, since

I was not running for office and since they couldn’t vote for me anyway.

Continuing in the armored vehicle, we drove along the road with men of the 84th Division lining both sides of the road in single file for a distance of more than seven miles. Then we left the area and returned to Frankfurt via the autobahn. The German autobahns by-pass all cities, and we were told that the Germans had no speed laws for traffic using them.

Arriving in Frankfurt, I visited General Eisenhower’s headquarters. The big yellow building composed of many wings, slightly reminiscent of the Pentagon in Washington, was noticeably unbombed amid Franklin’s general desolation. It once housed the central offices of the vast I. G. Farben industries.

Returning to the airport, I made presentation of the Distinguished Service Medal to four high-ranking officers of the United Kingdom Army and Air Forces for exceptionally meritorious service. After the presentation, the same units that had greeted me in the morning passed in review before their Commander in Chief. Our plane left immediately for Gato airport, and by 7 p.m., I was back in Babelsberg.

Captain John B. Ross, son of my press secretary, Charles Ross, and Major Alfred K. Lee, a personal friend of mine and son of former Congressman Frank Lee, were dinner guests at the Little White House that evening. Captain Ross spent several days in Babelsberg visiting with his father. Other callers included General Marshall and Ambassador Harriman.

On the same day I received the following invitation from Prime Minister Churchill in London:

“Assuming your departure would be 6th or 7th it would be very agreeable if you would come by air to Plymouth and join Augusta there. Your privacy between the airfield and the ship would be carefully protected. The King feels he would not like you to touch our shores without having an opportunity of meeting you. He would therefore be in a British cruiser in Plymouth Sound and would be very glad if you would lunch with him. He would then pay a return visit to the Augusta before she sailed. I hope these arrangements will be convenient to you.”

I replied: “I fully expect to get away from Terminal earlier than August 6th and I will give you as much advance notice as possible.

“Your permission to join the Augusta at Plymouth is accepted with appreciation. I will be very much pleased to meet with the expressed desires of His Majesty at Plymouth if my necessity for early departure for Washington meets entirely with his convenience.”

On the following day, July 27, there was again no meeting of the conference, since the British delegation had not yet returned to Babelsberg.
I worked on my nail during the forenoon and conferred during the day with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy. Joseph Davies called on me during the early evening, and that night Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, special assistant to the President, arrived from Washington and joined our party. At “Colors” I was so impressed with the quality of the bugling as the flag was lowered that I walked across the lawn to congratulate the buglers personally. That evening I also enjoyed the piano playing of Sergeant List.

On July 28 I wrote my mother and sister Mary:

Dear Mama & Mary:—Well here another week has gone, and I’m still in the Godforsaken country awaiting the return of a new British Prime Minister. I had hoped we’d be finished by now, but there are some loose ends to clean up, and we must meet again to do it . . .

I went to Frankfurt and inspected two American divisions on Thursday, the 3rd Armored and 84th Infantry Divisions.

Lewis Truman, Ralph’s boy, is the Chief of Staff and Asst. Div. Commander of the 84th. He is a nice boy and a good officer. He is a full Colonel now. I saw a lot of Missourians and a lot of good American soldiers. In most of the regiments they had the Missourians all in one place. I saw men from all over the state and talked to them.

When we were going through the 3rd Armored I made the remark that I’d seen a lot of Missourians but no South Carolinians, kidding Mr. Byrnes, who was in the car behind me. The soldier who was driving the car stood it as long as he could and finally, much to the pained surprise of the General who was riding with me, spoke up and said he was from Mr. Byrnes’ home town, Spartanburg. I stopped the caravan and brought Jim up and introduced him. The kid lived just around the corner from him.

That part of Germany where we made the inspection looks much different from Berlin and its surrounding territory. The children and the people looked well fed and seemed in better spirits.

The big towns like Frankfurt and Darmstadt were destroyed, but the small ones are intact. It is awful to see what the bombs did to the towns, railroads, and bridges. To think that millions of Russians, Poles, English and Americans were slaughtered all for the folly of one crazy egotist by the name of Hitler. I hope it won’t happen again.

There was a lieutenant in one of those Missouri artillery outfits I inspected named Hitler. He was from St. Louis. We had lunch with the 84th Division, finished the inspection and went back to Frankfurt where I pinned some four medals on 3 Englishmen and a Canadian.

It was the best day I’ve had here. Hope you are both well. I am hoping to leave here some day soon. Maybe next Tuesday or Wednesday.

Love to you both.

Harry

CHAPTER 25

On the afternoon of July 28 the heads of the British delegation returned, although Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden were no longer among them. Their party had suffered a decisive defeat in the elections, and as a result the Conservative Cabinet had resigned.

The new Prime Minister was Clement Attlee, and with him, as Foreign Minister, came Ernest Bevin. The two, accompanied by Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, called on me at the Little White House shortly after they arrived from London. The main purpose of their visit was to introduce Bevin. Secretaries Byrnes and Stimson, Admiral Leahy, and General Marshall were with me. The new Prime Minister had been present at the conference from the beginning and I had come to know him well. Attlee had a deep understanding of the world’s problems, and I knew there would be no interruption in our common efforts.

Bevin appeared to me to be a tough person to deal with, but after I became better acquainted with him I found that he was a reasonable man with a good mind and a clear head. He was anxious to do all he could for the peace of the world and to maintain friendship and understanding between Great Britain and the United States.

As Attlee and Bevin took their chairs at the round table for the tenth meeting of the conference, it was a dramatic demonstration of the stable and peaceful way in which a democracy changes its government.

Two days had passed without meetings between the heads of government, and because the new Prime Minister and his associates had arrived
so late from London, we decided to hold our first night meeting, convening at ten-fifteen at Cecilienhof.

Stalin said he wished to make an announcement before we went into the business of the meeting. He stated that the Russian delegation had received a proposal from Japan and that although the Soviet delegation had not been officially informed when the Anglo-American ultimatum was drawn up against Japan, nevertheless he wished to keep the Allies informed of an overture on the part of Japan.

The Russian interpreter then read for Stalin a communication from the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow, Saito, which was, in substance, as follows:

"On July 13 the ambassador had had the honor to submit a proposal of the Japanese Government to send Prince Konoye to Moscow. He had received the reply of the Soviet Government which did not see the possibility of giving a definite reply to the approach because the proposal of the Japanese Government had not been posted in the public press. In order to make the matter more precise, he was communicating the following: The mission of Prince Konoye was to ask the Soviet Government to take part in mediation to end the present war and to transmit the complete Japanese case in this respect. He would also be empowered to negotiate with respect to Soviet-Japanese relations during the war and after the war. Simultaneously, he wished to repeat that Prince Konoye was especially charged by His Majesty, the Emperor, to convene the Soviet Government that it was exclusively the desire of His Majesty to avoid more bloodshed by the parties engaged in the war. In view of the foregoing, he hoped that the Soviet Government would give favorable attention to his request and would give its consent to the arrival of the mission. He added that the Soviet Government was aware of the position which Prince Konoye occupied in Japan."

Stalin had told me, shortly after our arrival in Potsdam, that the Japanese had asked the Kremlin if it would be possible for Prince Konoye to come to Moscow. The Russians, so Stalin had informed me, had replied that they could not answer such a request until they knew what he wanted to talk about. It now appeared that the Japanese had sent another message, advising the Soviet government that Prince Konoye would request Russian mediation and that he was acting on behalf of the Emperor, who wanted to prevent further bloodshed in the war.

After the interpreter finished reading the Japanese message to Russia, Stalin declared that there was nothing new in it except that it was more definite than the previous approach and that it would receive a more definite answer than was the case last time. The answer would be in the negative, he said.

I thanked Marshal Stalin. Our ultimatum to the Japanese people of Japan July 26 was broadcast continuously and also had been sent through the customary neutral diplomatic channels; that is, through the intermediaries of Switzerland and Sweden. No formal reply had come from the Japanese. But on this day, July 28, when Stalin had the Japanese message read to the conference, our radio monitors reported that Radio Tokyo had reaffirmed the Japanese government's determination to fight. Our proclamation had been referred to as "unworthy of consideration," "absurd," and "presumptuous."

I then opened the meeting for business, stating that the Soviet delegation had two questions to discuss.

Attlee interjected to express regret that the "domestic occurrences" in Great Britain had interfered with the work of the conference and said that he was prepared to stay as long as necessary to complete this work.

We then went ahead with the business, the first of which involved the drafting of the agreement on the recognition of Italy and the eastern satellites, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary. The three foreign secretaries found that they could not agree among themselves on just what it was that the heads of government had agreed to. The Russians said it was one thing, the British said it was another, and Jimmy Byrnes could only report that "the United States has unfortunately found that if it agrees with the Soviet delegation, the British delegation does not agree, and if it agrees with the British, then the Soviet disagrees."

It was decided, after the British and Russian views had been restated, to pass over the question of recognition of Italy and the satellite states. I next introduced the matter of Italian reparations, pointing out that the United States had found it necessary, with the government of Great Britain, to contribute five hundred million dollars for the feeding and rehabilitation of Italy. We recognized, I added, that much more would be needed to keep Italy from starving, and I made it plain that the United States did not intend to provide money for the payment of reparations. If there were war plants that the Soviets needed, I said, we agreed that they should take them, but our contributions made to support Italy should have first claim on exports and removals.

Stalin said that it was possible to agree not to exact reparations from Austria, but the Soviet people would not understand if the same treatment was applied to Italy. Austria did not have her own armed forces, but Italy had sent her army as far as the Volga to devastate his country.

I replied that if any reparations could be obtained from Italy, I was perfectly willing but that the United States could not spend money to rehabilitate Italy just to enable her to pay reparations to other countries. Stalin replied that he understood this but that he referred to the moral
right of the Soviet Union to reparations as being based on the fact that for three and a half years its territory had been occupied and much devastation caused. In Rumania, Hungary, and Finland, he observed, the Russians had found equipment which would constitute a sum of three hundred million dollars for reparations. What sum, Stalin asked, was Italy prepared to pay in the form of equipment which might be available?

I answered that I would not even venture a guess and that, in any event, America was not interested in reparations for anybody.

Stalin said the answer could be postponed, but Bevin inquired if the Russian plan for collecting reparations from Italy was based on the assumption that the supplies furnished by the United States and Great Britain would be protected.

"I do not wish," Stalin replied, "to ignore the interests of America."

Attlee expressed his agreement with me and also his full sympathy for the Russian people in the suffering they had undergone. He reminded Stalin, however, that Britain had also suffered from attacks by Italy. The marshal, he said, could imagine the feelings of the British people if Italy had to pay reparations which actually came from Britain and America. He had no objection to military equipment being taken as reparations, but the fact was that Italy had to receive help in order to live.

Stalin replied that he would be willing to take equipment as reparations.

"Military equipment?" Bevin shot back.

"Yes," Stalin agreed, "military equipment."

Attlee asked if this would be once-and-for-all removals and not levies on war production.

"Yes," Stalin replied, "once-for-all removals."

Bevin, continuing the cross-examination, inquired if this meant military equipment having no peacetime value.

Stalin replied that military factories could be used for any purpose, and added that he had in mind the same type of equipment that was taken from Germany. Attlee said that it should be equipment having no peacetime usefulness. Stalin answered that all equipment could be adjusted for peacetime production. The Soviet Union was adjusting theirs now, he continued, since all such equipment was capable of peacetime uses.

Bevin observed that it was difficult to tell what the Russians would take away or to define the effect that removal of equipment might have on the economic life of a nation. Stalin admitted the difficulty, but he said he wanted only a decision recognizing the principle. The sum of reparations asked by Russia, he went on, could be reduced.

I said that I thought we were not far apart on the principle. What I wanted to protect, I insisted, was the help we were giving to Italy, and I added that I did not intend that help to be drained away for reparations to Russia.

Stalin expressed his agreement and assured me that the Russians "do not want to touch the advances the United States was making to Italy."

Bevin inquired if it were not then a question of priorities. The first priority, he suggested, should be given to what Great Britain and the United States had supplied to Italy, and the second claim would be reparations. Stalin said he wanted to give no bonus to aggressors without their paying at least a small part of the damage they had caused. I said I agreed with that. At five minutes past midnight the meeting was adjourned.

When I returned to the Little White House I immediately went to the Advance Map Room to look over the dispatches that had been coming in from Washington reporting the debate in the Senate on the ratification of the United Nations Charter. A message from the White House in Washington informed me, "Debate on the United Nations Charter has gone smoothly. Approximately 40 members of the Senate have spoken during the week. No difficulties have arisen. Every indication now that the Senate will vote on the Charter this afternoon and adjourn tonight. Hiram Johnson is in the hospital. Wheeler and La Follette have already stated publicly that they will vote for the Charter, and from present indications both Shipstead and Langer will also vote for the Charter. At the opening of this morning's session, McKellar read the President's message relative to the matter of forces being authorized under a joint resolution rather than a treaty. This has had a favorable affect."

"Will wire you again immediately after vote has been taken."

On July 27, the day before, I had sent a message to the president pro tempore of the Senate, Senator McKellar, to help dispel a doubt about the mutual-defense provisions of the Charter. The White House reported that this letter had helped solidify Senate support for the treaty.

A message had gone from the Advance Map Room to Washington saying, "President, Secretary of State and all the staff are eagerly awaiting your flash on the Charter. They wish to be notified regardless of the hour. There is a Big Three meeting late tonight and the hope is that the President can inform Stalin and Attlee at that meeting."

Before I turned in for the night a flash came to me from Stettinius, announcing: "Senate has just ratified the United Nations Charter 89 to 2. Senators Langer and Shipstead voted against ratification."

With this announcement that the United States Senate had supported me in my pledge of full cooperation with the peace-loving nations of the world within the framework of the United Nations, I immediately wrote
out the following statement for the press, to be released simultaneously in Berlin and Washington:

"It is deeply gratifying that the Senate has ratified the United Nations Charter by virtually unanimous vote. The action of the Senate substantially advances the cause of world peace."

The next day, July 29, was my second Sunday in Germany, and I again attended Protestant services at the Colosseum. When I returned to my quarters at Babelsberg I found Mr. Molotov and his interpreter, Mr. Calounsky, waiting to see me. Molotov came to inform me that Premier Stalin had caught a cold and that his doctors had ordered him not to leave his residence. For that reason, Molotov said, the Premier would not be able to attend a meeting of the conference today.

Molotov then told me that he wanted to discuss some of the issues that should come up at the next meeting of the conference. I agreed to his request and sent for Secretary Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, and Chip Bohlen, my interpreter. Our meeting lasted about an hour. Molotov began by saying that he would like to go over the problems that were proving difficult in the conference discussions. Secretary Byrnes pointed out that there were two principal questions which, in his opinion, remained outstanding and that if a decision could be reached on these it would be possible to consider winding up the Big Three conference. These were: the Polish western boundary and German reparations.

Secretary Byrnes then handed Molotov a copy of the United States proposal for fixing the western boundary of Poland, which read in part as follows:

"The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territory east of a line running from the Baltic Sea through Swinemunde, to west of Stettin to the Oder and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the eastern Neisse River and along the eastern Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany."

Molotov objected, saying that under the proposal the area between the Eastern and Western Neisse would not be included under Polish administration, and stated that Marshal Stalin probably would not approve it for that reason.

I said that I thought this proposal would be agreeable to the Soviet delegation, since in my opinion it represented a very large concession on our part, and that I hoped Mr. Molotov would submit it to Marshal Stalin. He replied that he would, of course, do so.

We then turned to a discussion of reparations from Germany. Molotov wanted to know what amount of equipment would be turned over from the Ruhr. He said he was prepared to demand a fixed sum, such as two billion dollars, from the Ruhr or five or six million tons of equipment. Secretary Byrnes said that our experts felt it was impossible to put any specific dollar value or tonnage on the equipment which would be available but that our proposal was to offer the Soviet Union twenty-five per cent of the total equipment considered available from the Ruhr.

Molotov said that twenty-five per cent of an undefined figure meant very little and added that the Soviet delegation wished to have a fixed sum or quantity agreed upon. Byrnes replied that at Yalta the Russians had suggested a total of twenty billion dollars for reparations from Germany, of which ten billion would go to the Soviet Union. These figures, he pointed out, had no relation to reality and offered a very good illustration of the danger of attempting to fix sums prematurely. He added that if we were to do that now, in the absence of sufficient data, the Soviet government might charge six months from now, if the figure turned out to be incorrect, that we were going back on the agreement reached at the Potsdam conference.

At this point I made it clear to Molotov that what we were trying to do was to arrive at a workable plan for reparations and that I would be inclined to have the Soviet Union receive fifty per cent of the total.

There was also some discussion on the division of the German merchant and naval fleets, and I expressed my opinion that we had already reached agreement that Russia was to get one third of the Navy now and that the merchant fleet was to be utilized in the war against Japan, with one third earmarked for the Soviet Union.

Molotov said he wished to take up one final matter with us in behalf of Premier Stalin, and that was the immediate cause of the Soviet entry into the Japanese war. He said that the Soviet government considered that the best method would be for the United States, England, and the other allies in the Far Eastern war to address a formal request to the Soviet government for its entry into the war. He said that this could be based on the refusal of the Japanese to accept the recent ultimatum to surrender and could be made on the basis of shortening the war and saving lives. Molotov said that of course the Soviet government was assuming that the agreement with the Chinese would be signed before the Soviet Union entered the war.

The proposal came as a surprise to me. I told Molotov that I would...
have to give the Soviet suggestion careful examination. The Russian commissar then left to report our discussion to Marshal Stalin.

We informed the British of the talk when Prime Minister Attlee, Mr. Bevin, and Sir Alexander Cadogan called at the Little White House later that day to confer with me and Secretary Byrnes.

On the following day, July 30, there was again no meeting of the heads of state, because Stalin was still indisposed. I spent most of the day on military matters in conference with Secretary Forrestal, General Eisenhower, Admiral Cooke, Admiral Cochrane, General Clay, Commodore Schade, and Captain E. B. Taylor. I took time to sign papers and to go over messages and mail from Washington—and to write to my mother and sister:

Dear Mams & Mary—The conference has been prolonged by the English elections and by the illness of Stalin. Mr. Stalin has been unable to leave his house for a couple of days. I really think he’s not so sick but disappointed over the English elections. I think we’ll be able to get along all right though.

Attlee has been here with Churchill all the time, and he has been Deputy Prime Minister in Churchill’s cabinet, so we ought to be able to proceed all right. We’ve had one meeting since the English came back and will have one today. If we can get a couple of major agreements over tomorrow and a few minor ones the next day, we can probably leave here Thursday or Friday, and I ought to be back in Washington by Thursday or Friday, Aug. 9th or 10th. Let’s hope so anyway. You never saw such pig-headed people as are the Russians. I hope I never have to hold another conference with them—but, of course, I will.

If we get done Thursday we’ll fly to Plymouth in England and leave from there. That will save two days on the ocean because it takes so long to get out of the English Channel when we leave from Antwerp.

I will have to lunch with the English King aboard a British cruiser, and then he’ll have to return the call to my ship, and then we’ll sail for home. I’d rather fly just as Harry did. I could be home a week sooner. But they all yell their heads off when I talk of flying.

I surely hope you are both well. Will keep you informed.

Love to you both.

Harry

From the time Stalin suggested, through Molotov, on July 29 that the United States, along with the other allies, address a formal request to the Soviet government for its entry into the war against Japan, I had been giving the matter careful thought. I had conferred with Prime Minister Attlee and with my advisers at length on the Russian proposal.

I did not like this proposal for one important reason. I saw in it a cynical diplomatic move to make Russia’s entry at this time appear to be the decisive factor to bring about victory. At Yalta, Russia had agreed, and here at Potsdam she reaffirmed her commitment, to enter the war against Japan three months after V-E Day, provided that Russia and China had previously concluded a treaty of mutual assistance. There were no other conditions, and certainly none obliging the United States and the Allies to provide Russia with a reason for breaking with Japan. Our military advisers had strongly urged that Russia be brought into the war in order to neutralize the large Japanese forces on the China mainland and thus save thousands of American and Allied lives. But I was not willing to let Russia reap the fruits of a long and bitter and gallant effort in which she had had no part.

After further consultation with the military and our British ally there was no question that Russia was bound to enter the war under the obligations the Soviet Union had undertaken at Moscow in October 1943 and recently under the Charter of the United Nations. With these facts and conditions in mind, I was now prepared to address a letter to Stalin. On July 31 I wrote Stalin as follows:

In response to your suggestion that I write you a letter as to the Far Eastern situation, I am attaching a form letter which I propose to send you at your convenience after you notify me you have reached an agreement with the Government of China. If this is satisfactory to you, you can let me know immediately when you have reached such agreement, and I will wire you the letter, to be used as you see fit. I will also send you by fastest courier the official letter signed by me. If you decide to use it, it will be all right. However, if you decide to issue a statement basing your action on other grounds or for any other reason prefer not to use this letter, it will be satisfactory to me. I leave it to your good judgment.

Harry S. Truman

The form letter read as follows:

Dear Generalissimo Stalin:

Paragraph 5 of the Declaration signed at Moscow October 30, 1943, by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and China, provides:

"5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations."

Article 106 of the proposed Charter of the United Nations provides:

"Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security."

Volume One: Year of Decisions
Article 103 of the Charter provides:

"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."

Though the Charter has not been formally ratified, at San Francisco it was agreed to by the Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Soviet government will be one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

It seems to me that under the terms of the Moscow Declaration and the provisions of the Charter, above referred to, it would be proper for the Soviet Union to indicate its willingness to consult and cooperate with other great powers now at war with Japan with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations to maintain peace and security.

Sincerely yours,

The Potsdam conference was now drawing to a close. The eleventh meeting was held on July 31, and on August 1, which turned out to be the last day of the conference, we held two sessions. We were now trying to get agreement on questions on which there had been sharp differences of opinion.

Our delegation sponsored a proposal to combine three of the major issues: reparations, Poland's western frontier, and satellite membership in the United Nations.

Stalin at once protested, saying that these questions were not connected and dealt with different subjects. Secretary of State Byrnes said that of course they were different subjects, but they had been before the conference for weeks without agreement having been reached. They were now being linked together because, he said, the American delegation was no longer willing to consider the one without the others in order to speed action on all three.

Stalin said the most debatable question was that of reparations from Germany. He said he was ready to accept the American position that no definite figure be set for reparations and that each country exact reparations from its own zone. Stalin also agreed that a determination was to be made within six months as to the share of equipment Russia was to get from the western zones. But Stalin and Molotov were persistently difficult about fixing the exact percentage of the reparations the Russians would get from the British, French, and American zones. Since most of the reparations would come from the Ruhr area, which lay within the British zone of occupation, Bevin fought to reduce the Russian percentages. He eventually yielded to Stalin's figure of fifteen and ten per cent. The fifteen per cent would apply to commodities in exchange from Russia, and the ten per cent would constitute outright reparations. We had previously agreed to that figure. Bevin said that the percentage the Soviets were asking, plus reparations from their own zone, would give them more than fifty per cent. Stalin insisted that it was less than fifty per cent. With the formula finally agreed upon, I appointed a committee composed of two representatives from each of the three governments to draw up a text.

I announced that the next question on the agenda was the second of the three proposals submitted in the United States paper—that of the western frontier of Poland. Byrnes read the United States proposal, which provided that the Poles were to have provisional administration of the area bounded by the Oder and the Western Neisse.

Bevin stated that his instructions were to hold out for the Eastern Neisse. He wanted to know if the zone would be handed over to the Poles entirely and if Soviet troops would be completely withdrawn. Bevin added that, according to the United States proposal, the territory would be under the Polish state and not part of the Soviet zone of occupation or responsibility.

I interrupted to say that cession of territory was subject to the peace treaty and that the American plan concerned only the temporary administration of this area. Bevin said it was his understanding then that the area would still technically remain under Allied military control. Otherwise, he said, we would be transferring territory before the peace conference. If it were a question of outright transfer, he said, he would first have to get the approval of the French. Stalin replied that this concerned the Russian zone and that the French had nothing to do with it.

Bevin asked if the British could give away pieces of their zone without approval from the other governments. Stalin replied that in the case of Poland it could be done, because we were dealing with a state which had no western border. This was the only such situation in the world, he asserted.

Bevin pointed out that the authority of the Control Council was to extend over the whole of Germany with its 1937 boundaries. He questioned whether any transfer could be made without consulting the Control Council.

Byrnes stated that we all understood that the cession of territory was left to the peace conference. Here was a situation, he said, where Poland was administering with Soviet consent a good part of this territory. Under the United States proposal, he explained, the three powers would agree to the administration in the interim by Poland in order that there would be no further dispute between them in regard to the administration of the area by the Polish provisional government. He added that it was not necessary that the Poles have a representative on the Control Council.

After another exchange of views I declared that we were all agreed on
the matter with his government and was willing that it should be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. This was agreed upon.

The twelfth meeting of the Potsdam conference convened at four o’clock in the afternoon on August 1, my last day at Potsdam. Byrnes said the foreign ministers had not been able to complete the draft on reparations because there was no agreement by the Big Three on Russia’s claim to German gold and foreign assets.

Stalin declared that an agreement might be possible on these lines: The Russians, he proposed, would not claim the gold which their allies had found in Germany. But with regard to shares and foreign investments, he suggested a demarcation line between the Soviet and western zones of occupation, with everything west of that line going to the Allies and everything east of that line going to the Russians.

I inquired if he meant a line running from the Baltic to the Adriatic. Stalin replied that he did, giving as an example that German investments in Rumania and Hungary would go to the Russians.

There followed a prolonged exchange between Bevin and Stalin in which the British Foreign Minister attempted to exact from the Russian Premier definitions of Russian claims to various types of German holdings in different geographical areas, but without much success.

It was finally agreed to accept the demarcation proposed by the Soviet delegation for the determination of reparations from German assets. Stalin said that he thought this decision should be put in the protocol but not published. I objected at once. I could see no reason for this secrecy, and I said so. Stalin thereupon withdrew his suggestion.

We were not misled by Stalin’s concessions on minor and sometimes only procedural points. When pressed on basic issues, he would resort to diversionary tactics, and on one occasion he said, “What can I do if I am not ready to make a decision?”

I then called on Secretary Byrnes to report on the question regarding war criminals. Byrnes said the draft was ready except for the listing of specific names, and he suggested that the listing be left to the prosecutor. Stalin insisted that names were necessary. If we were going to try industrialists, he said, the people should know. He said that was why the Russians had included the name of Krupp. I then called on Secretary Byrnes to report on the question regarding war criminals. Byrnes said the draft was ready except for the listing of specific names, and he suggested that the listing be left to the prosecutor. Stalin insisted that names were necessary. If we were going to try industrialists, he said, the people should know. He said that was why the Russians had included the name of Krupp. I remarked that I did not like any of the Nazi war criminals and that by naming some of them we might lead the others to think they would escape.

Stalin said that they were mentioned only as examples and that public opinion was interested in this matter. People were wondering why Hess was living so comfortably in England, he said. Attlee said, “You need not worry about that.” Stalin replied that what was important was the opinion of the people in the occupied countries. Bevin said that if there was any doubt about Hess he could give an undertaking that Hess would be handed over, and he added that the British would also send along a bill for his keep.

Stalin said he wanted advance delivery. Attlee replied that he had already received advance delivery on some of them. He had Goebbels, he observed. Stalin said he personally needed no undertaking. He was anxious to satisfy public opinion.

I stated that, as Marshal Stalin knew, the United States had appointed one of its most able jurists to the commission set up to deal with this
question and that Justice Jackson had advised me that it would be a handicap to him if persons were named before the commission was ready to bring them to trial, which I expected would be within thirty days. All of these people, I said, would be named in the indictment, and the marshal need not worry, for they would be tried and punished.

Stalin said he would be satisfied with just three names. Attlee suggested Hitler as one of them. Stalin replied that we did not have Hitler at our disposal but that he had no objection to naming him. Then he suggested that perhaps we could announce that within one month the first list of war criminals would be published. This was agreed upon.

We went on to examine the various points on which the conference committees had agreed, and one after another we gave them our approval. And at last only the final communiqué and protocol remained for a session that was to be held later that day. In this connection I asked that the communiqué mention my proposal for the international control of waterways, but Stalin objected, saying that there was already enough in the protocol. I pointed out, however, that the subject had been considered by the conference and that I wanted it included in the communiqué.

Stalin still objected. The question, he contended, had not been mentioned in a list of questions submitted before the conference, and the Russians were not in a position to discuss it. We should not be in a hurry to dispose of the matter. I said that I had not asked that it be disposed of but that it be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. This had been done, and I now asked that this be stated in the communiqué.

Stalin pointed out that there was nothing in the communiqué in regard to the Black Sea straits. The question of inland waterways was raised in connection with the question of the Black Sea straits, he observed, and he wanted to know why it should be given preference. In reply, I reminded him that the question concerned the frontiers of Russia and Poland, and Bevin admitted this fact, but he pointed out that the line must be recognized by the United Nations. He went on to say that the British and Americans had agreed to support this line at the peace settlement but that we had not agreed to accept a line established by the Russians and Poles.

Stalin suggested the words “immediately west of,” and the change was approved. Molotov then wished to make another change in the wording of the same document. Instead of the words “subject to examination by experts” he suggested the words “exact line on ground should be established by experts of the U.S.S.R. and Poland.”

I said that I had no objection if this applied to all questions but that I wanted to be free to mention this matter of inland waterways in any statement I might have to make before the Senate.

The afternoon meeting then adjourned.

The final meeting, the thirteenth, was scheduled to convene at nine o’clock that evening, but it was delayed until 10:40 p.m. to permit the various delegations more time to complete drafts of the two major documents growing out of the conference—the protocol and the communiqué. A protocol is a formal record of understandings reached by the parties to a conference. At the Potsdam meeting there were no secrets. I had made up my mind from the beginning that I would enter into no secret agreements, and there was none.

In this final meeting much time was taken up by changes in wording and minor amendments to the texts of both the protocol and the communiqué. For instance, Molotov suggested an amendment to the text concerning the western frontier of Poland. In the paragraph which stated that the line ran from the Baltic Sea through Swinemünde, he suggested the substitution of the words “west of” instead of “through.”

“How far west?” I asked.

Stalin suggested the words “immediately west of,” and the change was approved. Molotov then wished to make another change in the wording of the same document. Instead of the words “subject to examination by experts” he suggested the words “exact line on ground should be established by experts of the U.S.S.R. and Poland.”

Bevin stated that this was asking too much. The British could not cut themselves out of this, he added. Stalin observed that the question concerned the frontiers of Russia and Poland, and Bevin admitted this fact, but he pointed out that the line must be recognized by the United Nations. He went on to say that the British and Americans had agreed to support this line at the peace settlement but that we had not agreed to accept a line established by the Russians and Poles.

Stalin pointed out that the conditions for establishing the boundary were given in the document, and all that remained was to establish the exact frontier. This would mean only a variation of a kilometer or so, he remarked, “including a village here or there.”

Attlee argued that the amendment proposed by Molotov would antici-
pate the work of the peace conference. He wished to have a commission of experts appointed by the peace conference to lay out the frontier between Poland and Russia.

Stalin replied that he just could not understand this attitude. He asked who it was the British thought should be on the commission of experts—British, Americans, or Australians? He agreed, however, to let the old wording stand, and the Russian proposal was dropped.

Prolonged and petty bickering continued on the final wording of the protocol. I was getting very impatient, as I had many times before in these sessions, with all the repetition and beating around the bush, but I restrained myself because I saw that we were very slowly making progress in the right direction. I did not see why they could not come right to the point and get it over with instead of doing so much talking.

At last the protocol was agreed to by the heads of the three governments, and the remaining business of this final session was the communiqué. Here, however, Stalin took the position that, after listing the big decisions, the small ones would spoil the communiqué. He said we need not keep our decisions secret, but he just did not want the minor decisions in the communiqué.

Bevin inquired if he could speak of these decisions in the House of Commons. "Of course," Stalin replied.

A number of minor verbal suggestions were made—mostly by Bevin—and discussed. At one point, when Bevin criticized the English phraseology of the communiqué, Stalin said that whatever English was acceptable to the Americans was acceptable to the Russians.

The draft of the communiqué was finally approved, but now the Soviet delegation raised the question of who should sign first. At the previous two conferences of the Big Three, they pointed out, the Prime Minister or the President had been first to sign the communiqué. According to the procedure of rotation, Stalin said he felt that his signature should come first on the Potsdam document.

"You can sign any time you want to," I said. "I don't care who signs first."

Attlee remarked that he was in favor of alphabetical preference.

"That way," he said jokingly, "I would score over Marshal Zhukov."

Release time for the communiqué was agreed for 9:30 G.M.T. the following day, August 2. This was 5:30 P.M. Washington time. It would, of course, be released simultaneously in London and Moscow.

I then stated that there was no further business and that the conference was now ready to adjourn. I expressed the hope that our next meeting together might be in Washington.

Someone said, "God willing." It was Stalin.

It was three o'clock in the morning when the Potsdam conference formally adjourned. The delegates from the three nations spent some time in saying good-bys, and at 4 A.M. I left Cecilienhof with my party and returned to the Little White House. Shortly thereafter I left Babelsberg for the airport at Gatow on the first leg of my journey home.

The Potsdam conference had kept me away from the United States for nearly a month, and I was anxious to get back to Washington to report to the American people. As I left for home I felt that we had achieved several important agreements. But more important were some of the conclusions I had reached in my own mind and a realization of what I had to do in shaping future foreign policy.

En route home I wrote a report to the people to be given by radio on my return. In this statement I summarized the principal achievements of the conference. Among these was the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers as a consultative body of the five principal governments.

Another important agreement was the adoption of the formula for reparations. We were not making the mistake again of exacting reparations and then lending the money to pay for them. We intended to make it possible for Germany to develop into a decent nation and to take her place in the civilized world.

We had agreed on a compromise on the frontiers of Poland, which was the best we were able to get, but we had accepted it only subject to a final determination by the peace conference.

There were many reasons for my going to Potsdam, but the most urgent, to my mind, was to get from Stalin a personal reaffirmation of Russia's entry into the war against Japan, a matter which our military chiefs were most anxious to clinch. This I was able to get from Stalin in the very first days of the conference. We were at war, and all military arrangements had to be kept secret, and for this reason it was omitted from the official communiqué at the end of the conference. This was the only secret agreement made at Potsdam.

But the personal meeting with Stalin and the Russians had more significance for me, because it enabled me to see at first hand what we and the West had to face in the future.

At Potsdam the Russians had pledged their signature on a document that promised co-operation and peaceful development in Europe. I had already seen that the Russians were relentless bargainers, forever pressing for every advantage for themselves. It did not seem possible that only a few miles from the war-shattered seat of Nazi power the head of any government would not bend every effort to attain a real peace. Yet I was not altogether disillusioned to find now that the Russians were not in
eager about peace. It was clear that the Russian foreign policy was based on the conclusion that we were heading for a major depression, and they were already planning to take advantage of our setback.

Anxious as we were to have Russia in the war against Japan, the experience at Potsdam now made me determined that I would not allow the Russians any part in the control of Japan. Our experience with them in Germany and in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Poland was such that I decided to take no chances in a joint setup with the Russians. As I reflected on the situation during my trip home, I made up my mind that General MacArthur would be given complete command and control after victory in Japan. We were not going to be disturbed by Russian tactics in the Pacific.

Force is the only thing the Russians understand. And while I was hopeful that Russia might someday be persuaded to work in co-operation for peace, I knew that the Russians should not be allowed to get into any control of Japan.

The persistent way in which Stalin blocked one of the war-preventative measures I had proposed showed how his mind worked and what he was after. I had proposed the internationalization of all the principal waterways. Stalin did not want this. What Stalin wanted was control of the Black Sea straits and the Danube. The Russians were planning world conquest.

In a physical sense I found the conference to be exacting. Churchill and Stalin were given to late hours, while I was an early riser. This made my days extra long, and they were filled, in addition to the formal sessions, with long rounds of preparatory conferences with my advisers, with the study of documents pertaining to the meetings, and with work that was required on many state papers sent on from Washington. A President of the United States takes his office with him wherever he goes, and the number of details that require his attention never ends.

I was glad to be on my way home.

Arrangements had been made for me to fly to England, where I would board the Augusta in Plymouth Harbor and where I would have a brief meeting with King George VI. But there was considerable fog when we arrived over the southern coast of England.

Commodore Vardaman, my naval aide, had made arrangements for us to land at the airfield at St. Mawgan and had notified all the towns along the forty-mile route to Plymouth that our party would pass that way. But when we were over Harrowbeer, where the weather was fine, I asked the pilot of the Sacred Cow whether we could land at this airport near Plymouth. He said we could, and we did. It upset the naval aide, but it saved us two hours! This also thwarted the plans of a reception committee of the United States military personnel at St. Mawgan, but it was not long before transportation was assembled and we were in a motorcade en route to the city of Plymouth. I went directly by barge to the U.S.S. Augusta, which was anchored in Plymouth Roads, and arrived on board just before noon.

Soon after I was settled in my quarters Ambassador Winant, Admiral Stark, General Lee, and Admiral McCann came aboard to pay their respects and to make a short visit. They had been waiting for me at St. Mawgan but had hurried to Plymouth when they learned of our landing at Harrowbeer.

Shortly after noon I left the Augusta with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy for the H.M.S. Renown, which was anchored nearby. King George VI had come down from London by train during the morning and was aboard the Renown, waiting to welcome me to England. The British ship accorded the customary high honors as I arrived, and I was greeted personally by the King, who extended his hand to me and said, “Welcome to my country.”

I was impressed with the King as a good man. In the course of my visit with him I found him to be well informed on all that was taking place, and he gave me the impression of a man with great common sense.

After lunching with the King, I returned to the Augusta and within a few minutes the British monarch came aboard with his royal party to return my visit. He inspected the marine guard and made a brief tour of inspection of personnel on the weather decks forward. We then retired to my quarters, where we had a very pleasant visit for about thirty minutes. The King and his party then left, accompanied by full honors, and the U.S.S. Augusta immediately got under way. While we were talking, the King had asked me to autograph White House cards for the Queen and his daughters, and he, in turn, signed a card for my daughter Margaret.

As we were leaving Plymouth Roads a message from the Renown was received by the quartermasters of the Augusta.

From the King to the President: “From the President to the King,” I replied. “My hearty thanks for your generous expressions. It has been a delightful experience to visit you and your country. I am sure that our two nations will cooperate in peace as they are now cooperating so effectively in war.”
The historic message of the first explosion of an atomic bomb was flashed to me in a message from Secretary of War Stimson on the morning of July 16. The most secret and the most daring enterprise of the war had succeeded. We were now in possession of a weapon that would not only revolutionize war but could alter the course of history and civilization. This news reached me at Potsdam the day after I had arrived for the conference of the Big Three.

Preparations were being rushed for the test atomic explosion at Alamogordo, New Mexico, at the time I had to leave for Europe, and on the voyage over I had been anxiously awaiting word on the results. I had been told of many predictions by the scientists, but no one was certain of the outcome of this full-scale atomic explosion. As I read the message from Stimson, I realized that the test not only met the most optimistic expectations of the scientists but that the United States had in its possession an explosive force of unparalleled power.

Stimson flew to Potsdam the next day to see me and brought with him the full details of the test. I received him at once and called in Secretary of State Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, General Arnold, and Admiral King to join us at my office at the Little White House. We reviewed our military strategy in the light of this revolutionary development. We were not ready to make use of this weapon against the Japanese, although we did not know as yet what effect the new weapon might have, physically or psychologically, when used against the enemy. For that reason the military advised that we go ahead with the existing military plans for the invasion of the Japanese home islands.